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Abstract
This study investigates the technical and institutional 
feasibility of a system that ensures better essentiality 
scrutiny for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). 
We first studied the state of the art on essentiality 
assessment in literature, court cases involving larger 
scale essentiality assessments, essentiality assessment 
in patent pools, and the Japanese Hantei for Essentiality 
advisory opinion. A patent landscape analysis of SDO 
declared patents was performed to assess their use as 
input to essentiality assessment mechanisms. Technical 
feasibility was assessed in a pilot experiment, in which 
a variety of assessors evaluated patents for their actual 
essentiality. Institutional feasibility was, among other 
means, assessed via a stakeholder workshop.
Given (1) the observed interest in transparent data on 
essentiality of patents for standards, from implementers, 
patent owners and courts alike, (2) the potential benefits of 
such data for these parties and for the system as a whole, 
and (3) our finding that a system for generating such data 
seems both technically and institutionally feasible, we 
recommend policy makers to pursue the development and 
implementation of a system for essentiality assessments. 
Foreword
This report has been managed by the Digital Economy 
Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(JRC). The report was developed under the framework of 
the 2017 Communication of the European Commission 
‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential 
Patents’ (COM(2017) 712 final). This research builds on the 
previous work and expertise of the European Commission 
gathered in the field of standardisation and intellectual 
property rights, namely the following reports:
• 2014 study for DG ENTR ‘Patents and Standards – 
A modern framework for IPR-based standardization’.
• 2015 JRC Science for Policy Report ‘Fair, Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing Terms; Research 
Analysis of a Controversial Concept’ EUR 27333 EN.
• 2015 JRC Science for Policy Report ‘Intellectual Prop-
erty and Innovation in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT)’ EUR 27549 EN.
• 2016 study for DG GROW ‘Transparency, Predictability, 
and Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP 
Licensing - A Report for the European Commission’.
• 2016 study for DG GROW ‘Landscaping study of stand-
ard essential patents in Europe’.
• 2017 JRC Science for Policy ‘Licensing Terms of Stand-
ard Essential Patents; A comprehensive Analysis of 
Cases’ EUR 28302 EN.
• 2019 JRC Science for Policy ‘Making the rules. The 
Governance of Standard Development Organiza-
tions and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights’ 
EUR 29655 EN.
• 2019 JRC Science for Policy ‘The Relationship Be-
tween Open Source Software and Standard Setting’. 
EUR 29867 EN.
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Executive summary
Policy context
In November 2017, the European Commission issued a 
Communication “Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents” [17]. The first topic, covered in this 
Communication is on “Increasing transparency on SEPs 
exposure”. The Commission notes that information on the 
existence, scope, and relevance of SEPs is vital for fair 
licensing negotiations and for allowing potential users of 
a standard to identify the scale of their exposure to SEPs 
and necessary licensing partners. The Communication 
discusses essentiality assessments as a means of 
increasing transparency, announcing that the Commission 
will launch a pilot project for SEPs in selected technologies 
to facilitate the introduction of an appropriate scrutiny 
mechanism [17, p. 5]. In March 2018, the Council of 
the European Union issued ‘Council conclusions on the 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’, in which they 
also address this topic [11, §15].
Benefits of essentiality assessments
Objective of this study
Depending on its design and depending on which 
transparent data on essentiality is generated, such an 
assessment mechanism (or system, as we will call it in 
this report) can have important benefits (see also Table 
15), including:
• Determining the actual SEP exposure for a given prod-
uct (including knowledge on which patent owners ac-
tually hold actual SEPs for a given product);
• Facilitating smoother and faster SEP licensing negotia-
tions, requiring fewer resources and reducing transac-
tion costs in general;
• Reducing legal tension and ‘unnecessary’ court cases, 
and increasing legal certainty;
• Enabling better assessment of reasonableness of indi-
vidual royalty rates;
• Providing data valuable in the context of infringement 
procedures, especially when dealing with unwilling li-
censees.
Such benefits are particularly relevant in a world where 
standards that require the use of patented technology are 
becoming more and more widespread, where developments 
like IoT, Industry 4.0, connected cars and much more are 
reshaping the technological landscape and ecosystems. 
Many more companies, especially SMEs, will be part 
of future license negotiations. Maintaining an opaque 
environment in an increasingly complex and diversified area 
of technological uptake appears to bear high risks.
The objective of this study is to “assess the feasibility of a 
system that ensures better essentiality scrutiny for SEPs. 
This includes both the technical feasibility, how better 
scrutiny possibly could be carried out, and institutional 
feasibility, which institutions could possibly set-up and 
implement a system of better scrutiny” [16]. 
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A combination of approaches was applied to investigate 
whether it is technically and institutionally feasible to 
introduce a system for large-scale essentiality assessment. 
In short: 
• Case studies enabled us to learn from existing 
activities where some form of essentiality assessment 
has already been carried out. We looked at case studies 
on (1) academic and commercial literature reporting 
on essentiality assessment activities, (2) court cases 
that included large-scale essentiality assessments, 
(3) patent pools, and (4) the Hantei opinion for 
Essentiality offered by the Japan patent office.
• A specific	investigation was carried out to explore 
the potential of automated systems in the con-
text of essentiality assessments, including Artificial In-
telligence (AI).
• A landscape study on potential SEPs disclosed 
at Standards Developing Organisations (SDOs) 
was performed to investigate, among other things, 
how such disclosures could be used as an input for es-
sentiality assessments. 
• A pilot experiment was conducted, in order to inves-
tigate technical feasibility. Here, 28 different persons 
spent 176 working days, performing a total of 205 SEP 
assessments (considerably more than the 30 SEP as-
sessment specified in the technical specifications for 
this project). This experiment was carried out in close 
collaboration with six European patent offices, who 
provided examiners available for the assessments, and 
also helped to refine the assessment protocol. Inter-
nal project teams also participated in this experiment 
as assessors. The close collaboration with companies 
provided invaluable information to conduct this exper-
iment, such as claim charts (which are documents that 
match specific patent claims – and their features – to 
specific parts of a standard).
• The interactive process included a stakeholder 
workshop with 23 participants, covering all relevant 
stakeholder categories (including SMEs), in particular to 
learn about the many relevant aspects of institution-
al feasibility. We also had numerous other exchang-
es with other parties to validate and complement our 
findings. 
Below, the key findings of our study are summarised. 
In Chapter 10, these key findings are discussed in more 
detail.
Methodological approach
Key findings on the concept and meaning of essentiality
1. Essentiality is a binary concept, but an essen-
tiality assessment is a complex process. Con-
ceptually speaking, a patent is either essential for a 
standard, or it is not; there is no such thing as a ‘de-
gree’ of essentiality. 
2. Essentiality can only be determined once the 
standards’	document	in	question	is	final	(often	
referred to as ‘adopted’ or ‘frozen’) and once 
the patent in question is granted. Only at that 
point in time, the precise normative elements in the 
standard, and the exact scope of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, are known. 
3. Patent	essentiality	differs	 from	patent	validi-
ty, patent enforceability, and patent value, and 
these concepts should be kept separate. Never-
theless, these concepts are all important in the context 
of licensing negotiations concerning essential patents 
and deserve attention. They are also related to each 
other and in particular cases cannot be seen in isolation. 
4. Patent	essentiality	also	differs	from	patent	in-
fringement, because infringement depends on 
the	specific	implementation	of	a	standard	in	a	
device. Whether a specific device actually infringes a 
specific actually essential patent often depends on the 
type of device: not every device category needs to in-
corporate all the normative elements of a standard. In 
addition, it may also depend on whether the patent in 
question is only essential to an optional normative fea-
ture (which may or may not have been implemented in 
the device). Finally, a device may implement (and thus 
infringe) a patented invention that is not essential. 
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5. An essentiality assessment ideally starts from 
the	definition	of	essentiality,	but	could	also	be	
designed in an alternative way, closer to pro-
cedures that patent examiners are familiar 
with. Both the pilot experiment and extensive discus-
sions with stakeholders indicate that the results are 
largely similar, even though there might be rare edge 
cases where differences emerge. 
6. Essentiality assessments should be based 
on the normative elements of the standard 
only.	 Standards	 should	 be	 drafted	 in	 such	 a	
way that it can be clearly determined which 
are the normative elements. Standards contain 
both normative elements (which may be mandatory 
or optional) as well as non-normative elements (e.g. 
recommendations, possibilities, and informative 
statements). Most SDO have rules which define how 
specific words and/or how the document structure 
signals what is normative or not. It is important that 
such rules are well respected by those that draft 
standards. 
7. Essentiality assessments should be based 
on the claims of the patent. Solely the claims 
determine the scope of the exclusive rights conferred 
by the patent. The description and drawings of the 
patent should be used to interpret the claims.
Key findings on existing essentiality assessment mechanisms (case studies)
There is a very wide range of essentiality assessments 
available. They differ considerably in design, efforts, and 
quality. The below findings on these existing mechanisms 
are on the basis of desk research. 
8. Claim charts play a key role in high-quality 
essentiality assessments. In patent pools, actual 
assessments are outsourced to independent, specialist 
third parties, who receive claim charts as input. Individ-
ual companies prepare claim charts also for their own, 
standard-based licensing programs. The availability of 
claim charts is found to have a great positive impact 
on the quality of the outcomes and the efficiency of 
essentiality assessment. Here, efficiency refers to the 
resources required to achieve that quality.
9. To date, patent pools have the most sophis-
ticated systems in place for independent es-
sentiality assessment, and there are many 
opportunities to learn from them. Pools have 
well-developed appeal processes in place. Companies 
also create claim charts for the purpose of their indi-
vidual licensing activities.
10. Differences	in	national	patent	law	do	not	pose	
substantial problems for large-scale essenti-
ality assessments. Such differences (e.g. the Doc-
trine of Equivalents or induced infringement) may 
however still technically impact the outcome of a 
small number of essentiality assessments.
11. There	are	substantial	differences	 in	essenti-
ality	rates	across	firms	and	across	technolo-
gy generations. This has been confirmed in a num-
ber of court cases. This confirms that there is merit 
in transparent information on essentiality: in licens-
ing negotiations, one cannot simply assume that all 
companies, over all technologies, have similar essen-
tiality rates. 
12. Courts use information from large-scale essen-
tiality assessments to reach their verdict, even 
though they recognise the information they 
used, usually provided by experts, is not perfect.
13. For several reasons, market parties have not made 
use of the Japanese advisory opinion for essenti-
ality, known as Hantei-E (as of 10 March 2020). 
Our conversation with JPO staff indicated that like-
ly reasons are: (1) there are several stringent admis-
sion criteria, (2) the test itself is narrowly defined, and 
(3) only one single patent is investigated, which means 
no insights are gained on essentiality at the portfolio 
level. The procedure was revised in June 2019, and the 
significant changes that were made might make the 
system more appealing to potential users. 
14. Commercial assessments studies vary consid-
erably in methodology and quality. Moreover, 
details about the methodology are often not made 
available, which makes the quality of the outcomes 
difficult to assess.
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15. None of the existing assessment mechanisms 
we looked at establishes a formal legal status 
of essentiality (unless agreed between parties in a 
private contract, e.g. in patent pools). Parties disagree-
ing on the outcome of the essentiality assessment can 
challenge the assessment in court.
16. In existing, large scale essentiality assess-
ment schemes, the resources spent for com-
mercial studies and for court cases are very 
diverse (many range from € 300 to € 1000, 
but there are outliers as high as € 9000 per 
patent). The resources spent in a patent pool 
to assess a single European patent range from 
€ 5,000 to € 10,000. Note that the procedures and 
depth of the work differ greatly between them. The as-
sessors in the above-mentioned schemes are usually 
technical engineers (both senior and supervised junior), 
patent attorneys, and patent lawyers. 
Key findings on AI-based and other automated approaches
In our study, we also looked at possibilities to use artificial 
intelligence (AI)-based and other automated approaches 
for essentiality assessments. Our findings here are based 
on extensive discussions with stakeholders. 
17. AI-based and other automated approaches for 
essentiality assessment (e.g. based on seman-
tic similarity) are promising as supportive tools. Such 
tools can facilitate human essentiality assessment, 
increase their quality and/or reduce the amount of re-
sources required.
18. For several reasons we believe automated ap-
proaches will not be able to replace human ef-
forts for full essentiality assessments in the 
short or medium term. These reasons include: 
(1) the precise meaning, interpretation and scope of 
words and terminology (both in patents and stand-
ards) cannot easily be ‘understood’ by an automated 
system, (2) semantic approaches can face difficul-
ties dealing with changes in terminology over time, 
(3) patents are written in a different vocabulary (or 
even language) than standards, (4) a technology or 
solution required to implement the standard may not 
be explicitly mentioned in the standard’s text (i.e. im-
plied by the standard), (5) an essentiality assessment 
should consider possible alternatives to the patent 
under investigation that may also satisfy the stand-
ard, (6) an AI system would require a (not yet existing) 
reference training set, with a sufficiently large number 
of verified assessment outcomes, both positive and 
negative. 
19. The use of AI-based approaches for essentiali-
ty assessment may come with new challenges, 
such as anticipation (by those that file patents or sub-
mit technical proposals for standards) and acceptance 
of such AI systems by stakeholders.
20. The introduction of a (non-automated) assess-
ment system creates the opportunity to build 
a	 large	 data	 set	 of	 verified	 assessment	 out-
comes, both positive and negative. This refer-
ence data set could then be used to develop 
and validate future AI-based system. On the 
short to medium term, this could lead to an AI system 
as supportive tool, and on the longer term, perhaps, to 
a fully automated system for essentiality assessments.
Key findings on technical feasibility
Our findings on technical feasibility are based on a pilot 
experiment with a total of 205 essentiality assessments.
21. Our	 experiment	 confirmed	 that	 essentiality	
assessments on a larger scale, where each 
assessment takes on average approximately 
7 hours, are technically feasible. We compared 
the outcomes by assessors with various backgrounds 
with the assessment outcomes of the same patents 
done by patent pools, seen here as our reference 
point. The most consistent results are achieved by 
individuals who work in a patent office as patent ex-
aminers and are provided with a claim chart. They 
achieve a consistency rate of 84% (despite spending 
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considerably less time than the pool assessors). In 
our experiments, assessors who are senior engineers 
in academia score lower than that (75% consistency 
rate, without input claim charts). (Note that even in 
an experiment where assessments were – again – 
done by the pools themselves, it is not guaranteed 
that the outcomes this time would be 100% consist-
ent to the earlier findings.)
22. We expect the performance observed will im-
prove in a future essentiality assessment sys-
tem. Firstly, performance was likely impacted nega-
tively by several choices that were necessary to meet 
the scientific requirements for the experiment design. 
Among other things, we did not allow assessors to com-
municate with the patent owner to ask for clarification, 
to consult additional (public) information sources (such 
as the patent prosecution history) or to discuss cases 
with colleague assessors. In practice, such restrictions 
can be lifted, and performance is expected to increase. 
Secondly, in an actual implementation, there are (more) 
opportunities to seek specialisation, for instance by 
allocating patents to assessors according to their key 
technological competences, and by individual speciali-
sation on specific standards or even parts of standards. 
Thirdly, there are strong reasons to expect significant 
learning effects both at the individual and group level, 
as a result of specialised training. Fourthly, the system 
could implement features that improve accuracy, such 
as allowing parties (patent owners and/or third parties) 
to challenge the outcome of the assessment. Altogeth-
er, we anticipate substantially higher consistency scores, 
even though these could not be quantified in our study.
Key findings on institutional feasibility
Our investigation on the institutional feasibility of essentiality 
assessment is based on a variety of sources, including a 
stakeholder workshop (see Section 9.1 for details). 
23. Setting up a system for essentiality assess-
ment is institutionally feasible. Doing so, a choice 
has to be made for a consistent set of design choices 
across many interrelated dimensions, which involve sev-
eral challenges and trade-offs. There are several sce-
narios that offer such a consistent set of design choices.
24. Many stakeholders express a clear interest 
in increased availability of transparent data 
on the essentiality of patents for standards. 
The interest comes from different stakeholder catego-
ries, among which implementers, patent owners, and 
courts. In addition, SDOs have expressed interest in in-
formation on actual essentiality. While actors in these 
categories sometimes have different reasons for their 
interest, there are also commonalities, like the poten-
tial for smoother and faster licensing negotiations, re-
ducing transaction costs in general, for parties that are 
in principle willing to enter into a license.
25. The above-mentioned interest is mostly ex-
pressed in relation to mobile telecommunica-
tions and wireless networking standards, but 
the future may bring a similar interest in oth-
er standards. The emergence of IoT, Industry 4.0, 
changes in vertical industries, as well as the anticipat-
ed role of standards in solutions helping to address 
Grand Societal Challenges (standards for smart grids, 
Intelligent Transport Systems, etc.) may lead to a need 
for transparent data on essentiality for other, more do-
main-specific standards. Because it is hard to predict 
for which precise standards will be of interest in the 
future, it is advisable to set up any mechanism for es-
sentiality assessments in an open manner, so it can be 
used in relation to any standard. 
26. This	study	distinguishes	five	types	of	data	re-
lating to essentiality. These are: 
i. ‘Numerator data’ is information on the actual SEPs 
portfolio of a specific patent owner for a specific 
standard. 
ii. ‘Denominator data’ is information on actual SEPs 
owned by all relevant patent owners for a specific 
standard. In combination with numerator data, it 
can indicate the size (extent) of the SEPs portfolio 
owned by a specific patent owner in relation to all 
SEPs for the standard in question. Being able to do 
so is crucial for one of the licensing principles ex-
pressed by the European Commission [17], which 
states that, in defining a FRAND value, an individual 
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SEP cannot be considered in isolation, and one 
needs to take into account a reasonable aggregate 
rate for the standard.
iii. ‘Validated summary claim charts’ are one-page 
summaries that map claims in the actual essen-
tial patents to relevant parts of specific standards 
documents, also considering device categories 
and optional normative features. Such data helps 
to understand why and how a patent is essen-
tial, and also allows one to determine whether a 
patent is indeed used by a specific product (as a 
specific product usually does not implement all the 
normative elements of a standard. This data type 
both benefits patent owners and implementers in a 
number of ways but also benefits the patent owner 
specifically in an infringement context and helping 
it to meet one of the key requirements of the Hua-
wei/ZTE legal framework.
iv. ‘Detailed assessment outcomes’ provide extensive 
information on both patents assessed to be essen-
tial and those for which essentiality was not found. 
It is especially valuable for patent owners, for in-
stance when they want to challenge the outcomes 
of an assessment, or when they need to prove pos-
sible infringement. 
v. ‘Current ownership data’ provides, as the name 
suggests, information on the current owner of the 
patent in question. Without this data, knowledge 
about essentiality of a given patent has consid-
erably less relevance, and without it, it is hard to 
create the numerator data mentioned above. 
27. A system for essentiality assessments should 
make accessible the underlying data points. 
With such detailed data, the user can create the in-
formation that is relevant for use in a specific context 
by applying relatively simple filters (which standards 
documents, which device categories, which optional 
features, etc.).
28. The availability of claim charts (made avail-
able by the patent owner) as input for an as-
sessment procedure is an important aspect of 
designing a system that combines high quality 
with	high	efficiency. This is also confirmed by our 
experiment as well as by patent pools. Equally, it is 
important to acknowledge these claim charts are usu-
ally made and provided by the patent owner with an 
interest in a positive outcome. Therefore, in any mech-
anism, assessors should be well-instructed and gain 
experience in critically reading such claim charts, and 
assessments using such charts as input should remain 
rigorous and thorough. Essentiality assessments are 
however also possible without access to claim charts. 
In that case the claims for consideration must be se-
lected by the assessor (and patents often have many 
claims). This makes the assessment more demand-
ing (but completely independent from patent owner 
involvement). As a result, the amount of required re-
sources will likely be higher, or the level of accuracy 
will likely be lower.
29. This	 study	 identifies	 nine	 scenarios	 (see Table 
1 below) for a large-scale essentiality assess-
ment	mechanism.	These	scenarios	differ	in	the	
degree they create the various data types rel-
evant for essentiality, and in their feasibility. 
A scenario is a set of consistent design choices over 
the dimensions identified in this study (see Table 14). 
Below, Table 1 shows the degree by which these sce-
narios generate transparent data on essentiality, and 
the degree to which their implementation is feasible.
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30. We identify the three scenarios that are the 
most promising. These scenarios, described below, 
score at least ‘medium’ in terms of the degree to which 
transparent data on essentiality is generated.
• In Scenario B, all patents disclosed to SDOs as po-
tentially essential for a given standard are system-
atically assessed. The advantage of this scenario 
is that it satisfies many (but not all) expressed in-
terests for transparent data on essentiality, and its 
implementation is independent of parties’ willing-
ness to participate or provide input: data is created 
for the full landscape. A main downside is that it re-
quires very significant resources (in person-years). 
A lack of clear opportunities for a financing mecha-
nism might make it difficult to self-finance this sys-
tem. Finally, in this scenario the system does not 
generate information on patent ownership, which is 
also important for many uses of essentiality data.
• In Scenario D, assessments are initiated at the re-
quest of the patent owner, who then also provides 
claim charts as input to the process. The advan-
tage is that this scenario can generate rich data on 
essentiality, including ownership data and detailed 
data that may help to make patent licensing nego-
tiations smoother and faster. The involvement of 
patent owners also allows for higher quality and 
more cost-efficient assessments and is likely to 
increase acceptance in the market. Furthermore, 
it requires considerably fewer resources than the 
above scenarios and allows for a self-financing 
model in which all those that benefit contribute 
their share. Because patent owners perform a 
self-selection of potentially essential patents and 
the procedure is more cost-efficient, the overall 
needed resources are considerably lower than in 
Scenario B. A major downside is that it relies on 
voluntary participation by patent owners, and no 
data is generated for those parties who do not par-
ticipate (and therefore no comprehensive overview 
of the total essentiality landscape is created).
• Scenario F combines the key elements of the two 
scenarios above, and assessments initiated at the 
request of the patent owner are complemented 
with an assessment of patents disclosed to SDOs. 
For the latter, however, a representative sample of 
granted patents is taken instead of a systematic re-
view of each and every patent. This scenario com-
bines the key advantages of the two above scenar-
ios. Required resources are estimated to be slightly 
higher than in Scenario D. Compared to Scenario B, 
an amount of overhead would need to be added to 
the on-demand assessment, and/or (pre)financing 
for the sampling part would be required. 
 Two other scenarios (G+H) use some form of automat-
ed assessment, like Artificial Intelligence (AI). While 
promising, we think these two scenarios are not yet 
feasible in the short term but may become feasible in 
the future.
SCENARIOS
0: Status 
quo
A: Self-
assessment
B: All SDO 
disclosed 
patents
C: Sampled 
SDO disclosed 
patents
D: Voluntarily 
requested by 
patent owner
E: As D plus 
third-party 
requests
F: As D plus 
sampled 
disclosed SDO 
patent
G: AI-based 
system 
H: As D plus 
assistive AI 
system 
Degree to which 
transparent data 
on essentiality is 
generated 
[Main limitation]
Low
[No data 
at all]
Low
[No impartial 
data, diversity 
of definitions 
and tests]
Medium
[No type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Limited 
numerator 
data, type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Medium
[No denominator data. For 
non-participating firms, no 
numerator data and no 
ownership data]
Medium to 
high
[For non-
participating 
firms, less 
detailed 
numerator 
data and no 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Depends 
on public 
acceptance; 
no type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
High
[For non-
participating 
firms, no 
ownership data]
Feasibility of 
implementation
[Main challenge]
High Low 
[willingness]
Low 
[financing, 
capacity]
Medium 
[financing]
Medium to high 
 [partici pation]
Medium to 
high
 [participation, 
financing]
Not yet; 
possible in 
the (distant) 
future?
Not yet; 
possible in the 
(nearer) future?
[participation]
TABLE 1:	OVERALL	SCORES	OF	THE	SCENARIOS	ON	(A)	THE	GENERATION	OF	TRANSPARENT	DATA	ON	ESSENTIALITY	AND	(B)	IMPLEMENTATION	FEASIBILITY.
Type III data is ‘validated summary claim charts’ data; type IV data is ‘detailed assessment outcomes’ data. Dark orange indicates a low degree or a low feasibility, yellow medium, 
and green high.
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31. Many stakeholders indicated they would sup-
port a system for essentiality assessment. 
However,	only	once	final	decisions	on	system	
designs are made (and published) and the sys-
tem is operating, will we see the actual sup-
port	for	a	specific	design. To gain more support, it 
would be advisable to involve stakeholders throughout 
the different stages of setting up (e.g. setting require-
ments, defining specifications, and designing) any sys-
tem for essentiality assessment. As standardisation is 
global and involves patents at national and interna-
tional levels, it would be beneficial to open it to skilled 
assessors specialised in these different legislations, for 
gaining credibility and trust from all stakeholders. 
32. Many stakeholders embraced the principle of 
‘all	benefiters should pay’. While determining the 
allocation of costs and finding a way to collect financial 
contributions may be difficult, the voluntary partic-
ipation scenarios we discussed (D, E, F and H) offer 
good opportunities to collect contributions that are 
then shared among the benefiters, in a market-based 
mechanism. Such a system will obviously require sig-
nificant resources. However, stakeholders point out 
that such investments are still minor in light of the 
high potential value these essential patents represent, 
the considerable costs associated with acquiring and 
exploiting these legal rights, and the potential benefits 
if SEP transaction costs, tension and legal battles were 
reduced. 
33. While a transparency system has a public ben-
efit,	 it	would	also	be	beneficial	 if	the	system	
were	self-financing	 (by all benefiting stakeholders 
in the entire ecosystem). This would reflect the utility 
and value that the stakeholders see in the system. 
Recommendations
Transparent data on essentiality brings important 
benefits for all stakeholders. Based on our analysis we 
present recommendations addressed to policy makers 
in general and to the European Commission in particular 
(as commissioning body of this study), patent owners, 
implementers of standards, patent offices and patent 
organisations, patent pools, Standards Developing 
Organisations (SDOs), and, finally, to all stakeholders.
a) We recommend policy makers to pursue the 
development and implementation of a system 
for essentiality assessments. We recommend 
them to further formulate the precise requirements 
for such a system, identify the demand for a specific 
design, and assess its impact when creating a new legal 
framework, while taking into account the issues and 
risks relating to any particular approach. Because both 
the product markets and patent licenses in standards-
related markets have a predominantly global character, 
we also recommend policy makers to collaborate with 
similar institutions from other regions/countries to work 
towards an open and harmonised approach. 
b) We recommend that policy makers engage 
with all stakeholders in the above process, as 
acceptance by stakeholders is a key success 
factor. Among other things, this requires the system 
to be designed and operated in such a way that it 
earns trust. To achieve this, it is important to ensure 
high levels for reliability, thoroughness, and impartial-
ity. It is also beneficial to keep information up to date 
as appropriate.
c) When designing a system for essentiality as-
sessments,	we	recommend	to	specifically	con-
sider the three most promising scenarios we 
identify. These are: 
• A scenario where all patents disclosed to SDOs as 
potentially essential are systematically assessed 
(Scenario B in this report). The advantage of this 
scenario is that it satisfies many (but not all) ex-
pressed interests for transparent data on essenti-
ality, and its implementation is independent of the 
willingness of parties to participate or provide in-
put: data is created for the full landscape. A major 
downside is that it requires very significant resourc-
es, which might be hard to raise in a self-financing 
manner. It also does not generate information on 
patent ownership, which is important for many us-
ers of such data. Moreover, it requires that the SDO 
in question publishes all the disclosed patents’ 
identities, and this is not the case for SDOs that 
allow blanket disclosures. 
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• A scenario in which assessments are initiated at 
the request of the patent owner, who then also 
provides valuable input claim charts as input to 
the process (Scenario D). The advantage of this 
scenario is that it generates rich data on essen-
tiality, including ownership data and detailed data 
that can help to make patent licensing negotia-
tions smoother and faster, which already provides 
a benefit for patent owners to participate. The 
involvement of the current patent owners also 
allows for higher quality and more cost-efficient 
assessments and is likely to increase acceptance 
in the market. Furthermore, it requires considerably 
fewer resources than Scenario B, and allows for a 
self-financing model in which all those who benefit 
are contributing their share. A major downside is 
that it relies on voluntary participation by patent 
owners, and for those parties that choose not par-
ticipate, no data is generated (and, in case partic-
ipation is low, no comprehensive overview of the 
total essentiality landscape is created).
• A scenario that combines elements of Scenarios B 
and D, and assessments initiated at the request of 
the patent owner are complemented with an as-
sessment of patents disclosed to SDOs. For the lat-
ter part, however, a representative sample is taken 
of disclosed granted patents instead of a system-
atic review of each and all patents. This scenario 
combines the key advantages of the two above 
scenarios. 
d) We recommend that, in designing a system, to 
take into account the various business and li-
censing models of SEP owners.
e) We	recommend	to	recognise	the	specific	situ-
ation of SMEs. For SMEs that implement standards, 
it is important that transparent information on essenti-
ality is available at the product category and optional 
feature level, enabling them to determine the relevant 
SEPs for their specific products (for instance an IoT 
device that uses a the 3GPP NB-IoT protocol, which 
only implements a very specific part of the total 5G 
standard). It has to be taken into account that some 
SMEs might not be able to mobilise as much knowl-
edge or skills to interpret/process that information in a 
business context. For SMEs that are potential owners 
of SEPs, the assessment system should be designed 
in such a way that it does not create unnecessary 
obstacles to participate, and that the anticipated ben-
efits clearly outweigh the costs. 
f) We	 recommend	 to	 strive	 for	 a	 self-financing	
system for essentiality assessments, in which 
all benefitting stakeholders in the ecosystem contrib-
ute. This would reflect the utility and value that the 
stakeholders see in the system.
g) We recommend the European Commission to 
arrange for a small, supervising body to de-
sign	and	define	the	procedures,	to	oversee	the	
system, to harmonise internationally with the 
different	 regions/countries	 concerned,	 and	 to	
have overall responsibility for quality and per-
formance. Actual assessment tasks can then be out-
sourced to existing organisations, especially those that 
already have experience with similar tasks, such as 
patent offices and patent organisations, as well as law 
firms and patent attorney firms that already perform 
essentiality assessments. A certification scheme is a 
good way to ensure that these organisations perform 
the assessment in a harmonised manner and meet 
the requirements for reliability, impartiality, quality and 
performance.
h) We recommend to consider the detailed as-
sessment procedure developed in our pilot ex-
periment as input when specifying and design-
ing a system. This procedure is described in Chapter 
8. Our procedure was developed in close collaboration 
with patent offices and with input from experts. We 
furthermore recommend embracing the specific, future 
improvements we identified in our pilot experiment 
(see Section 8.3). Among other things, such improve-
ments include technical specialisation, collaboration 
between assessors and between assessors and patent 
owners, and training and learning in individual as well 
as group settings. 
i) We	 recommend	 to	 explore	 Artificial	 Intelli-
gence (AI) based approaches to support es-
sentiality assessments in the future. We rec-
ommend starting by arranging essentiality 
assessment records to be collected so they 
can be used for developing (including train-
ing and validating) AI systems for this specif-
ic task. One option is to have a future competition, 
where external parties get access to a dataset for 
training and testing purposes in order to develop AI-
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based systems. The performance of these contenders 
is then validated (using a different part of the data 
set), and the best design can be selected to play a 
complementary role (e.g. pre-screening) in the essen-
tiality assessment system.
j) We recommend that patent owners consider 
how a system for essentiality assessment can 
benefit	 them.	 In specific, we recommend them to 
consider how ‘validated summary claim charts’ (this 
is a one-page summary mentioning claim numbers 
and sections in standards documents; see Section 
9.2.1) can help them to conclude smoother and 
faster licensing negotiations with willing prospective 
licensees and enable them to act better when facing 
unwilling prospective licensees.
k) We recommend that implementers consider 
how a system for essentiality assessments can 
benefit	 them	 and	 how	 they	 can	 contribute	 to	
support or facilitate such a system. A potential 
benefit for implementers is that such a system can help 
them check if license offers by patent owners are fair 
and reasonable. A possible form of support could be an 
indication of their willingness to cooperate proactively and 
constructively when transparent, impartial information 
is available on actual essentiality resulting from the 
application of a defined and published methodology.
l) We	recommend	that	the	European	Patent	Office	
(EPO),	 national	 patent	 offices	 and/or	 patent	
organisations consider playing an active role 
in carrying out assessments in a system for 
essentiality assessments to be introduced. 
This study identified that these organisations are very 
well positioned in terms of knowledge and skills to 
perform this task, and widely trusted to be impartial 
and objective. 
m) We recommend that patent pools and their 
members investigate whether the assess-
ments they perform (and have performed) can 
serve as an input to a new system for essen-
tiality assessment and engage in discussion with 
the European Commission with the aim of evaluating 
whether a fast track procedure can be implemented. 
n) We recommend that patent pools and their 
members investigate how essentiality assess-
ments under the new assessment system can 
play a role in their own patent inclusions 
procedures. Patent pools could benefit from the 
efficiencies and effectiveness of assessments done 
under the new assessment system, if these meet 
their requirements for those assessments, possibly 
in the form of input to additional own assessments.
o) We recommend that Standards Developing 
Organisations (SDOs) implement improvements 
in	 their	 disclosure	 rules/procedures	 and	
(access to) disclosure data, while ensuring that 
such steps do not compromise the current roles these 
processes and databases have in their own processes 
and policies. Such steps would not only facilitate 
(external) essentiality assessments but also provide 
added value for their members and stakeholders 
otherwise. We recommend that SDOs specifically 
consider improvements in:
a. data specificness (e.g. data on the individual pat-
ent identity and on the specific standard, docu-
ment, document version or specific sections or 
parts within such documents), 
b. data quality (e.g. updating unharmonised records 
and orphans, and complement incomplete disclo-
sures), and 
c. keeping data up to date (e.g. by updates of disclo-
sures).
p) We recommend that all stakeholders men-
tioned above adopt a constructive and collab-
orative stance towards the potential creation 
of a system for essentiality assessments. 
While there are certainly differences between parties, 
the availability of transparent data on actual essen-
tiality in the long term will benefit all benevolent par-
ties in the market, will reduce transaction costs and 
friction. In the current practice, information is usually 
shared under NDAs, and it often takes months if not 
years to agree on them. It takes courage to move to 
a new practice, in which documents such as validated 
summary claim charts (see above) are shared with-
out NDAs, or perhaps even made public. Yet, such a 
change is likely to eventually offer great benefits to 
both patent owners and (willing) licensees. Maintain-
ing an opaque environment in an increasingly com-
plex and diversified area of technological uptake ap-
pears to bear high risks. Forward-looking steps will 
require parties to think in terms of possibilities, not 
objections. 
1  INTRODUCTION
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1.1 | Context of the study
Both, the standardisation system and the intellectual 
property system are of key importance for our increasingly 
technological society. Both systems aim to promote 
innovation and contribute to general welfare. They bring 
about technological solutions that are important in our 
daily lives, and there is a strong expectation that new 
technological solutions can help us to address grand 
societal challenges in the fields of energy, transport 
and mobility, environment and sustainability, health and 
wellbeing, and a secure society.1
At the same time, there is tension between the standardi-
sation system and the intellectual property system. While 
they serve common goals, the standardisation system is 
based on inclusiveness (so that any party, without un-
due barrier, can implement technical standards), where-
as the intellectual property system is one that provides 
parties with rights to exclude others from using specific 
innovations.
Many standards setting organisations addressed 
potential problems that can result from this tension by 
adopting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policies. A very 
common policy found in the major Standards Developing 
Organisations (SDOs) is one in which members (or 
other participating in the standard-setting process) are 
(1) obliged to notify (‘disclose’ or ‘declare’2) the SDO of their 
belief that they own patents3 that may be or may become 
necessary to implement standards developed by that 
SDO (i.e. an obligation to ‘disclose’ patents are potentially 
‘essential’4) and (2) requested to undertake a commitment 
to license such patents under Fair, Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions should these 
patents actually become essential.5 If a patent owner 
decides not to enter into such a commitment, the SDO will 
ensure that the standard they develop does not require 
the patented invention in question. By having such policies, 
SDOs reduce the risk that investment in the preparation, 
adoption and application of standards could be wasted 
as a result of an essential patent for that standard being 
unavailable. 
The above declarations are usually made public by the SDO, 
and their numbers have been growing over time. At the time 
of writing, the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) alone published 297,557 disclosed patents, 
belonging to approximately 25,000 patent families. It 
is important, however, that these are patents that were 
believed to ‘may be or may become’ essential for a standard, 
and do not tell us about whether they are actually essential. 
A party may, for instance, have submitted a technical 
proposal and (properly) disclosed patents related to this 
proposal at that time, but the eventual standard may not 
include the technology in the proposal. Or a party may have 
made a declaration on the basis of a patent application (as 
most SDO policies indeed require), but the eventual granted 
patent does not include the claim any more that would be 
required to implement the standard. Such cases are not 
rare, and it is believed that many disclosed patents, if not 
the majority, is actually not essential. 6 
That patents that once were disclosed are not actually 
essential does not hamper the working of the SDO IPR 
policies in any way. Their goal of preventing to develop 
Introduction1
  1 These challenges are among the main focus of the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, which reflects the policy priorities of the 
Europe 2020 strategy and addresses major concerns shared by citizens in Europe and elsewhere (European Commission, 2020).
  2 SDOs differ in the terminology they use here, and some SDOs use both terms (sometimes with slightly different meanings; for instance, a ‘declara-
tion’ may be a document where a party ‘discloses’ one or more patents and also enters into a licensing commitment). For reasons of consistency, 
we will only use the term ‘disclosure’ in this report.
  3 While such policies often cover any form of IPR, in the scope of this report we will specifically focus on patents.
  4 Further on in this report, we discuss more specific definitions of essentiality.
  5 In this report, when we talk about essential patents, we in principle refer to patents that actually essential (sometimes referred to by others as 
‘factually essential’), unless we specifically mention ‘potentially essential’, ‘alleged essential’, etc.
  6 See also Chapter 3, that discusses court cases. While the data from such court cases night not be perfect, they do provide us with an order of 
magnitude.
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standards for which essential patent are unavailable, 
is still met. Yet, it does mean that this list of disclosed 
patents cannot be regarded as a total overview of actually 
essential patents. This makes this database not well fit 
to be used, for instance, for licensing purposes (there are 
other reasons for this as well; for instance, a declarations 
database does not inform us about the current owner of 
a patent). 
In November 2017, the European Commission issued a 
Communication “Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents’, often referred to by its number, 
COM(2017)712 Final [17]. This communication covers 
four main topics, of which the first is titled ‘Increasing 
transparency on SEPs exposure’.7 The Commission notes 
that information on the existence, scope and relevance 
of Standard Essential Patents (SEP) is vital for fair 
licensing negotiations and for allowing potential users of 
a standard to identify the scale of their exposure to SEPs 
and necessary licensing partners. The Communication 
discusses essentiality assessments as one way to increase 
transparency, and introduced this as follows: 
 “Evidence points to the risk of broad over-declarations 
and makes a strong case for more reliability with 
respect to SEP essentiality. Stakeholders report that 
recorded declarations create a de facto presumption 
of essentiality in negotiations with licensees. This 
scenario places a high burden on any willing licensee, 
especially SMEs and start-ups, to check the essentiality 
of a large number of SEPs in licensing negotiations. 
There is therefore a need for a higher degree of 
scrutiny on essentiality claims. This would require 
scrutiny being performed by an independent party 
with technical capabilities and market recognition, at 
the right point in time. Having said this, introducing 
such a scrutiny requirement to SEPs must be balanced 
against the cost. However, an incremental approach, 
whereby scrutiny takes place at the request of either 
rightsholders or prospective users, calibrating the 
depth of scrutiny and limiting checks to one patent 
within a family and to samples, could ensure the 
right cost-benefit balance of this measure.” [17, p. 5] 
(footnotes omitted). 
In the Communication, the Commission furthermore 
“considers that declared SEPs should be subject to reliable 
scrutiny of their essentiality for a standard, and will launch 
a pilot project for SEPs in selected technologies with a 
view to facilitating the introduction of an appropriate 
scrutiny mechanism” [17, p. 5].
In March 2018, the Council of the European Union issued 
‘Council conclusions on the enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights’, in which they also address this topic [11, 
§15]. Here, the Council “emphasises the importance of 
more transparency related to the essentiality of patents 
and invites the Commission, together with relevant 
stakeholders – including, where applicable, Intellectual 
Property Offices – to develop a system that ensures better 
scrutiny.”
  7 The other three topics are “General principles for FRAND licensing terms for SEPs”, “a predictable enforcement environment for SEPs” and “open 
source and standards”, respectively.
1.2 | Objective of this study
The objective of this study is to “assess the feasibility 
of a system that ensures better essentiality 
scrutiny for SEPs. This includes both the technical 
feasibility, how better scrutiny possibly could be 
carried out and institutional feasibility, which 
institutions could possibly set-up and implement 
a system of better scrutiny” [16]. Among other 
things, the call for tenders specified that a sample of at 
least 30 SEPs had to be assessed (we eventually carried 
out 205 assessments), a SEP landscaping analysis had to 
be carried out, and case studies to be executed on court 
cases, the Japanese Hantei-E model, and at least 3 patent 
pools. 
While the above aim is short, it is a challenging one. In 
order to answer it, we deployed and combined a number 
of different research approaches (see below), both 
considering existing knowledge and experiences as well as 
carrying out experiments to create insights that do not yet 
exist.
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It is also important to note that in-depth mechanisms that 
would generate data on patent validity, on other aspects 
of patent enforceability (such as non-expiration, renewal 
fees paid, formal requirements being met, etc.), or on the 
technical merit or economic value of patents, are outside 
the scope of this study. Yet, we do discuss such aspects 
when they relate to specific aspects of essentiality 
assessments.
1.3 | Methodology
In this study, various methods were employed to answer the 
research questions. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview 
of how the full study was set up. The arrows represent 
the (dominant) knowledge flows and dependencies 
between tasks. 
Test design 
phase
Experiment 
phase
Reporting & 
review
4a. Case study on 
patent pools
4c. Hantei case 
study
4d. Execution of
external essentiality
tests
1. Lit. review
5. Stakeholder 
workshop
2. Landscaping and quality
analysis
3. Legal cases
4c. Execution of
internales sentiality
tests
FIGURE 1:	SCHEMATIC	OVERVIEW	OF	THE	STUDY.
In the initial, exploratory phase of the study, the literature 
review provided an overview of the academic, commercial 
and institutional reports on essentiality assessment 
mechanisms. A landscaping analysis and a quality analysis 
were performed simultaneously to gain insight into the 
relevance of essentiality assessment mechanisms.
We then investigated current implementations of 
essentiality assessment through three case studies:
• A legal case study analysing various court cases in 
which essentiality evaluation was carried out.
• In an analysis of patent pools, we describe and com-
pare the mechanisms put in place by patent pools to 
determine the essentiality of patents before entering 
the patent pool.
• An analysis and evaluation of the Japanese Hantei ad-
visory system.
From the knowledge gathered thus far, an experiment 
was performed in order to test the technical feasibility 
of essentiality assessment as well as the necessary 
parameters: what experience and training levels are 
required, are there learning effects for evaluators, etc. 
The experiment was carried out by a team consisting of 
researchers (with participants from various backgrounds, 
ranging from patent attorneys to senior engineers), as well 
as teams of patent examiners at European patent offices.
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For both the landscape analysis and the experiment, we 
focused on ETSI standards. One reason for that is that 
the declarations database of ETSI is the best database 
of its kind. The fact that we focussed on ETSI standards 
in the landscape analysis and the experiment does not 
imply, however, that the overall scope of transparency and 
feasibility of a mechanism for essentiality assessment is 
limited to ETSI. 
The final step was to discuss the range of technically 
feasible methods and institutional feasibility through a 
workshop. 
The outcomes of all the steps are presented in this 
report, which contains policy recommendations regarding 
essentiality assessment mechanisms in Europe. 
1.4 | Structure of this report
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Chapters 
2 to 5 present the insights from the case studies, starting 
with a literature review (Chapter 2), then an overview of 
relevant legal cases (Chapter 3), an investigation of patent 
pools (Chapter 4) and an explanation of the Japanese 
Hantei for Essentiality Advisory Opinion (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 6, we summarise our landscaping exercise. 
Chapter 7 describes in detail the technical feasibility of 
essentiality assessment, based on our pilot experiment. 
Chapter 8 presents the organisational feasibility of such 
an assessment mechanism, derived from the views 
collected during the stakeholder workshop. In Chapter 9 
we integrate all the outcomes, resulting in a number of 
key findings and recommendations. The Annexes contain 
an overview of the material we consulted in our literature 
study (Annex 1), the instructions and feedback form used 
in our pilot experiment (Annex 2) and the list of stakeholder 
workshop participants (Annex 3).

2 LITERATURE REVIEW OF ESSENTIALITY 
ASSESSMENT
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To develop a method for essentiality assessment of SEPs, 
we built on and learned from earlier approaches to such 
assessments. We conducted a literature review in order 
to collate and analyse existing publications reporting on 
essentiality assessments performed by various parties. We 
focussed on studies that analyse what share of declared 
SEPs determine which patents declared as standard 
essential are in fact essential for the respective standard.
By reviewing existing publications, we found out about 
essentiality assessment methods employed in practice. 
More precisely, we collated and analysed information on 
a) the overall approach to essentiality assessment applied 
in each case, b) the patents (or patent documents) that 
are subject to essentiality assessment, and c) the entities 
or persons tasked with essentiality assessment. We also 
learned about the context and how the use of these 
methods is embedded as part of our aim to assess the 
quality and cost of essentiality assessments.
Annex 1 contains an overview of all the sources we used 
for this review.
Literature review of essentiality assessment2
2.1 | Introduction and selected literature
2.2 | Main topics in the selected literature
Essentiality assessments of patents and in particular 
declared SEPs are commissioned by different parties, 
for various purposes, and with varying approaches. Even 
though many literature contributions rely on manual 
assessments of essentiality, process design choices and 
operationalisations can differ substantially. We grouped 
the main findings into six topics.
Main topic 1: Results and accuracy of essentiality assessments
The rate of actually essential patents across the various 
studies differs substantially, from 20% in Goodman 
& Myers [24], 35% in PA Consulting Group [37] and 
approximately 56% in two Cyber Creative Institute studies 
[13]. The differences can be partly attributed to the fact 
that these studies look at different standards, at different 
periods in time, and use different samples. It is therefore 
not easy to determine the accuracy of any of these studies 
(see Main Topic 6, below).
Main topic 2: Assessors’ qualifications
The assessors’ qualifications can vary. Many studies 
provide limited information on qualifications. Fairfield 
[20], [21], [22] report that “telecom engineers” and, in 
later studies, “experienced wireless engineers” did the 
assessments; Jefferies [33] mention “physics PhDs, 
wireless engineers, patent law specialists” and “former 
patent office employees”. In the case of the 3G3P patent 
pool, the lead evaluator is usually a patent lawyer or a 
knowledgeable agent from the firms in the International 
Patent Evaluation Consortium (IPEC) consortium.
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The studies also seem to differ considerably concerning the 
time an assessor spends on each patent, although precise 
information on this parameter is not usually provided. 
Only Fairfield [22, p. 17] report “an average of one hour 
of analysis per patent”. 3G3P is at the upper end of the 
scale, claiming to devote an average total of three working 
days to assessing one application to the pool (two days 
by the lead evaluator, half a day each by two additional 
evaluators). No report provided detailed information on 
the number of patents assessed per person. This variable 
should be relevant since we would expect learning effects, 
resulting in increased speed and/or accuracy.
Main topic 3: Time spent and number of patents rated per person
Main topic 4: Parts of the patents considered 
Main topic 5: Cost
Main topic 6: Reliability
Some studies mention which parts of the patents were 
considered in the assessment. Others do not provide this 
information. In the case of 3G3P, patent owners provide 
extensive information on the patents prior to essentiality 
Few studies provide precise cost estimates, and the 
estimates that are given vary. PA Consulting’s discussion 
document [36] prepared for the ETSI IPR Meeting in 2015, 
indicates that their assessment costs € 300 to € 500 per 
patent. At the same time, they claim that developing claim 
charts and running thorough validity checks would cost 
Most of the studies we analysed do not compare their 
assessment results with any external, high-quality 
benchmark (such as the patent pools’ assessment), not 
even a subsample of the patents they studied. Thus, we 
have no information on the accuracy of their essentiality 
assessments. The one exception is the academic study by 
Brachtendorf et al. [8], which we discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 6. As far as we are aware, most studies also do 
not measure inter-coder reliability (where the same patent 
is assessed by two or more assessors, and the level of 
assessments, including claim charts, with an explanation 
of why they consider the input claims essential for the 
respective parts of the standard.
€ 5,000 to € 10,000 per patent. Similarly, Charles River 
Associates [10] estimate that for one declared patent, a 
“medium” assessment would cost around € 4,500 and a 
full assessment € 9,000. In the case of the 3G3P patent 
pool, we estimate higher costs. The lead evaluator devotes 
on average two working days to assessing one application.
agreement is measured). This is only mentioned in the 
case of 3G3P, where three evaluators assess one patent 
(although information on the level of agreement is not 
provided). If two studies refer to the same standard and 
the same set of patents, then reliability could be checked 
at least on an aggregate level. However, the standards 
and/or patent sets that were analysed differ across 
studies, which makes it difficult to compare the results. 
Even the definition of a “patent family” is not consistent 
across all studies.
2.3 | Conclusions
In recent years, a number of commercial assessment 
studies and services related to essentiality have been 
published and introduced. Even though the approaches of 
these studies may look relatively similar at first glance, 
they can differ substantially when it comes to details. 
The definition of essentiality varies, and several studies 
actually measure something different entirely (such as 
‘seminal patents’). Although detailed information on their 
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methodology and actual execution is often incomplete or 
not publicly available, we observe there is a great diversity 
in design, operational choices, and resource investment.
In spite of the differences between the various studies, we 
were able to identify some design features and learnings 
to be considered for this study:
• Most studies start from lists of patents disclosed as 
potentially essential, for instance patents disclosed to 
ETSI. Patents are considered until either a certain cut-
off disclosure date, or according to which standard or 
technical specification they refer to.
• Relevant patents are usually grouped into patent fam-
ilies (definitions vary or are often not provided), and 
then a representative patent is identified and assessed 
for essentiality. The exact approaches to this grouping 
exercise differ between studies. Some studies not only 
consider granted patents but also investigate ‘essenti-
ality’ of patent applications (one can dispute whether 
such a thing is possible in the first place). 
• It is not always clear from the various reports which 
part of the standards documents’ text was actually 
used in order to assess essentiality (i.e. only specific 
claims or the entire patent text). In some cases, patent 
owners could provide additional information (e.g. claim 
charts), thereby indicating which claims to look at. 
• In terms of the actual essentiality assessment pro-
cess, the commercial and institutional studies we re-
viewed all utilise manual assessments of essentiality. 
The (few) academic contributions we identified on this 
topic all used an automated approach (being semantic 
similarity between patent and standard documents).
• Most studies seem to be commissioned or carried out 
by consultancies specialising, to some degree, on in-
tellectual property. They either get external evaluators 
involved or ask internal expert staff to carry out the as-
sessments. Nonetheless, most studies did not provide 
details on the assessors carrying out the assessments, 
such as qualification and experience.
It is hard to assess the quality of the outcomes of these 
efforts, as there is no accountability, no appeal procedure, 
and no evaluation of the outcomes. Most of the studies do 
not present indicators of data validity, such as inter-rater 
reliability or a comparison of the results to a benchmark 
of known accuracy. Such indicators would be useful for the 
interpretation and evaluation of the results.
3 CASE STUDY ON COURT CASES INVOLVING LARGER 
SCALE ESSENTIALITY 
ASSESSMENT
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The overall aim of this case study is to learn from relevant 
legal cases about the design and implementation of 
essentiality analyses. In order to do so, we identified – 
within a large pool of case law - almost twenty court cases 
and competition agency rulings that involved (directly or 
indirectly) determining patent essentiality in the context 
of technical standards. In consultation with the European 
Commission and its JRC, we subsequently focused on 
three court cases that included large-scale essentiality 
analyses and therefore had the most potential for the 
overall aims of our study. These three cases are: Unwired 
Planet v Huawei (judgement issued in 2017) [44], TCL v 
Ericsson (judgement issued in 2017) [40] and Innovatio 
(judgement issued in 2013) [26]. 
Before further introducing these three cases below, we 
would like to note that:
• This case study focuses specifically on essentiality 
assessments as conducted in the context of these 
court cases. We do not consider the numerous 
other interesting aspects of these cases, nor their 
outcomes (unless directly related to essentiality 
assessments). 
• While we committed our best efforts to correctly sum-
marising these court cases on the relevant aspects, the 
cases and the actual procedures for the essentiality 
analyses described, have a level of detail that is im-
possible to fully discuss within the scope of this case 
study. For more details, we therefore refer readers to 
the actual rulings.
Case study on court cases involving larger 
scale essentiality assessment
3
3.1 | Introduction and studied court cases
3.1.1	 Unwired	Planet	v	Huawei	(2017)
Unwired Planet International is a non-practicing entity 
that acquired a telecommunications patent portfolio from 
Ericsson, with the aim of concluding license agreements 
with implementers of relevant standards. Several 
implementers who refused to conclude a license were 
faced with infringement proceedings before the courts, 
and one of those implementers was Huawei. Unwired 
Planet brought infringement proceedings against Huawei 
before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 
Chancery Division, Patents Court. The judgement [44] was 
handed down in April 2017 by Judge J. Birss. 
The proceedings related to the UK parts of six European 
patents from Unwired Planet’s portfolio which the 
company used to sue Huawei, Samsung and Google for 
patent infringement in March 2014. Five of these patents 
were claimed to be an SEP by Unwired Planet and one was 
not. Unwired Planet’s aim was to conclude a license for 
an entire portfolio rather than the six patents in dispute. 
Alongside technical trials discussing the technical merits 
of the disputed patents as well as the essentiality of 
those individual patents, the Court also scheduled a non-
technical FRAND trial. This was to deal with inter alia 
essentiality, but on a much larger scale, to determine the 
total number of patents essential to each of the relevant 
standards. By April 2016, three technical trials had taken 
place involving four of the six patents. Two of Unwired 
Planet’s patents were held valid as well as essential to the 
standard by the Court, and two were held invalid. At this 
point Unwired Planet and Huawei agreed to postpone the 
technical trials indefinitely. 
Huawei lodged an appeal, for which the judgement [43] 
was handed down by the Court of Appeal on 23 October 
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2018. The content of the appeal judgement is not 
considered in this case study, because the appeal did not 
concern the essentiality assessment as performed by the 
parties in the first instance, nor the High Court’s evaluation 
of those assessments.
3.1.2	 TCL	v	Ericsson	(2017)
Ericsson owns a large portfolio of patents relating to 
telecommunications. TCL is a large handset manufacturer 
and was the seventh largest seller of handsets globally in 
the last quarter of 2016 [45]. The two parties had concluded 
a license agreement with a term of seven years for Ericsson’s 
2G/GSM patent portfolio in March 2007, and over the course 
of the years, started negotiations on 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE 
licenses as well. Between October 2012 and late 2014, while 
negotiations were still ongoing, Ericsson launched a number 
of patent infringement lawsuits in six non-U.S. jurisdictions: 
France, the UK, Brazil, Russia, Argentina and Germany. 
Negotiations between the parties, however, continued. 
In March 2014, TCL filed an action with the Central District 
Court of California asking for a declaration that Ericsson 
had failed to offer FRAND rates and requesting the court 
to determine the FRAND rates to which TCL was entitled. 
In response, Ericsson filed a mirror image action in Texas, 
which was eventually transferred to the Central District 
Court of California and consolidated with TCL’s initial 
action. The case did not involve a discussion on possible 
infringement of individual patents but focused on the 
calculation of the FRAND license for Ericsson’s portfolio. 
The judgement [40] was handed down in December 2017 
by Judge J.V. Selna. 
In December 2019, this judgement was overruled on 
procedural grounds by a ruling [41] of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit because Ericsson was denied a jury 
trial by the District Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
did not have to deal with the other grounds for appeal, 
including the criticism of the portfolio calculation. This 
means that the judgement relating to this substance 
was “vacated”, but not explicitly rejected. Thus, our report 
will only look at the calculations presented in the District 
Court’s judgement.8 
  8 See [41, p. 19, Footnote 8]: “As Ericsson confirmed during oral argument, we need not reach any of its arguments challenging the district court’s 
FRAND analysis if we conclude that the district court violated Ericsson’s right to a jury trial.”
3.1.3	 Innovatio	(2013)
Innovatio IP Ventures LLC owned a portfolio of patents 
relating to wireless networks which originally belonged 
to Broadcom. Innovatio had sued a large variety of users 
who applied the IEEE 802.11 standard (popularly known 
as ‘Wi-Fi’) in their day-to-day businesses, like restaurants, 
coffee shops, hotels, and grocery stores, for violating 23 of 
its patents. A number of device manufacturers, including 
Cisco, Motorola, Netgear, and Hewlett-Packard, sought 
a declaration that their products – and the networks or 
systems that those products were a part of – did not 
infringe Innovatio’s patents, and that these patents were 
invalid. In turn, Innovatio accused the manufacturers of 
infringing those 23 patents as well. All cases were referred 
to the Northern District Court of Illinois for so-called 
multidistrict litigation. The judgement [26] was handed 
down in September 2013 by Judge F. Holderman.
3.2 | Main	findings	from	selected	court	cases	
In each of the above cases, one or more large-scale 
essentiality assessments were performed by the 
parties involved. These were usually done in the 
context of the ‘top-down approach’, in which, for a 
given standard, the essential patents portfolio of a 
specific company is compared to all existing essential 
patents. 
Below, we discuss important aspects of these essentiality 
assessments. 
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In the reviewed court cases, we observed several sets 
of starting points in terms of patents to be assessed on 
essentiality. In the Unwired Planet v Huawei case, 
both parties had instructed experts to perform essentiality 
assessments: one is referred to in the case as HPA and the 
other as MNPA. In short: 
• The HPA calculations took ETSI disclosed patents as 
starting point. This involved various steps, including 
ETSI database extraction and de-duplication, then 
finding patent family members. Eventually, a set of 
18,938 potentially essential patent families was iden-
tified. Of these, 11,384 families were selected that in-
cluded at least one issued and non-expired patent and 
an English or Chinese language member. In the next 
step, families were allocated to one of more of the fol-
lowing ‘classes’: GSM (n=1,525), UMTS (n=5,158) and 
LTE (n=7,077).9 
• The MNPA calculations also took ETSI disclosed patents 
as starting point, focussing only on the LTE standard. 
This also involved a number of selection steps (seven 
in total), many of which were similar to HPA: identify-
ing the patent families declared as essential to ETSI 
for the relevant standard, removing duplicates and 
expired patent families. Several steps were criticised 
during the proceedings, which led to a revised MNPA. 
The revised MNPA identified 5296 ‘live LTE families’, 
1781 fewer than the comparable 7,077 families iden-
tified by HPA. In later steps, that set of families was 
divided into 3,377 ‘core’ and 1,919 ‘non-core’ patent 
families.10 Within ‘core’, it then identified 2,128 fam-
ilies as potentially relevant for handsets, and in ‘non-
core’ 1,209 patent families potentially relevant for 
handsets.11 
In the TCL v Ericsson case, only TCL had instructed 
experts to perform an essentiality analysis for both 
(1) the total number of patents essential to the standard 
(the ‘denominator’), as well as (2) Ericsson’s share relative 
to that number (the ‘numerator’). For (1), the starting point 
was disclosed patents at ETSI, and their identified patent 
family members. The following steps selected active 
families (at least one patent is non-expired), patents 
published in English, and patents with claims potentially 
essential for user equipment. The 7,106 patent families 
remaining after the selection process were then divided 
into 2G, 3G, and 4G, and then sorted by patent owner for 
the 15 largest patent owners. For (2), the TCL experts 
started with a set of 235 patent families that Ericsson 
contended to be essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G standards. 
For 192 of these, Ericsson had provided claim charts, and 
these were the ones selected for essentiality assessment 
by the TCL experts [40, pp. 32-33].12
In the Innovatio case, the starting point was a set of 
444 patents claims asserted by Innovatio to be infringed. 
Note here, that the Northern District Court of Illinois kept 
to the language of the IEEE Bylaws, which explicitly refers 
to Patent Claims instead of Patents.13 The defendants 
contended that all these 444 patent claims were in fact 
essential to the IEEE 802.11 standard, and therefore 
covered by a FRAND obligation. Innovatio claimed that 
only 276 patent claims were essential, and that it was not 
bound to a FRAND obligation for the other claims (allowing 
the company to demand a higher royalty-fee, for instance). 
In summary, we see that several analyses presented at 
court cases take the ETSI database of disclosed patents 
as their starting point. These analyses are similar in 
terms of the selection and filtering steps considered 
relevant (e.g. family reconstruction, filtering for the 
relevant standard, de-duplication, selection of granted 
and non-expired patents, relevance for the relevant 
device category). The actual operational choices across 
these analyses, however, vary considerably (see below) 
and have a significant effect on the ultimate selections. 
Furthermore, some analyses applied additional filters, 
for the time period or ‘importance’ of the patent. In the 
context of this report, these observations are important: 
3.2.1 Selection of patents to be assessed 
  9 For more details, see [44, §286-289]. For the numbers mentioned, see especially the figure in §288.
 10 For this analysis, ‘core’ denotes importance, not the common technical use of that word (the common distinction between ‘RAN’ and ‘Core net-
work’). In the MNPA, whether a patent was a ‘core’ patent or not was determined by a cut-off date: any patent with a priority date after 31st 
December 2008 was non-core, see [44, §274].
 11 For more details, see [44, §274-281]. For the numbers mentioned, see especially the figure in §278.
 12 Note that it was contended that certain patents were essential to multiple standards, which resulted in 219 pairs of patent families and stand-
ards with corresponding claim charts.
 13 For more details, see [27, pp. 13-14].
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different selections only lead to different patents being 
assessed. They will also likely lead to different ‘essentiality 
rates’, even if the results of each individual assessment 
were identical. For the purpose of this case study, we 
define ‘essentiality rate’ as the total number of patents 
found to be essential, divided by the total number of 
patents investigated for essentiality. Such a rate could be 
calculated for all companies that own patents relevant 
to a given standard, or for one patent owner in particular. 
Often, the denominator in this division (i.e. ‘total number 
of patents investigated’) is the total number of patents 
disclosed at an SDO as potentially essential for a given 
standard, but the denominator can also be another set of 
patents, such as a set preselected by a patent owner.
Finally, the Innovatio case raises an interesting aspect for 
this study: a patent owner can also have an interest in 
asserting that their patents are not essential to a standard.
3.2.2 The use of sampling
In two of the analyses, sampling was used to reduce the 
number of patents that would have to be assessed for 
essentiality. 
In order to determine rates of essentiality in the Unwired 
Planet v Huawei case, the experts who conducted the 
revised MNPA analysis (see above), made their selection 
of potentially essential families as discussed, then drew 
random samples of the patents owned by two selected, 
large patent owners. The extent of these samples, 38 and 
30 patents respectively, was argued to be ‘of a size that 
would allow [..] to draw conclusions with at least 90% 
confidence about the pool from which the sample was 
drawn.”14 The court in this case did not criticise the fact that 
sampling was used. The results that the experts derived 
from this exercise were later used in their calculations as 
average essentiality rate for the whole industry.
In the TCL v Ericsson case, the experts who performed an 
essentiality analysis drew a random sample of one-third of 
the patents from each of the 15 largest patent owners, for 
each standard (GSM, UMTS and LTE). The resulting sample 
included 2,600 patent families [40, p. 28]. This sampling 
procedure was not criticised by the court or disputed by the 
opposing party.
 14 For more details, see [44, §333].
3.2.3 Essentiality assessment procedures
Below, we discuss which procedures were used for 
essentiality assessment in the court cases under review, 
what criticisms were raised, and the courts’ responses to 
these criticisms. Note again that these court cases are 
sophisticated; sometimes courts dismiss certain criticisms, 
at other times courts acknowledge them, but adopt 
adjustments or corrections and still use the results. It is 
beyond the scope of our analysis to discuss our cases 
in that level of detail, and so for further details, see the 
actual rulings. 
In the Unwired Planet v Huawei case, again we need 
to distinguish between the efforts of the experts on both 
sides. The experts doing the ‘HPA’ analysis reviewed “the 
essentiality of a patent in [the 11,384 families mention in 
the previous section]. The review took about 30 minutes 
per family. The patent and relevant standard were selected 
in accordance with given rules. The claims of the patent 
were compared to the relevant standard specification to 
determine if the standard required all the elements of the 
claims. If the Evaluator determines that the specification 
does not provide a clear reason to rule out the patent as 
being essential, then the family is deemed essential. If 
the family provides a clear reason to rule out the patent 
being essential, the family is deemed not essential. […]” 
[44, §286] On the opposing side, the expert conducting 
the ‘revised MNPA’ analysis, was asked to review the 38 
respectively 30 patent families of the two selected, large 
patent owners (see above), and this took him 5-6 hours per 
patent family. He concluded that the essentiality rate of 
one of these patent owners (excluding optional features) 
was at most 16.6%, then revised that further to 15.9%. 
He concluded that the essentiality rate (excluding optional 
features) for the other patent owner was at most 9.4%. 
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Various objections were voiced against both approaches. 
Concerning the HPA analysis, one critique related to what 
could be summarised as its “in case of doubt, consider 
the patent to be essential” approach, which results in an 
overestimation. The judge commented: “I find that it is 
accurate to describe the evaluation step in the HPA as 
a step which errs on the side of including a patent in the 
deemed essential pool.” [44, §355]. For the revised MNPA, 
however, the court noted that “The corresponding number 
in the Revised MNPA is 355 but that number is much too 
low if it is too represent all Relevant SEPs.” [44, §377]. 
Eventually, for its own calculations, the court picked a 
number about halfway between the results of these two 
analyses. [44, §377].
In the TCL v Ericsson case, as explained above, one 
party had a sample of 2,600 patents assessed by a team 
of assessors for essentiality, and of those, a subset (17%) 
was checked by an expert for accuracy.15 The procedure of 
essentiality assessment received several criticisms from 
the opposing party, one being that the team of assessors 
“must have spent on average about 20 minutes per patent, 
and charged $100”, pointing out the difference between 
the fees charged in patent pools. To this criticism, the 
court replied: “While charging on average only $100 per 
patent family may be cheap, this process is only intended 
to provide a workable size of the relevant universe and 
has no need to be as precise as a licensing pool must 
be. The Court does not think that the internal procedures 
used by either patent pools or Ericsson to determine the 
essentiality of their own patents are fair benchmarks for 
assessing quality of the analysis done by [the assessment 
team for TCL]. While they are similar tasks, they require 
very different levels of certainty because the results are 
being used in very different ways.” The court did, however, 
agree with the criticism that the experts who performed 
the essentiality assessments had failed to read the entire 
patent specification. It was therefore probable that they 
had included too many patent families. Here, the court 
writes: “This means that they may not have noticed 
if a patent contained a means plus functions claim, 
likely would not have noticed if a patent used its own 
lexicography, and would not have read any specification 
disclaimer or the file history.” [40, p. 31] .16
In the Innovatio case, both sides had involved experts to 
discuss the essentiality of the patent claims. As already 
explained, in this case it was not the patent owner but 
the defendants who contended that certain patent claims 
were in fact essential to the relevant IEEE 802.11 standard 
(so the FRAND commitment would apply). Therefore, the 
court ruled that the burden of proof should rest with the 
defendants, and thus their analyses were subject to the 
most scrutiny [27, p. 13]. The court itself also performed 
in a sense an essentiality analysis since it had to rule on 
each and every individual patent claim whether it was 
essential or not.17 
 15 For more details, see [40, p. 28].
 16 The court also rejected several steps in the TCL expert analyses concerning the importance and contribution of the patents in question, adjust-
ments to arrive at royalty rates, and a confirmation step on the basis of forward citations; however, these steps are beyond the scope of this study 
focusing on essentiality assessments.
 17 [27, pp. 23-48] contains said analysis per technological category.
3.2.4 Findings on essentiality rate 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, we see ‘essentiality rate’ 
as the total number of patents found to be essential, 
divided by the total number of patents investigated 
for essentiality. Such a rate could be calculated for 
all companies that own patents relevant for a given 
standard, or for one specific patent owner. Often, the 
denominator in this division (i.e. ‘total number of patents 
investigated’) is the total number of patents disclosed at 
an SDO as potentially essential for a given standard, but 
the denominator can also be another set of patents, such 
as a set preselected by a patent owner.
In the court cases under review, we find – or can calculate 
– various results for these essentiality rates, as produced 
by experts but also by courts themselves (often based on 
adjusted input from experts). Such numbers should be 
looked at with utmost care. They cannot be compared 
with each other, unless the process used to generate 
them is identical or, at least, comparable. We showed in 
Section 3.2.1 that the analyses in the court cases under 
review differ considerably in operational choices, as well 
as in essentiality assessment procedures. Indeed, looking 
at exercises where the starting point was SDO disclosed 
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patents, we see essentiality rates for the entire industry 
ranging from 16.6% (for the 4G/LTE standard) [44, §333] 
all the way up to 47.9%.18 Looking at exercises where 
the starting point was a specific set of asserted patents, 
we see essentiality rates between 70.7% for a given 
company’s 2G portfolio19 and 100% for another specific 
company’s asserted patent claims.20 [27, p. 49].
Having expressed our concerns about reporting absolute 
essentiality rates, and about comparing rates derived from 
exercises using different operational choices, we think it is 
useful to examine the differences between rates generated 
by one and the same exercise. This shows significant 
differences over technology generations. To illustrate, in 
the HPA analysis for the Unwired Planet v Huawei case, 
we found that the essentiality rate of disclosed GSM 
patents was 28% higher than disclosed UMTS patents, 
and 14% higher than disclosed LTE patents.21 While the 
court in question acknowledged that specific procedural 
choices affected the results of this analysis (see above), 
such choices probably affected the results for the various 
technology generations (GSM, UMTS and LTE) in the same 
way. 
Across various patent owners, we see even larger 
differences. For instance, the revised MNPA analysis in the 
Unwired Planet v Huawei case assessed the essentiality 
rates of two selected, large patent owners. The rate 
found for one company was 69% higher than the other.22 
Even though we acknowledge the possible limitations 
to this specific analysis, it suggests there are significant 
differences in essentiality rates across companies.
 18 Percentage derived from [40, p. 29]: 446 (2G) + 1,166 (3G) + 1796 (4G) patent families / 7,106 total patent families = 47.9%.
 19 Percentage derived from [40, p. 34]: 29/41 = 70.7%.
 20 Here the court concludes asserted patents were found to be essential by court.
 21 Calculations based on the numbers as reported in [44, §288].
 22 Calculations based on the numbers as reported in [44, §333].
 23 See [44, p. 64] The “for all” rates can be calculated by dividing the three numbers mentioned in Step 5 by the corresponding numbers mentioned 
in Step 4 of the HPA table. The RAN and UE numerators can be found in the same table and column below Step 5.
 24 See [44, §333]. The rate of 13.9% is the average of the two rates of patent owner A and patent owner B.
 25 See [44, §377]. The rate of 26.2% is the average determined by the Court of the two LTE numbers contended by the experts from both sides.
 26 See [40, pp. 28-29]. Rates are calculated as follows: the total number of SEPs identified as essential (446 + 1,166 + 1,796) divided by the total 
number of patent families of 7,106.
 27 See [40, p. 32]. Rates are calculated as follows: the total of (365 + 953 + 1,481) divided by the total of patent families of 7,106.
Case Analysis or data by Standards 
in question
Total standard or portfolio  
of	a	specific	party?
Essentiality 
rate 
Numerator
Unwired 
Planet
Experts for Huawei 
(‘HPA’)23
2G/GSM Total standard 41.2% for all
20.5% for RAN
23.7% for UE
ETSI disclosures 
plus filter (“Identified 
disclosed families 
with at least one 
issued and non-
expired patent and 
an English or Chinese 
language member”
3G/UMTS Total standard 31.8% for all
18.2% for RAN
22.4% for UE
4G/LTE Total standard 35.8% for all
22.4% for RAN
26.3% for UE
Experts for Unwired 
Planet (‘MNPA’)24
4G/LTE Total standard 13.9% ETSI disclosures plus 
filter4G/LTE Portfolio of major patent owner A 9.4% ‘at most’
4G/LTE Portfolio of major patent owner B 15.9% ‘at most’
Judge Birss25 4G/LTE Total Standard 26.2% n/a (*)
TCL Experts for TCL26 2G/3G/4G Total of all three standards 47.9% ETSI disclosures plus 
filter2G/3G/4G Total U.S. patents of all three 
standards
44.5%
Judge Selna27 2G/3G/4G Total U.S. patents of all three 
standards
39.4% n/a (*)
TABLE 2:	ESSENTIALITY	RATES	DERIVED	FROM	TWO	COURT	CASES	(DISCLAIMER:	THESE	RATES	HAVE	BEEN	OBTAINED	USING	DIFFERENT	DATA	SETS,	ASSUMP-
TION	AND	PROCEDURES	AND	CANNOT	BE	COMPARED).
RAN: Radio Access Network, a specific part of mobile standards. UE: User Equipment, referring to a handset.
*: Rate chosen after considering input of both parties. 
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Table 2 summarises the essentiality rates that can be 
derived23 from the Unwired Planet v Huawei judgement 
and the TCL v Ericsson judgement.24 These numbers must 
be treated with care and are provided to demonstrate 
once more that using different data sets, assumption 
and procedures, can lead to essentiality rates can varying 
greatly (which makes comparisons difficult).
 28 Some of these percentages are not mentioned in the judgement but can be derived by means of a simple division of the applicable numbers.
 29 We do not discuss the Innovatio case here, as it did not generate such data. Furthermore, the table does not contain data points of calculations 
where the start was a specific preselection of patents believed to be essential (as outcomes reflect the choices in that preselection, and outcomes 
are totally incomparable with the data in this table.
3.2.5	 Use	of	essentiality	findings	on	final	judgement
In all the cases reviewed, the courts noted imperfections 
and sometimes flaws in the submitted essentiality 
assessment analyses. At the same time, these courts 
expressed their view that some uncertainty is inherent to 
such tasks, and that a certain degree of uncertainty can be 
acceptable. They explain that imperfections and flaws do 
not necessarily mean that there is no merit in the findings 
of such analyses. Without being exhaustive, the above is 
reflected by the following court statements: 
 “First, as with the HPA, one needs to take care with 
the results because the error bars are wide. However 
the results of the MNPA are not meaningless and do 
not systematically favour Unwired Planet, as long as 
one does not think the results are the true essentiality 
rates.” [44, §367].
 “The task the HPA performs is an inherently difficult 
one. The answers can only ever be approximate. In 
the HPA the essentiality evaluation step is and was 
intended to be a coarse filter to screen out non-essen-
tial patents and to err on the side of including a pat-
ent in the deemed essential pool. This does not mean 
the method is flawed or unreliable. I am satisfied that 
the HPA has applied a consistent yardstick and pro-
duces meaningful results. It is a reasonable attempt 
to deal with over-declaration and derive information 
about how many essential patents there really are.” 
[44, §361].
 “Having now been through all the points in detail, I will 
stand back and consider the MNPA as a whole. Broad-
ly the HPA and MNPA are aimed at the same difficult 
task. The MNPA has flaws but, apart from one aspect 
of the Original MNPA, overall in my judgment the Orig-
inal MNPA was and the Revised MNPA is a reasona-
ble attempt to derive information which allows one to 
assess the strength of a portfolio of patents declared 
essential to LTE as against the industry as a whole, 
from the point of view of what licensees would be in-
terested in.” [44, §366].
 “Ultimately the Court finds that the flaws are not 
enough to justify rejecting TCL’s experts’ calculation of 
the total number of SEPs entirely. However, the Court 
does find it appropriate to make certain adjustments 
to TCL’s calculation of the overall number of SEPs […].” 
[40, p. 32].
In all the cases we reviewed, the essentiality analysis 
results were eventually considered for reaching a verdict – 
and in fact played a significant role in each case. 
3.3 | Conclusions 
Having reviewed three court cases in which one or more 
large-scale essentiality analyses were performed, we now 
present several conclusions specifically selected for their 
relevance to our overall study.
• The common assumption by many is that a patent own-
er has an interest in having confirmed that its patents 
are actually essential, and an implementer an interest 
to see confirmed these patents are not actually essen-
tial. But from the cases we studied, we also see the op-
posite situation, in which a patent owner has an interest 
in having confirmed that its patents are NOT actually 
essential, and an implementer an interest to see con-
firmed these patents ARE actually essential. (This oppo-
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site situation seems especially relevant when patents 
are indeed implemented in products, and if they are not 
actually essential, then the owner is not bound by any 
FRAND commitment it may have made.) 
• Those analyses that took SDO disclosed patents as a 
starting point, show a strong similarity in terms of the 
selections and filters found to be relevant. However, 
the actual operational choices in these analyses varied 
considerably and had a significant effect on the final 
set of patents to be assessed for essentiality. This is 
likely to result in different outcomes for the overall ex-
ercise, even though the results of each individual pat-
ent assessment would have been identical. 
• In two court cases, sampling is used to reduce the number 
of patents that would have to be assessed for essentiality. 
In one case, experts used a 33% randomly drawn sample 
on a per-company, per-standard basis, and this approach 
was not criticised or disputed in the case. In the other 
case, experts used sampling to select 68 patents from 
two selected, large patent owners, and this sample 
size was argued to be large enough to achieve a 90% 
confidence level that the sample was representative for 
the pool from which the sample was drawn. Also here, 
this approach was not criticised or disputed.
• The actual assessment procedures varied considera-
bly in design and parameters used. In some analyses, 
senior experts spent 5-6 hours per patent. In others, a 
team of assessors spent 20-30 minutes per patent, 
sometimes supervised by a senior expert, who validat-
ed a sample of the results.
• Because specific operational choices and differences 
in assessment procedures have a large impact on the 
outcomes, the resulting essentiality rates of the 
various analyses we see in the court cases un-
der review cannot be compared. 
• When looking at a single analysis, however, it is in-
formative to note possible differences in essentiality 
rates across standards (e.g. technology generations) 
and across patent owners. For both, we observed 
large differences. In one analysis, the overall es-
sentiality rate found for disclosed GSM patents was 
28% higher than disclosed UMTS patents. In another 
analysis, the essentiality rate of one selected, large 
patent owner was 69% higher than the rate of the 
other selected, large patent owner for this analysis. 
Such	 differences	 suggest	 there	 is	 merit	 in	
transparent information on essentiality: we 
cannot simply assume that all companies, 
over all technologies, have similar essential-
ity rates. 
• Although in all three cases some aspects of the patent 
selection procedures and the actual assessment pro-
cedures were criticised by the opposing party, and also 
the courts acknowledged that the outcomes of such 
assessments are not perfect and are subject to some 
flaws, the courts still took the position that such as-
sessments do have merit. In fact, in all three court cas-
es, the results of the essentiality assessments were 
finally used to reach a verdict (sometimes after the 
court made adjustments). 

4 CASE STUDY ON ESSENTIALITY 
ASSESSMENTS 
IN PATENT POOLS
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Patent pools aggregate IPR for the purpose of joint 
licensing [42]. Pool membership is voluntary, and most 
patent pools focus on technology standards. Competition 
and antitrust laws require that the patents in pools 
are complementary and not substitutes. To meet this 
requirement, standards-based pools undertake efforts 
to ensure they include patents that are in fact standard-
essential patents (after all, standard essential patents 
are by definition complementary).30 When pool members 
submit patents to the pool, these patents must pass an 
essentiality assessment. These assessments are typically 
outsourced to specialist organisations, located across the 
globe. 
Arguably, of all the organisations carrying out essentiality 
assessments and publicly share results, patent pools are 
arguably the most experienced: they are one of the few 
types of organisations in which essentiality assessment is 
currently implemented structurally. The aim of the patent 
pool case study is to learn as much as possible about 
essentiality assessment experiences in such pools. 
This case study involved carrying out extensive interviews 
with five selected patent pool administrators, or recognised 
experts involved in the pool effort, as well as desk research 
on relevant documentation. The interviews lasted two to 
four hours each, mostly with several representatives of the 
patent pool (up to six). Four interviews were performed 
face-to-face, and one was via teleconference. All the 
interviewees were given a transcript of the interview 
as well as the opportunity to correct or augment this 
transcript afterwards. Two interviewees made use of this 
opportunity, and their additional feedback was processed. 
We also considered any document or reference provided 
by the organisations and interviewees where relevant.31
We selected the five following pools/pool administrators:
• 3G3P, also known as the “WCDMA pool”, or the “3G 
Patent Platform” is an initiative that emerged from 
the UMTS IPR Working Group, established in the late 
1990s. Over the years the pool has selected different 
licensing administrators. For the first 5 years it was 3G 
Licensing, then for 5 years SIPRO, and since 2017 Via 
Licensing. 
• Avanci is a relatively new patent pool focused on 
licensing technology for telecommunications in IoT 
markets (primarily connected cars, smart meters and 
connected homes).32 The Avanci pool offers patents 
relating to 3GPP 2G (GSM, GPRS, EDGE), 3G (WCDMA, 
HSPA) and 4G (LTE, LTE-A) cellular standards. As per 
February 2020, the Avanci pool covers patents from 37 
patent owners and counts Audi, BMW Group, Porsche, 
Skoda, Volkswagen and Volvo among its licensees.33
• One-Blue administers a patent pool holding patents 
related to Blu-Ray Disc (BD). One-Blue considers itself 
a ‘one-stop-shop’ for licensing UHD, BD, DVD and CD 
essential patents. Licensing programmes are split by 
product category (e.g. software, player/recorder, drive, 
PC, ROM discs, Recordable/Rewritable discs). One-Blue 
was established in 2009 by Panasonic, Philips, Sony, 
Hitachi, Samsung, and Cyberlink.
• SISVEL is an administrator of various patent pools re-
lated to wireless communication, audio/video coding, 
broadband technology and digital video and display 
technology, among others. SISVEL emerged from the 
patent and trademark department of Italian consumer 
electronics vendor Indesit in 1982.
Case study on essentiality assessments  
in patent pools
4
4.1 | Introduction and selection of patent pools
 30 Carrying out essentiality assessments also helps to create a fair basis for royalty distribution among pool members.
 31 A particularly useful source for the 3G3P pool is [23].
 32 At the time of writing, licenses for connected cars and smart meters were already available, and licenses for connected homes were coming ‘soon’.
 33 Source: [www.avanci.com], consulted 17 February 2020.
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• Via Licensing is an organisation administering 
various licensing programmes, related to the AAC (an 
audio coding standard), LTE (“4G”), WCDMA (“3G”), 
802.11a-j (“Wi-Fi”) and several MPEG standards, 
among others. Via Licensing was formed in 2002 and 
is an independently managed subsidiary of Dolby 
Laboratories.
Most licensing administrators manage multiple pools. 
Usually, each pool has its own Pool Agreement that is 
reached by the patent owners involved in the pool’s setting-
up phase. Consequently, differences can arise between the 
precise rules and arrangements in pools within the same 
licensing administrators. We asked pool administrators to 
elaborate on such differences if any. 
The interviews were semi-structured and focused on four 
main topics:
1. Patent submission procedure.
2. Technical aspects of the essentiality assessment pro-
cedure.
3. The evaluators performing the essentiality assess-
ment.
4. Appeals and publication of results.
The findings presented here relate to the pools we 
interviewed; other pools may of course be organised 
differently. The interviews were held in March 2019 and 
other information has been updated up to 22 August 
2019.
4.2 | Main	findings	from	selected	patent	pools
Patent pools require prospective members to submit 
one or more patents for assessment. The pools also all 
require a claim chart, which they consider crucial 
for being able to properly assess essentiality 
with	an	appropriate	 level	of	confidence. Thus, we 
can characterise the assessment procedure as ‘validating 
submitted claim charts’, rather than performing ‘greenfield’ 
assessments. 
The claim charts need to be detailed. For each patent 
claim deemed essential, the claim chart must identify for 
which standard document(s) and specific version(s) that 
is the case. Additionally, for each claim deemed essential, 
the chart must show how all the individual claim features 
match the specific text (sentences) in the standard, for 
instance using colour coding. Most pools expect patent 
owners to prepare the claim chart themselves; some pools 
offer claim chart construction as a service (for a fee). If the 
scope of a pool is limited to specific device categories (like 
terminals, also called User Equipment – UE), the patent 
owner must limit their claim charts to those devices. 
If companies submit patents that belong to what they 
consider the same patent family, they inform the pool. 
Some pools will fully examine each family member 
independently,34 whereas others only do so with defined 
‘key countries’ and offer a lighter procedure for other 
countries.35 
Fees
All the pools we analysed outsource essentiality 
assessments to specialised parties. When a patent owner 
submits a patent for assessment to a pool, the pool 
charges a fee, which the patent pools indicate reflects 
the actual, average costs of an outsourced essentiality 
assessment. In most cases, pools charge fixed fees, while 
others charge fees based on the actual (per-hour) costs, 
with an upper limit. The fees differ across as well as within 
pools. 
The most significant variation within pools is due to 
differences in labour costs between various regions of 
the world (typically, pools source assessors from all major 
patenting countries in the world and assign assessors 
depending on the country where the patent is granted). 
In one pool, the assessment of a US patent costs twice 
as much as an assessment of a European patent, and ten 
4.2.1 Main topic 1: Patent submission procedure
 34 Usually this is done by different evaluators, see below.
 35 For instance, by applying a ‘vouching’ procedure, where the patent owner makes a formal statement that a certain patent contains the same 
deemed essential claim(s) as another patent undergoing a full assessment and provides a certified translation as well.
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times as much as the assessment of a Chinese patent. 
Some pools charge additional costs if the submitted patent 
is claimed to have more than two essential claims. Some 
pools charge costs per claimed product category. Most 
pools charge fees for re-assessment (see the section on 
‘appeals’, below). There is often a discounted assessment 
fee for family members. The typical fee charged by pools 
for a European patent is between € 5,000 and € 10,000.
Patent selection
Only granted patents can be submitted for assessment. 
A prospective pool member must own and submit at 
least one patent they believe to be essential. It is up 
to the prospective member whether to submit all the 
granted patents they believe to be essential for the 
given pool, or to (initially) submit only a subset. In the 
first case, a higher royalty income from the pool may be 
expected, as the royalty allocation in virtually all pools 
is based on the number of patents positively identified 
as being essential.36 In the second case, however, there 
are initially lower expenses on assessment fees, and the 
fees may be spread over time. During the interviews, pool 
administrators indicated that most companies choose to 
submit all the patents they believe to be essential already 
at an early phase. 
None of the pools we analysed uses sampling 
methods. Several interviewees expressed their 
belief that competition law requires all patents 
in a pool to be assessed for essentiality, and thus 
sampling is not allowed. Some pools impose limits on 
the number of patents that can be submitted by a single 
patent owner for assessment (‘caps’). Presumably, they do 
so because of the huge time and financial resources that 
would be required to assess all the potentially essential 
patents held by their members. 
 36 The actual royalty allocation models may be complex, however, and involve more parameters.
 37 The Doctrine of Equivalents is a legal rule in many (but not all) of the world’s patent systems that allows a court to hold a party liable for patent 
infringement even though the infringing device or process does not fall within the literal scope of a patent claim, but nevertheless is equivalent 
to the claimed invention.
 38 Note that pools do not check patent validity and follow the general rule that a granted patent is assumed to be valid until a competent authority 
decides otherwise.
4.2.2 Main topic 2: Technical aspects of the essentiality assessment procedure
Most pools adopt a definition of essentiality that is equal 
or very similar to the one used by the SDO producing the 
standard. Some pools limit essentiality (by definition) to 
specific product categories. Most, but not all pools include 
patents for optional normative features in their definition. 
Typically, pools exclude patents required to include 
features generally requested by buyers of products, but 
not covered by the standard as such (sometimes called 
‘implementation patents’).
Pools expect the evaluators they contract to consider the 
full national law when they assess a patent for particular 
jurisdiction. Theoretically speaking, the outcome 
of the assessment could depend on whether 
particular jurisdiction recognises the Doctrine 
of Equivalents,37 or induced infringement, or other 
specific national aspects. Yet, interviewees indicated 
that	 in	 practice,	 such	 differences	 hardly	 ever	
matter for essentiality assessments.
Standard version considered
In most pools, the submitting patent owner selects the 
version of the standard to evaluate against (usually the 
latest one available at that time). In some cases, the 
pool prescribes the version. Some pools explained to 
us that they also check whether a patent submitted for 
assessment covers an invention that was already present 
in an earlier version of the standard, predating the priority 
date of the patent – in that case, the patent is likely to be 
invalid in the first place.38 
Usually, new versions of standards exclusively add features 
and almost never remove existing features. Additionally, 
licenses granted by pools typically cover current, previous 
and future versions of a standard. Hence, pools do not 
investigate whether a patent ‘loses’ essentiality in a later 
revision the standard version. (Almost invariably, a new 
revision of a standard is comprising all elements of the 
previous – one reason being the necessity to maintain 
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backwards compatibility to products that implement 
an older version of the same standard. As a result, it is 
very uncommon that a patent ‘loses’ essentiality. Note, 
however, that while a ‘new standard’ or ‘new standard 
generation’ (e.g. 5G versus 4G) may inherit technology 
from the previous standard, but on that step, there will 
also be technology that is not ‘inherited’.)
Rejection rates
When asked for rejection rates, pools report figures from 
‘almost zero’ up to 10%. All pools stressed that this number 
is the result of strong selection effects: before submission, 
patent owners prepare a claim chart, and will only submit 
the patent to the pool if they themselves believe – based 
on the prepared claim chart – that the patent is actually 
essential. As a result, patents likely to be non-essential 
are not submitted to the pool in the first instance. Hence, 
the essentiality rate of patents offered to a pool should 
never be compared to the essentiality rate of patents 
disclosed to SDOs as ‘potentially essential’. In addition, 
several pools ‘pre-screen’ patents, which further reduces 
the rejection rates in the assessment process. Lastly, there 
are also learning effects on the side of the patent owner in 
terms of preparing claim charts. 
4.2.3 Main topic 3: The assessors performing the essentiality assessment
Most pools outsource essentiality assessment to external 
contractors, usually specialised law firms. Some pools 
outsource the task to the International Patent Evaluation 
Consortium (IPEC),39 a network of 26 patent law firms in 
23 countries performing essentiality assessment services. 
Outsourcing creates a strict division between essentiality 
assessment and the patent pools’ other activities. Usually, 
a patent in a given jurisdiction is assessed by a contractor 
under that same jurisdiction. Within contracting firms, 
individual evaluators are selected on their experience 
in specific technology fields, and many individuals have 
performed work for different pools throughout their career. 
In some pools, an experienced ‘master’ law firm develops 
the procedure and trains law firms involved in other 
jurisdictions to ensure consistency in procedures. 
An essentiality assessment in the context of a patent 
pool on average requires between 2 to 3 days per patent, 
although there is considerable variation. In the (unusual) 
case of the patent owner not providing a claim chart, the 
assessment requires considerably more resources. As 
noted above, the fees charged for the assessment reflect 
the average costs.
To prevent bias or conflict of interest, pools respect the 
principle that an assessment is never performed by a law 
firm working for or against the owner of a patent to be 
evaluated. Pools usually also rely on the general principle 
that a law firm should not accept a task that might involve 
a conflict of interest. Often, pools have more than one 
evaluator in a given jurisdiction and can thus avoid such 
conflicts. 
 39 See [www.ipside.com] and [ipec-patent-evaluation.com].
 40 Such lists can be found on the pools’ websites. Several pools, however, indicate these lists are samples, and it is hard to say whether they are 
complete or not.
 41 An example here is the list published by Sipro Lab Telecom for the WCDMA pool [38].
 42 Sometimes, the submitter is only informed whether the outcome is positive or negative, and so if they want the report, they have to request it.
4.2.4 Main topic 4: Publication of results
Most pools make all positive assessment outcomes public 
by publishing a list of pooled patents.40 For some pools, this 
list also differentiates product categories.41 However, pools 
that limit the number of patents that can be submitted 
by a single patent owner for assessment (‘caps’) may not 
publish a list of pooled patents. Because they only look 
at a portion of the total portfolio of their members, these 
pools believe such a list is not meaningful. 
The (detailed) outcome of the assessment is described 
in a report that usually remains confidential between the 
evaluator, the submitter,42 and the pool. Neither do other 
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pool members nor third parties typically have access to this 
assessment report. The report typically states (1) whether 
the patent is essential or not, (2) the claim(s) found to 
be essential, and (3) considerations by the evaluator if 
the outcome is negative. For pools with different licensing 
plans for different device categories, the assessment 
report may also indicate for which device categories the 
patent was found to be essential. In some but not all cases, 
the report includes an annotated claim chart provided by 
the submitter, where the annotations from the evaluator 
relate to their interpretation of the claims. 
While the above, full detail report is usually confidential, 
pools can also create complementary documents, with 
a somewhat lower level of detail, that may be made 
public or available to a wider audience. As an illustration 
of a specific case, we will now provide details on the 
documents issued by 3G Licensing and its successor, Sipro 
Lab Telecom, in their respective role of WCDMA patent 
pool administrator. These are:43 
1. A “Certificate of Essentiality” establishes the current 
ownership of an identified patent associated with a 
Certified Essential Patent: it may be used widely to in-
dicate that the Patent Owner has a Certified SEP and 
intends to actively license them;
2. A “Declaration of Essentiality” is usually one-page 
summary mapping claims in the identified patent to 
relevant product categories and relevant parts in one 
or more standards, each identified by a reference and 
version number (and often also reference to specif-
ic figures, table or other elements in the text of the 
standard). It allows any third party to quickly verify the 
essentiality of the patent. It may also support a pat-
ent owner in disclosing a patent to an SDO (and pro-
viding detailed information on the relevant standards 
sections and the ‘illustrative part of the standard’ if 
applicable);
3. The full output results of the assessment. This con-
tains a full (validated) claim chart44 where each claim 
submitted to essentiality assessment is broken down 
into a set of claim elements, each of them individual-
ly indicated to read onto a listed referenced and ex-
tracted relevant standard portion. These full output 
results are made available to the applicant only (and 
to the patent owner if it is not the applicant initiating 
the evaluation process). This document may be used 
to prove essentiality or may lead to prove possible in-
fringement. Its use is decided by the patent owner. 
Generally, the underlying documents used for assessment 
(including submitted claim charts) are considered 
commercially very sensitive information and are therefore 
covered by non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). The same is 
true for the potentially negative outcomes of assessments, 
which are not made public either. Interviewees indicated 
that one of their concerns is the legal risk, especially where 
an opponent could use such documents to their advantage. 
 43 Sources: [2], [1] and [39].
 44 Note that this is not the submitted claim chart of the applicant.
 45 Note that pools evaluate whether a submitted patent goes against an agreed version of the standard (see above). The standard may further 
evolve, and a patent not found essential now, may indeed become essential for a future version. If a firm believes so, it can submit the same 
patent later on to be evaluated against a newer version. But we do not consider such cases to be an appeal.
4.2.5 Main topic 5: Appeal procedures
Most (but not all) pools have formal appeal procedures.45 
If this is the case, the owner of a rejected patent can 
request the assessment report or a motivation report 
(insofar this has not already been automatically provided) 
upon a negative outcome. If the patent owner appeals, 
some pools will request a different contractor to perform 
a new assessment (and neither the ‘old’ nor the ‘new’ 
contractor is informed this is a re-assessment). Other 
pools will ask the same contractor for a re-assessment, 
and the patent owner may provide clarifications, improved 
claim charts, or additional documents. In some cases, the 
patent owner can choose between a new contractor or 
the same contractor. Appeals usually come with a charge, 
albeit usually lower than a regular assessment. 
Some pools also allow licensees to appeal a positive 
essentiality assessment. We have no data on how often 
this happens. Furthermore, some pools allow other pool 
members to appeal a positive essentiality assessment. 
They may do so by providing a ‘fast procedure’ where 
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the appellant (‘challenger’) provides all its arguments 
against the positive result, the patent owner rebuts, and 
the appellant is allowed to react to the rebuttal. After that, 
the evaluator makes a binding decision. This procedure, 
however, is hardly ever used, as most pool members do 
not want to provoke a challenge war. 
4.3 | Conclusions
Patent pools have extensive experience of carrying 
out essentiality assessments. Although the context in 
which they do so (e.g., collective licensing, respecting 
antitrust/competition law) differs from that of the general 
essentiality assessments this study is investigating, pools 
do demonstrate a process which could in many ways serve 
as a blueprint for such general assessments. While their 
processes are discussed in detail above, patent pools 
typically have the following features and strengths: 
1. A voluntary process to participate (in the case of pools: 
a focus on generating licensing revenue).
2. A key role for claim charts, submitted by patent own-
ers, to ensure high effectivity and efficiency (where 
effectivity refers to the quality of the outcomes and 
efficiency refers to the resources required to achieve 
that quality).
3. Actual assessments are outsourced to experienced, 
specialist third parties, and thus separated from other 
activities in the pooling process.
4. Well-developed appeal processes, which are not called 
upon often but provide safeguards deemed necessary 
by stakeholders.
5. A specific choice in terms of transparency: positive re-
sults generally become public, and some pools also 
make a more detailed, one-page summary available 
to interested third parties that maps claims in the iden-
tified patent to relevant product categories and rele-
vant parts in one or more standards, each identified by 
reference and version. In all pools, however, negatives 
outcomes and underlying documents (including sub-
mitted claim charts) are recognised as commercially 
sensitive and are not published. 
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This case study investigates the Japan Patent Office 
(JPO) advisory opinion (Hantei) system of essentiality 
assessment (Hantei-E). The availability of such an 
assessment mechanism for standard-essential patents 
aroused the interests of not only the European Commission 
but also other governments [29]. The JPO has employed 
an advisory opinion (Hantei) system (hereafter referred 
to as ‘conventional’ advisory opinion system) since 1959. 
On April 1st, 2018, JPO introduced a variant on this 
conventional system specifically designed to assess the 
essentiality of patents asserted to be essential by their 
owner. To date, this system is the only mechanism in 
existence in the public sector that assesses the essentiality 
of standard essential patents. 
We discuss how JPO’s essentiality assessment mechanism 
is designed, how it contributes to resolving disputes 
involving standard-essential patents, and which issues 
have emerged since its introduction. Ultimately, we 
describe the key lessons to be learned from this system 
with a view to potentially implementing an essentiality 
assessment scheme in Europe.
This case study is primarily based on the documents and 
other materials made public by the JPO, in particular, 
the “Manual of ‘Hantei’ Advisory Opinion for Essentiality 
Checking” [31] as well as Japanese government documents 
explaining the background and establishment of Hantei-E. 
In addition, we interviewed JPO officials on March 1, 
2019 in Tokyo. JPO was given the opportunity to review 
the transcript of that interview and provide feedback and 
corrections. 
Not long after our interview, changes were made to 
Hantei-E, and in June 2019, the JPO published a revised 
version of its document describing the system. In Section 
5.3, we discuss the major changes. 
Here we adhere to the language used by the JPO in its 
(translated) documents as closely as possible. For instance, 
the documents consistently use the terms ‘demandant’ 
(party requesting an opinion), ‘demandee’ (party that is 
requested to reply)’, and ‘trial’.
Case study on the Japanese Hantei  
for Essentiality advisory opinion
5
5.1 | Introduction to Hantei-E
5.2 | Main	findings	on	Hantei-E
The main findings describe the scope, operation, usage, 
and limitations of Hantei-E. We first describe the 
‘conventional’ Hantei advisory opinion on which Hantei-E 
is based. 
5.2.1 Original model: the conventional advisory opinion system
The JPO introduced the conventional Hantei advisory 
opinion system in 1959. The system was devised to 
determine whether a particular product or service infringes 
the scope of a granted patent. When a request for an 
advisory opinion is filed, the JPO (or more specifically: a 
panel of three administrative judges) determines whether 
the object, product (or process) specified by the demandant 
falls within the technical scope of the indicated patented 
invention. 
The JPO’s advisory opinion does not have any legally 
binding force. Nevertheless, it is considered to be an 
authoritative determination, well-respected by Japanese 
society [30]. While this chapter focuses on patents, the 
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advisory opinion system is also applied for utility models, 
designs, and trademarks. 
Every year, the JPO receives between 50 and 100 requests 
for a conventional Hantei advisory opinion, and typically 
dozens of these requests are for patents [30]. A fee of JPY 
40,000 (approximately € 300) is charged for each request. 
The average trial period for a request differs across various 
types of intellectual property rights. In the case of a patent, 
the average trial period is between four and five months 
[30].
JPO’s advisory opinions are published, including all 
documents submitted by the parties involved. An exception 
can be made if such documents contain trade secrets.
5.2.2 Scope of the Hantei-E advisory opinion system
On April 1st, 2018, JPO introduced a variant on the 
conventional advisory opinion system, specifically 
designed to assess the essentiality of patents asserted to 
be essential by their owner. We refer to this new system 
as Hantei-E. 
Any request for Hantei-E must adhere to the following 
three scoping criteria:
1. There is a dispute over the essentiality of the patented 
invention between the parties concerned (the deman-
dant and the demandee46). Such a dispute must be 
about the essentiality of a specified patented inven-
tion. If two parties are in a licensing negotiation, but 
one of the parties informs the JPO there is no dispute, 
then the request is not admissible. 
2. It must be possible to specify a virtual object based 
only on indispensable features required in a specified 
standard document issued by an SDO. This standard 
document must also be submitted to JPO as evidence.
3. The requester must be willing to allege that the spec-
ified virtual object falls within the technical scope of 
the patented invention. In other words, the procedure 
can only be initiated by a party arguing that a patent 
is essential and cannot be initiated by a party that be-
lieves a patent is not essential. 
 46 In this chapter, we will continue to use the language as used by the JPO for Hantei-E.
5.2.3 Operating the Hantei-E advisory opinion system
The Hantei-E procedure consists of three steps:
1. A demandant (party requesting an opinion) submits 
a request for an advisory opinion on essentiality. This 
must include the reasons for the request and the iden-
tity of the demandee (party requested to reply).
2. The demandee submits counterarguments. If the de-
mandee does not submit any counterargument, the 
JPO will make a determination based solely on the al-
legations and evidence provided by the demandant. If 
the demandee believes that there is no actual dispute 
over the essentiality, they may alternatively provide 
specific reasons why they believe this.
3. Having considered all the documents submitted by 
the demandant and the demandee, the JPO starts the 
proceedings. The JPO assembles a panel consisting of 
three administrative judges who have a good under-
standing of the technologies relevant to the patent 
and the standard in question. The three administrative 
judges are designated by the JPO’s Commissioner. The 
panel determines whether the virtual object product 
specified by the demandant falls within the technical 
scope of the patented invention. In cases where more 
information is needed to make an appropriate deter-
mination of essentiality, the JPO will request further 
documents from the demandant and/or the demandee.
The trial period for essentiality assessments is not known, 
as the advisory opinion on essentiality has not been 
requested since its introduction. The judges are expected 
to spend a total time of several days working on this 
essentiality assessment.
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A fee of JPY 40,000 (approximately € 300) is charged, 
equal to the fee in the conventional advisory opinion 
system. This fee obviously does not reflect the total 
(labour) costs.
5.2.4 Usage of the advisory opinion system for essentiality assessment
As of March 2019, the JPO has not received any requests 
for Hantei-E. This is in stark contrast with the regular 
Hantei advisory opinion, for which dozens of requests are 
received every year.
We were informed that in cases concerning products that 
comply with standards, parties are advised by the JPO 
to request a conventional Hantei assessment instead of 
Hantei-E (insofar the product already actually exists).
 47 In cases where a patent owner argues that an implementer is infringing a patent but that the patent is not essential, and the patent owner argues 
they are not bound to any FRAND commitment, the implementer might want to attest that the patent is essential.
5.2.5 Limitations of the advisory opinion system
Hantei-E has various limitations, which may correspond 
with the reasons why the system has not yet been utilised.
1. Implementers are not likely to meet the scoping crite-
ria for requesting an opinion. As indicated above, the 
demandant must assert that a given patent is essen-
tial. In most cases, however, an implementer will not 
want to make such an assertion (it is much more likely 
that an implementer wants to assert that a patent is 
not essential). However, we note that there might be 
(exceptional) cases where this is different.47
2. The negotiating parties may be reluctant to engage in 
Hantei-E as all the information they provide will be-
come public and especially because this will usually 
include details about the negotiations between the 
parties. 
3. By requesting Hantei-E, a party may breach the con-
fidentiality agreements it entered into when starting 
negotiations with the other party. 
4. In Hantei-E, only a single patent is considered. It does 
not provide information about the essentiality rates of 
larger portfolios of patents. 
5. It is not possible to request Hantei-E for optional [nor-
mative] features of a standard. 
6. Hantei-E requires that the demandant selects a spe-
cific part of the standard to be considered. The proce-
dure will not consider that the patent may be essen-
tial for another part of the standard. Consequently, 
Hantei-E can only confirm that a patent is essential 
for the entire standard but cannot confirm a patent is 
not essential for the entire standard (as the patent 
may be essential for another part which is not being 
investigated). 
7. The requirements to file a request for Hantei-E are de-
manding (perhaps even more so for implementers). Af-
ter all, it is the demandant who must define the virtual 
object and compare it with the patented invention and 
the virtual object. 
8. The advisory opinion of essentiality is not legally 
binding. If an advisory opinion is not favourable for 
either party – the demandant or the demandee – the 
party in question can still take this to court (neither an 
appeal to the JPO nor a second advisory opinion are 
possible).
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In June 2019, the JPO published a revised version of 
its document describing Hantei-E [32], revealing several 
significant changes to this system, including: 
1. In addition to licensing negotiations, Hantei-E can 
now also be used for negotiations to buy and sell 
SEPs. 
2. You can now also request the JPO to provide an opin-
ion that a Virtual Object does not fall within the tech-
nical scope of the patented invention. 
3. Patents that are essential for optional [normative] fea-
tures are now within the scope of Hantei-E. 
4. Documents concerning Hantei-E can be kept confiden-
tial, subject to the JPO Commissioner’s approval, for 
instance in case of trade secrets.
5. The Hantei-E system also covers practically essential 
technologies which are not specified in the standards 
documents but necessary when implementing 
standards (referred to as “self-evidently technically 
essential”).
6. Multiple standard documents from various SDOs can 
be considered simultaneously for one single Hantei-E 
request (as far as relevant statements can be speci-
fied). 
5.4 | Conclusions
Until now, market parties have not made use of Hantei-E48. 
Our conversation with staff of the JPO indicated that the 
likely causes are that:
• There are several stringent admission criteria. Among 
other things, the requesting party must be willing to 
attest the patent is essential (so the procedure can-
not be initiated by a party that believes a patent is 
non-essential); both parties must declare that there 
is a dispute (if one party denies the dispute, the case 
is not admissible), and must agree to their roles in the 
procedure.
• Relevant information (also about the negotiations) will 
become public. Parties may be reluctant to have such 
information becoming public, and parties may also 
have entered into an NDA which does not allow them 
to disclose such information. 
• The test itself is narrowly defined. The requesting par-
ty must define a virtual object based on the stand-
ard; this object may not include optional features, and 
must indicate a specific part of the standard (hence, 
the procedure will not consider that the patent may be 
essential for another part of the standard, and there-
fore can never result in a conclusion that a patent is 
non-essential – it can only result in a statement that it 
is essential for that specific part of the standard. 
• Only one single patent is investigated, so no insights 
are generated on essentiality at the portfolio level. 
The Hantei-E revision incorporated several significant 
changes. By broadening the admission criteria, allowing for 
negative advice (i.e. that the virtual object submitted is not 
infringing upon the patent), including optional features in the 
standard, and allowing confidentiality and more, the Hantei-E 
system might be more appealing to potential users.
 48 In personal communications with a representative of the Japan Patent office, we were informed that as of 10 March 2020, there have not been 
requests for Hantei-E.
5.3 | Revision of Hantei-E in June 2019
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In recent years, automated text comparison based on 
semantic similarity measures and more recently on 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools has been on the rise. Given 
the nature of the task of essentiality assessment and 
the growing popularity of AI, many people are wondering 
whether AI systems would be suitable for such a task. If so, 
the benefits would be significant: they require relatively few 
human resources and have an almost infinite overall system 
capacity. Their analysis could be – in principle – impartial 
and free of human error or judgement. We will start by 
discussing the first academic paper applying semantic 
similarity to assess essentiality of patents (Section 6.2). 
We then reflect on the potential and limitations of AI-based 
essentiality assessments (Section 6.3). 
Automated approaches to essentiality 
assessment
6
6.1 | Introduction to semantic similarity and AI approaches
6.2 | The	Brachtendorf,	Gaessler,	and	Harhoff	study
Of particular interest is the first published study exploring 
the use of a semantic similarity approach to determine 
essentiality, by Lorenz Brachtendorf, Fabian Gaessler, and 
Dietmar Harhoff, associated with the Max Planck Institute 
for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Ludwig Maximilian 
University of Munich, and the Technical University of 
Munich [8]. Their study investigates the semantic similarity 
between patents and standards documents in order to 
assess the essentiality of patents disclosed as potentially 
essential to a technical standard. 
The paper considers standards documents, identified 
on the basis of patent declarations at ETSI (resulting in 
4,796 standards documents). The authors compare these 
with 37 million patent documents, considering patent 
claims as well as technological descriptions (see below).
The study uses an algorithm developed in the 2016 
dissertation by Michael Natterer [35], who later founded 
a company to further develop that algorithm. In essence, 
the algorithm measures similarity using a vector space 
model, calculating, among other things, the cosine 
distance between texts. It uses two metrics: similarity 
score (the absolute similarity value calculated by the 
algorithm, expressed as an integer between 0 and 1,000) 
and similarity rank (a focal patent’s rank relative to other 
patents, in order of similarity score). 
The algorithm is validated by comparing the findings with 
the results of the manual essentiality assessments for the 
TCL v Ericsson court case (see Chapter 3). At the individ-
ual patent level, consistency is limited. From the set of 
166 patents assessed to be essential by manual evalua-
tors, the automated system predicted only 40 (24%) were 
essential. From the set of 236 patents assessed not to 
be essential by manual evaluators, the automated system 
predicted 216 (92%) were not essential. If we assume the 
reference point is perfect (which it may not be), then the 
automated system has many false negatives, and fewer 
false positives. Yet, the authors find strong and highly 
significant correlations between the experts’ decisions 
on standard essentiality and their own measurement of 
semantic similarity, and good accuracy in predicting the 
share of actual SEPs in a larger portfolio. 
While emphasising that the “method can hardly replace a 
thorough manual assessment”, they describe their findings 
as a “meaningful approximation of standard essentiality” 
[8, p. 18] on an aggregate level, and name several use 
cases [8, pp. 21-22] to “estimate shares of true SEPs in firm 
patent portfolios”; to “facilitate the assessment of SEPs as 
well as the search for relevant, but (so far) undeclared 
patents”; and to “help singling out patents relevant for 
specific parts of the standard.” The authors point out 
that “a substantial advantage of [the] approach lies in its 
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scalability, and thus, time- as well as cost-efficiency”; it is 
also “arguably more objective and accessible than most 
of the proprietary datasets on SEP assessments.”
The authors furthermore note that “[…] we find that the 
semantic similarity between patents and standards is 
more strongly determined by the technological description 
than by the specific wording of the patent claims.” 
[8, p. 8]. However, in a robustness test, the authors show 
that the relationship holds when using the claims as sole 
input. The stronger determination of the patent description 
is interesting, but also worrying: it is only the claims that 
determine the scope of exclusive rights conferred by 
the patent, and therefore only the claims determine the 
essentiality.49 The technological description in the patent 
may be important to further understand the appropriate 
interpretation of the words used in the claim, but this 
description in itself cannot be considered a basis for 
essentiality. Further critique, also raised by the authors, 
is that the patent wording can be chosen strategically to 
resemble the standard document.
In sum, the method will hardly be able to replace a 
manual approach when it comes to assessing essentiality 
at individual patent level, but could prove very useful for 
efficient pre-screening. For that purpose, the approach 
can perhaps be further calibrated to have very few false 
negatives, at the expense of generating more false 
positives. After all, if used for pre-screening, the selected 
patents will still undergo a manual test. 
 49 See Article 69, Clause 1 of the European Patent Convention [19] “The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European 
patent application shall be determined by the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims.”
 50 As a simplified example, consider the use of the word ‘diode’, an electronic device that allows current to flow easily in one direction while present-
ing high resistance in the reverse direction. Before the broad introduction of the semiconductor diode, references to ‘diode’ implied a vacuum tube 
electronic device functioning as a diode. The semiconductor diode and the vacuum tube are very different devices, but depending on the context 
and time frame, the same word was used for both.
 51 The definition of essentiality at ETSI is explicit on this aspect: if alternatives exist that are not patented, the patent in question is not essential; if 
only alternatives exist that are also patented, then the focal patent is essential (as well as the patented alternatives). Rules at other SDOs differ 
or are not explicit [6, pp. 66-67].
6.3 | Conclusions 
While carrying out this study, we had many discussions 
on the use of automated systems, based on semantic 
similarity or on AI, for essentiality assessment. These 
discussions highlighted the advantages and potential, but 
also a number of – often inherent – limitations of such 
systems for determining essentiality.
Based on our discussions, we concluded that while 
automated approaches to essentiality assessment are 
promising, it is unlikely they will be able to replace human 
efforts in the short or medium term for a number of 
reasons:
1. The meaning, interpretation, and precise scope of 
words and terminology (both in patents and standards) 
are dependent on context, making it hard to automa-
tize.50 
2. Semantic approaches can face difficulties dealing with 
changes in terminology over time. This may be particu-
larly relevant for fundamental or foundational patents 
for technologies used in standards, because at the 
time these technologies were invented, the vocabulary 
might have been different from when the text for the 
standard was drafted. 
3. The patent to be evaluated, or parts of it, may be 
written in a different (natural) language than the re-
spective part of the standard. Furthermore, even with 
the same natural language, the vocabulary in patents 
(drafted by patent attorneys) often differs from that in 
standards (drafted by engineers). 
4. A technology or solution required to implement the 
standard may not be explicitly mentioned in the stand-
ard’s text, but still be required in order to satisfy the 
standard (i.e. implied by the standard). 
5. An essentiality analysis should consider possible al-
ternatives to the patent under investigation that may 
also satisfy the standard. This means that an auto-
mated approach should not only look at the patent 
under investigation, but also all other patented and 
non-patented inventions.51
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6. An AI system would require a reference training set, 
with a sufficiently large number of assessments, both 
positive and negative, of a very high confidence level. 
Such a perfect training set does not (yet) exist. 
7. Any such system is prone to gaming, whereby patent 
owners, anticipating the workings of such a system, 
will adapt the wording in their patent applications 
(which might end up in the granted patent claims) and 
in their technological contributions to SDOs (and might 
find their way into the text of the standard). 
Furthermore, we stress that any automated approach 
should base its conclusions for essentiality solely on the 
normative portions52 of a standard. Also, it should base its 
conclusions on essentiality solely on the text in the patent 
claims.53 
We do however acknowledge that automated approaches 
may be valuable as assisting tools and potentially 
improve the efficiency of human essentiality assessment. 
A primary role here could be reducing a large number of 
potentially essential patents (e.g. SDO disclosed patents) 
to a smaller set that might be essential (removing those 
which are ‘easy’ to determine as not essential at all, for 
instance because the standard is based on an entirely 
different technology than the one in the patent). For such 
a task, it is acceptable that the mechanism still selects 
some degree of false positives, but it should have an 
absolute minimum of false negatives (otherwise, patents 
would be deleted from the set even though they are in 
fact essential).54 To ascertain whether any system satisfies 
the latter requirement, you need a large set of actually 
essential patents to verify that (a reference set).
As indicated above, one of the challenges for creating such 
an AI system is the availability of a reference set, in order 
to validate the system’s performance, and, if relevant, train 
the system (sets must be different and non-overlapping). A 
set must be large enough to serve its purpose and include 
both actually essential and actually non-essential patents. 
The difficulty is obtaining such a set; those currently most 
likely to have such information (the owners themselves) 
are, for understandable reasons, not keen to make such 
information public, especially if it concerns non-essential 
patents (one of the reasons why the patents for our pilot 
were subject to NDAs). Yet, if the European Commission set 
up a system for essentiality assessment, the outcomes, 
generated over a certain period of time, could serve as 
input for developing, testing and validating an AI-based 
approach which could then be introduced to assist. This 
development could be outsourced to external parties, if 
the necessary confidentiality was ensured.
Another possible future role for a semantic-similarity or AI-
based approach is to identify potentially essential patents 
owned by companies that made blanket declarations at 
SDOs which allow this (e.g. IEEE, ITU, ISO, and IEC). For 
this purpose, the availability of a reference set is less of 
a challenge. 
Finally, there is also an important non-technical aspect to 
consider: whether stakeholders that need essentiality data 
(implementers, patent owners, and courts) will accept the 
outcomes of essentiality assessments based on semantic 
or AI approaches. The general attitude in society towards 
such systems is still an open question, as well as the 
specific views of stakeholders for whom the stakes can 
be high.
 52 The normative portion is that part of the text that must be implemented in order to comply with the standard. Standards documents also have 
many non-normative parts, which can be used to explain, clarify, give examples, and so on. According to the ETSI essentiality definition, both the 
mandatory and optional features in the standard are normative portions (other SDOs may have other definitions).
 53 After all, only the claims determine the scope of exclusive rights conferred by the patent, and therefore determine the essentiality. The description 
and drawings are to be taken into account for interpreting the claims. Note that for a considerable number of European patents, the claims are 
available in the English language (among others), but the description is only in German or French.
 54 Note that the study presented in Section 6.2 currently has the opposite characteristics: many false negatives and few false positives.
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Part of the Terms of Reference of this study was the 
execution of a ‘landscape’ study of patents disclosed at ETSI, 
one of the three European Standards Organisations (ESOs). 
This landscape analysis fulfils three main goals in this 
study: (a) to understand how patents disclosed at ETSI 
are best retrieved and processed in order to investigate 
them, (b) to understand the features of patents disclosed 
at ETSI, and the implications of these features using them 
as input for an essentiality assessment mechanism, and 
(c) to analyse whether SDO disclosed patents differ in 
quality (both technical merit and economic value) from 
other comparable patents. 
This chapter presents a summary of the landscape study, 
which is separately available as: 
Landscape analysis of potentially essential 
patents disclosed to SDOs
7
7.1 | Introduction and selected database
R. Bekkers, E. Raiteri, A. Martinelli & E. M. Tur (2020). “Landscape study of potentially essential patents disclosed to 
ETSI”. JRC Digital Economy Working Paper 2020-06, JRC120137. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/jrc.
7.2 | Data, methodology and approach 
Investigating patents disclosed at SDOs brings along a 
number of challenges. 
The first challenge is finding a reliable source of 
declarations data. This source has to enable us to clearly 
identify the universe of disclosed patents for a specific 
standard and all the members of the patent family of the 
disclosed patents. These are the requirements for reducing 
concerns about confounding effects in the analysis. Using 
a data source that is incomplete or does not enable us to 
reconstruct the full patent family of a disclosed patent 
would risk including patents in the analysis that have been 
disclosed as SEPs or members of a family disclosed as 
SEP. To ensure our analysis met the above requirements, 
we focussed on patents disclosed to a single SDO: the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), 
as was also specified in the Terms of Reference for this 
study). ETSI maintains a public and complete database 
of patents disclosed by patent owners as potentially 
essential to an ETSI standard. The language ETSI uses in 
its declaration form is “[patents and patent applications] 
that may or may become essential […]” [15, ANNEX 6, 
Appendix A]. A key element in the ETSI database is the 
‘basis patent’: the specific patent provided by the 
disclosing party. Although the disclosing party can state 
the identity of the basis patent’s family members, ETSI IPR 
policy determines that the FRAND licensing commitment 
entered into includes ALL the base patent’s family 
members,55 where the family definition is provided by ETSI 
(see below).
The information in the ETSI database also enabled us to 
reconstruct the patent family of disclosed patents and 
match the disclosed patents to other data sources in order 
to recover additional bibliographic information. 
The second challenge is that, although the ETSI database is 
public, the data collection and processing require considerable 
 55 Technically speaking, the disclosing party may also inform ETSI that it wishes to exclude a specific family member from its FRAND commitment.
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attention and careful decision making. We aimed to create a 
list of all the unique patents and patent applications disclosed 
to ETSI and identify all the family members of the disclosed 
patents. To this end, we applied the ETSI definition of patent 
family: an ego family of the basis patent which includes all 
the documents that have at least one priority in common 
with the basis document, as well as the priority document(s). 
In addition, we considered both granted patents and patent 
applications in our data gathering and identification process. 
For this reason, unless clearly indicated otherwise, whenever 
we mention ‘patents’ here, we mean both patent and patent 
applications (similar to ETSI IPR policy).
Third, we need to gather additional and up-to-date 
information about the ETSI disclosed patents. To do so, we 
matched the list of disclosed patents that we recovered 
from ETSI with the PATSTAT database (Autumn 2018 
version). Of particular importance is the identification and 
construction of the patent quality measurements used for 
the main analysis. 
Finally, the quality comparison between disclosed patents 
and ‘comparable’ patents not disclosed as SEP demanded 
the creation of an appropriate control set. To facilitate 
this task, we considered exclusively patents granted by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
or the EPO, both for the disclosed and the control patents. 
Then we applied exact matching techniques to increase 
the degree of similarity between the two groups, and, 
given the general abundance of potential control patents 
for each disclosed SEP, we randomly selected up to five 
control patents for each treated unit.
Table 3 summarises our approach and main outcomes.
Phase Data Method Outcome
Data collection:
– Identification of disclosed patents
– Identification of the ETSI patent 
family
ETSI online declarations 
database
EPO-PATSTAT Database 
(Autumn, 2018)
Database matching 
based on application/
publication number or 
family identifier
Identification of 25,072 disclosed 
(basis) patents and their related 
ETSI family
Landscape of disclosed patents:
– Construction of relevant patent 
variables (patent level)
– Descriptive statistics
25,072 disclosed (basis) 
patents as identified in 
Chapter 2 
Gather patent level 
information on the 
sample of 25,072 
disclosed (basis) 
patents
Patent-level information dataset
Description of the 
disclosed (basis) patents’ 
characteristics, regarding timing, 
technology, ownership, patent family 
size, claims, backwards and forward 
citations. 
Quality assessment:
– Identification of the disclosed 
patents
– Construction of the control set
– Quality assessment
Set 1: 4,607 granted 
disclosed European 
patents and 19,477 
matched control patents
Set 2: 12,832 granted 
disclosed USPTO patents 
and 56,100 matched 
control patents
EPO-PATSTAT Database 
(Autumn, 2018)
OECD Quality Database 
(Version 2019)
Starting point is the 
25,072 patent families 
as identified in  
Chapter 2. 
Focal patents are 
granted to EPO (USPTO) 
patent family members
Construction of the 
control group: exact 
matching of patent-
level characteristics 
Quality comparison between 
disclosed patents and patents not 
disclosed 
Regression analysis to account 
for quality differences between 
disclosed and control patents
TABLE 3:	OVERVIEW	OF	THE	PHASES,	DATA,	METHODOLOGY	AND	OUTCOMES	OF	OUR	APPROACH
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Our main conclusions are as follows: 
1. While the ETSI IPR database of disclosed potentially 
standard-essential patents is by far the most sophisti-
cated one, it is a non-trivial task to identify patent num-
bers from that database and clean/harmonise/select/
de-duplicate/transform that data into information that 
can be used for a given purpose, such as input for an 
essentiality assessment process.56 It is also important 
to have a good understanding of ETSI IPR policy, the 
related procedures, database aspects and in particular, 
the meaning of ‘patent family’ in the ETSI context. For 
good reasons, ETSI uses a tailor-made definition, and 
this has a significant impact on understanding and in-
terpreting the data for specific purposes. Unlike usual 
definitions of patent families such as DOCDB and IN-
PADOC, ETSI patent families are ego-families and not 
mutually exclusive. As a simplified example, Figure 2 
shows how a given set of eight patents and their prior-
ity relations translate into two DOCDB patent families, 
one INPADOC family, and eight ETSI patent families 
(which partly overlap). 
While the ETSI database also contains a large number 
of ‘non-harmonised records’ (i.e. records that ETSI itself 
has not yet managed to match with the European patent 
database), we found that these records are not likely to 
have a large impact on the use of the data. 
7.3 | Main	findings	from	landscape	analysis	of	SDO	disclosures
 56 In order to obtain correct counts of ETSI IPR declarations and patent disclosures for a given set of standards, we used, as recommended to us by 
ETSI, the on-line ETSI ‘Dynamic Reporting’ tool, not the ‘Declaration’ tool (which is reserved for declarants and does not eliminate any multiple 
declaration, as intended). ETSI also publishes a Special Report (SR 000 314) from time to time (usually twice a year) which lists all the declara-
tions and disclosures received so far. At the end of 2019 (after we finalised the data analysis for this report), ETSI started to make the Special 
Report also available as an Excel file which contains the main tables from the ETSI IPR Database and allows for advanced filtering in Excel without 
the need to know SQL query language.
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FIGURE 2:	THE	DIFFERENCES	BETWEEN	THE	DOCDB	PATENT	FAMILY	(TOP	LEFT),	THE	INPADOC	PATENT	FAMILY	(TOP	RIGHT),	AND	THE	ETSI	PATENT	FAMILY	
(BOTTOM	LEFT	AND	RIGHT),	FOR	A	GIVEN	SET	OF	PATENTS	AND	THEIR	ASSOCIATED	PRIORITIES.
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2. Data on disclosed patents provides valuable insights 
into which patents are potentially essential to a stand-
ard. This data clearly serves an important function with-
in the operation of the SDO itself, which is to ensure 
that a standard only requires known patents for which 
a FRAND commitment has been issued. It is important, 
however, to be well aware of the intrinsic limitations 
of such data if used for other purposes. Among other 
things, patents disclosed as being potentially essen-
tial: (1) may not be owned (anymore) by the disclosing 
firm, (2) may not be actually essential, (3) may not be 
granted, (4) may not be enforceable (valid, non-expired, 
renewal fees paid, etc.), (5) may greatly differ in techni-
cal merit, (6) may relate to functionalities not relevant 
for a certain product category (e.g. a mobile phone or an 
infrastructure product), and (7) may relate to optional 
normative features that might not be used in a given 
device conforming to the standard. Moreover, the pat-
ent families of these patents may differ substantially in 
terms of geographical coverage. 
3. ETSI-disclosed patents can be used as a starting point 
for an essentiality assessment procedure (see the 
scenarios Section 9.3). Overall, the dataset includes 
25,070 disclosed patent families, of which 16,089 
contain a European patent (Table 4, left column, also 
shown in Figure 3). Focusing on disclosed patent families 
whose basis patent was granted as of February 2019 
yields a much lower total of 12,760 families, among 
them 9,818 with an EPO family member (Table 4, 
middle column). If one limits the assessment procedure 
to SEP exposure in Europe (i.e. only looks at patent 
families that comprise a granted European patent), then 
the relevant dataset includes 8,320 European patents 
that would need to be investigated: 1,449 families that 
have a granted European patent as a basis patent, 
and for 6,871 families there is a granted European 
patent in the family of the disclosed basis (Table 4, 
right column). It is worth noting that those 2,942 patent 
families whose basis patent is granted but that do 
not contain a European patent are mostly filed at the 
Chinese patent office and at the WIPO. Numbers could 
go down a bit if one excludes expired patents from the 
analysis, as well as patents that cannot be enforced 
because renewal fees have not been paid. But doing so 
requires careful consideration whether there are family 
members of that patent that are still alive, which would 
result in enforceability (and thus SEP exposure) in other 
geographies. Further note that these were the numbers 
as of February 201957 and, almost on a daily basis, new 
patents are disclosed, and patents that were disclosed 
earlier in time, are granted.
 57 These numbers are based on the ETSI database as of late February 2019 (when we retrieved the data), and patent grant information is from 
the PATSTAT 2018 Autumn Edition.
Patent families Total number With granted basis patent 
With granted 
European 
patent
Total number of disclosed families (patent families following the ETSI family 
definition)
25,072 (100%) 12,760 (100%) 8,320 (100%)
which have an EPO basis patent  2,151 (8.6%)  1,449 (11.4%) 1,449 (17.4%)
which do not have an EPO basis patent but include an EPO family member 13,938 (55.6%)  8,369 (65.6%) 6,871 (82.6%)
which do not have an EPO basis patent and do not have an EPO family 
member
 8,983 (35.8%)  2,942 (23.1%) n/a
TABLE 4:	NUMBER	OF	DISCLOSED	PATENT	FAMILIES	(FOLLOWING	THE	ETSI	FAMILY	DEFINITION):	TOTAL,	WITH	GRANTED	BASIS	PATENT	AND	WITH	GRANTED	
EUROPEAN	PATENT.
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FIGURE 3:	TOTAL	NUMBER	OF	DISCLOSED	PATENT	FAMILIES	(APPLYING	THE	ETSI	DEFINITION	OF	FAMILY)	AND	WITH	EUROPEAN	BASIS	PATENTS.	ON	THE	BASIS	
OF	ETSI	DECLARATIONS	DATA	RETRIEVED	AS	PER	FEBRUARY	2019	
4. For the 6,871 families where there is a granted Euro-
pean patent in the family of the (non-EPO) disclosed 
basis patent, it is key that the ETSI patent family defi-
nition is used to identify that European patent. If the 
DOCDB family definition were used instead, changes 
are significant that no European patent is identified at 
all while there may very well exist an actually essential 
EPO family member of the disclosed patent. If the INPA-
DOC family definition were used, changes are significant 
that a European patent is selected which is actually 
non-essential, while another EPO family member exists 
that is actually essential (but not selected). 
5. There is considerable variety over time in the number of 
new patent families being disclosed. In general, there 
is an upward trend. In the years 2017 and 2018 alone, 
9,311 new patent families were disclosed to ETSI – 
that is 37% of the total of all 25,072 families (the year 
2019 falls outside our data set). This is a clear peak 
compared to other years, probably because of intense 
5G standardisation activity during that period.
6. There is considerable fragmentation in the distribution 
of companies – or organisations – that disclosed 
these patents, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, 
the distribution is skewed, with a long tail: out of the 
148 disclosing firms, 14 disclosed more than 
500 patent families, 21 companies disclosed between 
50 and 500 families, and 113 disclosed less than 
50 families. Again, we emphasise that the current 
owners of these patents may be different from the 
disclosing firms. These distributional characteristics 
are relevant in case any essentiality scheme chooses 
to use sampling: given the skewed nature of the 
distribution, a sample of disclosed patents might 
need to be stratified in order to be representative of 
individual firms. Assessing larger samples or even full 
portfolios for such companies is a potential solution.
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7. We observe big shifts over time in terms of the home 
country of firms disclosing patents (see Figure 4). Es-
pecially remarkable is the recent increase in shares of 
disclosed patent families from Chinese firms and, to 
a lesser degree, from South Korean firms, at the ex-
pense of European and US firms. Again, we stress that 
such numbers as such do not yet say anything about 
whether these patents will eventually be granted (and 
in which countries), and what their technical merit is, 
etc. But the growth in numbers is notable. This is also 
reflected in an increasing share of disclosed basis pat-
ents from the Chinese patent office. 
8. It would be desirable to break ETSI declarations related 
to cellular standards up into, for instance, technology 
generations (2G, 3G, 4G and 5G). Yet, despite the high 
sophistication of the ETSI declarations database, for 
the bulk of the ETSI declarations, such a distinction 
cannot be made in a reliable way without examining 
the content of each individual disclosed patent. This is 
related, among other things, to the way 3GPP technical 
specifications series are structured.
9. This study also investigated whether SDO disclosed 
patents differ in quality from other comparable pat-
ents. We looked at two dimensions of quality: tech-
nical merit (i.e. the technological contribution to the 
field) and economic value (i.e. the economic returns 
a patent generates). We use observable characteris-
tics of patents and patent families, such as forward 
citations, family size, and patent renewal, to proxy 
both dimensions (for details, see the separate land-
scape study report). While such proxies are known 
to be far from perfect, they do provide us with val-
uable insights. Our analyses showed that disclosed 
SEPs score higher in all the main proxies for patent 
quality commonly used in the patent literature. This 
is true for variables usually associated with technical 
merit and for those usually associated with economic 
value. All in all, these results confirm the expectation 
that patents disclosed to ETSI are of greater techno-
logical importance and have more market potential 
than suitable controls. Our interpretation of these 
findings is as follows:
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FIGURE 4:	NUMBER	OF	DISCLOSED	PATENT	FAMILIES	(USING	THE	ETSI	DEFINITION	OF	FAMILY)	BY	EARLIEST	DISCLOSING	COMPANY;	35	LARGEST	COMPANIES;	
FULL	TIME	PERIOD	(1990–2019).	(DATA	SET:	THE	25,072	DISCLOSED	BASIS	PATENTS	FROM	DIFFERENT	JURISDICTIONS).	BASED	ON	ETSI	DECLARATIONS	DATA	
RETRIEVED	AS	PER	FEBRUARY	2019.
Disclaimer: patents in the disclosed families shown here:
• may not be owned (anymore) by the disclosing firm,
• may not be factually essential,
• may not be granted,
• may not be enforceable (valid, non-expired, renewal fees paid, etc.),
• may greatly differ in technical merit
• may relate to functionalities not relevant for a certain product cat-
egory (e.g. a mobile phone or an infrastructure product),
• may relate to optional features that might not be used in a given 
device conforming to the standard.
Moreover, the patent families shown here may differ in terms of ge-
ographical coverage.
Note that this data set includes all ETSI standards: those based on 
3GPP Technical Specifications as well as others (DECT, TETRA, etc.)
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• That disclosed patents have a higher econom-
ic value than comparable, non-disclosed patents 
is not surprising. After all, a subset of these pat-
ents will become actually essential patents, then 
will need to be licensed by all parties in the world 
implementing that standard,58 and thus have the 
potential to generate significant licensing revenues 
(or other benefits such as cross-licensing oppor-
tunities). Hence, it is rational for the applicants of 
such patents to seek protection in many countries 
and renew their patent, precisely the variables as-
sociated with a patent’s higher economic value. 
• If disclosed patents have a higher technical mer-
it, this may indicate that SDOs are able to attract 
promising technologies (to know whether they are 
able to select attractive technologies for the stand-
ard, we would need to know which of these are 
actually essential). Yet, the higher technical merit 
may also be on account of the act of declaration as 
such, because: Firstly, disclosed patents are more 
‘visible’. Secondly, for any party investing in R&D in 
a technical field where standards are important, it 
is rational to build such R&D on knowledge already 
embedded in these standards, instead of on a 
‘dead track’. This also increases the likelihood that 
essential patents (and also the wider set of dis-
closed, potentially essential patents) receive more 
citations from future patents.
58 To be precise: insofar the patent is actually required for the normative portions of the standard that is implemented in a specific product.
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FIGURE 5:	SHARE	OF	DISCLOSED	PATENT	FAMILIES	(USING	THE	ETSI	DEFINITION	OF	FAMILY)	BY	DISCLOSING	FIRM’S	HOME	COUNTRY/REGION,	OVER	TIME	(DATA	
SET:	THE	25,072	DISCLOSED	BASIS	PATENTS	FROM	DIFFERENT	JURISDICTIONS).	NOTE	THAT	THE	1990–1995	TIME	FRAME	IS	OMITTED,	DUE	TO	FEW	OBSERVA-
TIONS	IN	THOSE	YEARS.	BASED	ON	ETSI	DECLARATIONS	DATA	RETRIEVED	AS	PER	FEBRUARY	2019.
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 59 Wherever we use the word infringement, note that if a patent is actually licensed, it is not infringing.
 60 DOCDB (somehow simplified) only identifies families that have exactly the same combination of priorities. Using this definition in the context of 
identifying family members for essentiality assessment, one would overlook members that might indeed include the essential claim. INPADOC 
identifies all families that share priorities, directly or indirectly. Using this definition in the context of identifying family members for essentiality 
assessment, one would risks including a lot of family members that do not include the essential claim of the disclosed patent at all (and even 
patents that are filed long before the invention of the essential claim!).
7.4 | Conclusions
The main results of our landscape study of disclosure of 
potentially essential patents made to ETSI are the following. 
• Caveats: Using data from the ETSI IPR database of 
disclosed potentially standard-essential patents is a 
non-trivial task that requires a good understanding of 
ETSI IPR policy and the related procedures. In particu-
lar, one needs to bear in mind that such SDO data-
bases were not created to be used in the context of 
licensing. Moreover, the fact that a patent has been 
disclosed as being potentially essential does not im-
ply that it is actually essential, granted, enforceable, 
of high technical merit, or necessarily infringed59 by all 
products that conform to the standard. 
• Trends and patterns of disclosure: We find a 
considerable variety over time in the number of new 
patent families being disclosed. In general, there is a 
strong upward trend, with a particularly high number of 
disclosures in 2017 and 2018. As to the home coun-
try of companies (or organisations) disclosing patents 
we observe an increase in recent years in the shares of 
disclosed patent families from China and, to a lesser 
degree, from South Korea. Looking at the companies (or 
organisations) that disclose patents we find a fragment-
ed and highly skewed distribution, with the top 6 out of 
a total of 148 accounting for more than half of all dis-
closed patent families. Finally, our analyses show that 
disclosed SEPs score higher in all the main proxies for 
patent quality commonly used in the patent literature.
• Use of ETSI disclosures for assessments: 
ETSI-disclosed patents can be used as a starting point 
for an essentiality assessment procedure for mobile 
communication standards. If one focusses on SEP ex-
posure in Europe, then (as of February 2019) our data-
set includes 8,320 European patents that would need 
to be investigated: 1,449 families according ETSI’s 
family definition that have a granted European patent 
as the disclosed (‘basis’) patent, and a further 6,871 
families that comprise a granted European patent. 
• Use of other SDOs disclosures for assess-
ments: Going beyond ETSI, one needs to be aware 
that there is a large variation between SDO patent dis-
closure databases. In particular, SDOs that allow blan-
ket disclosures (which do not explicitly name patents 
deemed essential) pose a very significant challenge.
• Importance of the appropriate patent family 
definition:	If disclosed patents are indeed used as a 
starting point, one will often need to consider the fam-
ily members of these patents. Here, it is important to 
take good note of the ego-family definition that ETSI 
adopted. This definition allows for identification of all 
those patents that in fact share one or more priorities 
with the disclosed patent. Other patent family defini-
tions (such as the widely used DOCDB and INPADOC) 
do not work in this way,60 and we advise against using 
these other definitions when considering family mem-
bers in the context of assessing essentiality.

8
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY: 
PILOT EXPERIMENT  
ON ESSENTIALITY 
ASSESSMENT
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One of the key elements of the overall study is a pilot 
experiment, in which a variety of assessors evaluated 
patents for their actual essentiality. We start by describing 
the experiment set-up, our reference point and then how, 
the we collected our data and constructed our cases.
Technical feasibility: pilot experiment  
on essentiality assessment
8
8.1 | Pilot experiment on essentiality assessment
8.1.1 Experiment set-up
The pilot experiment we conducted consists of two parts. 
The first part, also called the ‘internal experiment’, focused 
on differences across assessor profiles in terms of skills 
and background. The assessors in this part were members 
of the research consortium and had the following profiles: 
(1) patent examiners, (2) patent attorneys, (3) senior-level 
engineers and (4) junior-level engineers (supervised). The 
second part, also called the ‘external experiment’, focused 
on the effects of the availability of claim charts and on 
regular assessment vs. novelty-based assessment. Here, 
the assessments were carried out by examiners working for 
patent offices across Europe. Our main goal was to ensure 
that all the assessors are both neutral and professional. 
In total, over both experiments, 28 different persons 
(assessors) performed a total of 205 assessments. 
A single assessor carried out up to 9 assessments 
(7.3 on average). The assessors reported they spent an 
average of 6.9 hours on each case, which means that 
all the assessors together spent a total of 1,414 hours 
(176 working days) on assessments. 
We wish to express our gratitude to the patent offices and their individual examiners participating in this experiment. 
Our various meetings and extensive dialogues with these offices enabled us to improve our pilot experiment, and 
the very significant resources these offices made available permitted us to make a large number of observations, 
and thus achieve more robust conclusions.
Numerous ‘cases’ were prepared for the experiment, 
whereby each case included: (a) a patent, (b) one or more 
specific standard documents for which essentiality needs 
to be assessed (e.g. TS 25.211 V2.5.0), and, in selected 
cases, (c) a claim chart document. We aimed to include 
a broad sample of patents and standard documents, 
to ensure our findings would not be the result of some 
specificities of individual patents or standards. In total, 
the experiment involved 45 unique patents and 48 unique 
standards documents. Cases were randomly allocated to 
assessors, while ensuring that a single assessor never 
received more than one case on the same patent or on the 
same standard document (to prevent unobserved learning 
effects). 
The assessments were set up as a blind experiment. 
The patents to be assessed were anonymous: applicant, 
inventor names and patent numbers were removed, and 
assessors received strict guidelines not to consult any 
other information about the patents they were looking 
at than the one provided. A Chinese wall was created 
between the people carrying out the assessments and the 
people who designed the experiment. Among other things, 
the assessors did not know that their results would be 
compared to a reference point.
To ensure the assessors did not have to look at patents 
outside the scope of their own knowledge area, the 
experiment focused on one single technological area, and 
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individual assessors were chosen on the basis of their 
knowledge of that area. In consultation with the European 
Commission, we decided to focus the experiment on the 
ETSI/3GPP 3G and 4G standards. 
One important element of the experiment was to inform 
the assessors about what definition of essentiality they 
should apply for conducting their task. Our starting point 
here was to stay as close as possible to the definition 
of essentiality adopted by ETSI,61 the standards body 
that created the 3G and 4G standards central to our 
experiment. (Moreover, the patent pools from which we 
derived our reference points – see below – use an identical 
or very similar definition to ETSI.) While staying as close as 
possible to ETSI’s definition, we explained essentiality in a 
way that would be more informative for our assessors.62 
We furthermore emphasised to our assessors that their 
exercise should disregard the patent’s presumed validity, 
enforceability (e.g. whether the patent has expired, has 
been declared invalid by a court, etc.), its economic value, 
and whether the patent would be infringed by a specific 
product or product category based on the standard.63 
During our meetings with the patent offices, the argument 
was raised that the above definition of essentiality 
includes the concept of ‘infringement’. Some offices felt 
that due to the nature of their regular activities, they 
would be ill-equipped to answer questions relating to 
infringement, whereas other offices indicated they would 
not have any problems using such a concept. (The latter 
category included offices that already offer freedom-to-
operate services on the market, and such services also 
use the concept of infringement.) During the discussions 
with patent offices on alternative approaches that would 
not require the concept of infringement, an assessment 
was proposed which we will call the novelty-based 
assessment. In this assessment, the assessor carries 
out the following thought experiment: In the hypothetical 
case that the standard document had already been 
published before the patent’s priority date, would that 
document have been novelty-destroying? Note that this is 
a hypothetical case: a valid patent can only be standard-
essential if its priority date precedes the publication of the 
standards document for which it is essential; if the order 
would have been the other way around, then the patent 
would by definition not meet the novelty requirement 
and thus be invalid. The outcomes of this novelty-based 
assessment may indeed be very similar to those of a 
regular essentiality assessment (we test that in our pilot 
experiment). During extensive discussions with the patent 
offices and other parties, we tried to identify situations 
where the outcomes of the two assessments would be 
different, but we did not find any. In fact, most parties 
commented that even though the criteria to be assessed 
are different, the actual work the assessor carries out 
seems very similar. Based on the above, we gave patent 
offices the freedom to perform the experiment using the 
alternative novelty-based assessment. Ultimately, one 
office decided to do so, and the examiners at that office 
were given an adapted version of the instruction set, in 
which the regular definition of essentiality was replaced 
by one based on novelty.
The experiment took place between May and September 
2019. To ensure the essentiality assessments would be 
as reproducible and objective as possible, the assessors 
were given a 15-page instruction set, developed in 
collaboration with the participating patent offices. This 
document included the precise task and procedure to be 
followed, definitions of essentiality and other relevant 
concepts, organisational elements, an explanation of 
what other documents they could or could not consult, 
example evaluations, and the feedback we sought (both 
the determination of essentiality and other qualitative 
feedback). Communication with assessors took place via a 
personalised web system, whereby each assessor received 
 61 ETSI’s definition of essentiality is: ‘“ESSENTIAL” as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking 
into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise 
dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR. For the avoidance of 
doubt in exceptional cases where a STANDARD can only be implemented by technical solutions, all of which are infringements of IPRs, all such 
IPRs shall be considered ESSENTIAL.’ See Clause 15 (Definitions) of ANNEX 6 (ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy) in [15].
 62 The explanation we gave our assessors was: “A patent is essential with respect to a particular standard if it is not possible to comply with the 
standard without infringing that patent. More specifically: (1) Essentiality should take into account normal technical practice and the state of the 
art generally available at the time of standardization, (2) A patent is essential even if it would only be infringed when implementing optional 
features of the standard, and (3) The costs of alternative (non-infringing) implementations should not be taken into account when deciding 
essentiality (i.e. ‘commercial essentiality’ is not considered here). There may be a very specific situation where the following applies: If an un-
patented alternative is available that complies with the standard, then the patent cannot be essential. If alternatives exist, but are all patented, 
then they are all considered essential.”
 63 Ideally, our experiment would have used precisely the same definition of product categories as the pool reference points. However, as our exper-
iment included four different pools, each with their own product category definition, this was not possible.
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precisely the right information and set of documents and 
could provide results and feedback per case and general 
feedback. This web system also ensured that cases were 
performed (and submitted) one by one.64 
8.1.2 Reference point: patent pool inclusion
Ideally, a pilot experiment like this would be able to 
compare the assessment outcome with the absolute truth, 
and thus be able to measure the accuracy of assessments, 
as well as the shares of false positives (patents assessed 
to be essential but actually not) and false negatives 
(patents assessed as not essential but actually are). 
But such a perfect world does not exist. Ultimately, the 
verdict of essentiality (and infringement) lies with an 
authorised court, and there are very, very few cases where 
this verdict is drawn (far too few to be able to serve as 
reference point for a study like this). Moreover, verdicts 
of court cases may be reversed in appeal, or based on 
specific assumptions (e.g. essentiality with respect to a 
specific product category) or conditions (e.g. patent law in 
a specific country). Furthermore, the selection of patents in 
court cases is not random. Thus, perfect reference points 
do not exist in the real world.
Yet, despite not being ‘perfect’, one data item does exist 
that can serve as sensible reference point: the essentiality 
assessments carried out by patent pools. As already 
concluded in our case study on pools (see Chapter 4), 
pools have well-developed and sophisticated assessment 
procedures, carried out by external parties. They have many 
years of experience in this, spend significant resources 
on such assessments and have appeal procedures if 
stakeholders believe an assessment is not accurate. Yet, 
arguably, in case of uncertainty about the actual essentiality 
of a patent submitted by a member, patent pools may be 
subject to incentives to include that patent, which would 
lead to over-inclusion. Also, communication between a 
submitting member and the evaluator as well as appeal 
opportunities may lead to over-inclusion. At the same time, 
such effects may be offset by pressure from other members 
not to do so, as these other members would see their own 
share in the allocation of royalties drop, and thus demand 
neutral judgements. After carrying out our experiment, we 
investigated our data, but found no indications that suggest 
our pool reference point suffers from over-inclusion.65 
Given the fact we work with patent pools as reference 
points, our study will not report results in terms of accuracy, 
false positives and false negatives, but instead speak of 
consistency (with the pool results), inconsistent positives 
(patents by a patent pool member that are assessed as 
essential, but are not included in the pool) and inconsistent 
negatives (patents assessed as non-essential but included 
in the patent pool). 
Table 5 presents an overview of concepts in the ‘perfect 
world’ and in our pilot experiment. 
In the below sections, present our findings on the 
consistency rates with pools. When we do so, please 
keep in mind that even when new assessments would be 
done with exactly the same procedure as used by these 
pools (and even by the pool assessors themselves), the 
‘consistency’ outcome is not by definition 100%. After all, 
individual assessors might still come to different outcomes 
(we further discuss that below at Section 10.1).
 64 This was done to prevent assessors, after completing their last case, from changing their assessment of earlier cases (for instance assuming 50% 
of the cases should have been essential). It was also pivotal in order to measure learning effects.
 65 If over-inclusion was indeed significantly present in our cases, we would see more inconsistent negatives than inconsistent positives in our 
experiment. However, looking at the actual data, we see this is not the case. Thus, while we cannot rule out over-inclusion by pools with a high 
confidence level, we have no indications of it.
The ‘perfect world’ This pilot experiment
Accuracy: degree to which assessments are similar to absolute 
truth
Consistency: degree to which assessments in the experiment are 
similar to the outcomes of patent pool assessments
False positives: patents assessed to be essential but are 
actually not
Inconsistent positives: a patent pool member’s patents that are 
assessed as essential in the pilot, but not included in the pool
False negatives: patents assessed not to be essential but 
actually are
Inconsistent negatives: patents assessed as non-essential in the 
pilot, but included in the patent pool
TABLE 5:	CONCEPTS	IN	THE	‘PERFECT	WORLD’	AND	IN	OUR	PILOT	EXPERIMENT.
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Given the two values of the reference point (included 
or not in the pool), and our aim to be able to compare 
assessments with and without the claim charts made 
available to the assessors,66 we created a data set with 
the cases that fall into four different categories, as shown 
in Table 6. 
8.1.3 Data collection and case construction
 66 The claim charts made accessible to the assessors are the same ones these patent owners used for their earlier pool submission. While the 
format of these charts is not pre-defined by pools in detail, they do all look similar: they identify the patent and the standards document(s) in 
question, and provide a table of alleged essentiality links between specific patent claims and paragraphs in the standards document(s), followed 
by an extensive discussion on each of these alleged essentiality links, where each feature in the patent claim relates to the full text in the stand-
ard (often color-coded by feature).
 67 For an explanation on these entities, see Chapter 4.
Patent included in pool (‘supposed essential’) Pool member patents not included in pool  (‘supposed non-essential’)
Claim 
chart made 
available to 
assessor
Category I
• Data source: pool acceptance information supplied by 
patent owner; claim charts supplied by patent owner
• Data quality: very high
• Assessment difficulty: average 
Category II
• Data source: pool rejection information supplied by 
patent owner; claim charts supplied by patent owner
• Data quality: very high
• Assessment difficulty: high (see text) 
No claim 
chart made 
available to 
assessor
Category III
• Data source: pool inclusion information from pool 
publication
• Data quality: very high
• Assessment difficulty: average
Category IV
• Data source: pool non-inclusion data reconstructed 
(see text)
• Data quality: medium (see text)
• Assessment difficulty: average
TABLE 6:	THE	FOUR	CATEGORIES	OF	CASES	IN	OUR	PILOT.
To construct our cases, we consulted several 
complementary data sources. While most patent pools 
publish data on individual patents that are included in 
the pool (and hence have successfully passed the pool 
assessment), pools invariably do not publish information 
on patents rejected because they did not pass the 
essentiality assessment. Furthermore, for neither 
accepted nor rejected patents do pools publish the claim 
charts submitted by the patent owners. Since we wanted 
to have accepted as well as rejected patents in our 
experiment, and also access to the original claim charts, 
we sought collaboration with companies to give us this 
private data. We formally approached ten SEP owners67 
who had submitted patents to the WCDMA patent pool, 
the Sisvel LTE/LTE-A patent pool, the Via Licennsing 
LTE patent pool, or the Avanci patent pool – all pools 
that focus on the same technological area as our pilot 
experiment. Following the initial responses from these 
patent owners, we entered into extensive discussions 
with three SEP owners, covering the patent information 
as well as the non-disclosure agreements (NDA) they 
would require in order to agree to share such data with 
us and with the assessors in our experiment. Eventually, 
agreements were reached, and NDAs were signed with 
all involved parties, allowing us to create cases for both 
categories I and II in Table 6.
We wish to express our gratitude to the SEP owners and persons involved in this project, by discussing and/or 
providing the information required to execute this experiment. We appreciate that each SEP owner has invested a 
significant amount of time and resources in their cooperation, for which we are extremely grateful.
It is important to note that cases in category II are 
expected to be, on average, of a relatively higher difficulty 
level. After all, a patent owner will only submit a patent 
to a pool if they perceive there is a good chance it will be 
found essential. Patents that are clearly not essential (e.g. 
because the final standard uses a different technology 
than the one covered by the patent, or where the claim 
in the patent application giving rise to essentiality is no 
longer present in the granted patent) will likely not be 
selected by the patent owner for pool submission. 
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The data collected via the above procedure is of very high 
quality (we can be certain of pool acceptance or rejection, 
and each individual data point was extensively discussed 
with the patent owner). Given the self-selection of patents 
submitted to patent pools as described above, however, 
there are considerably fewer rejections at patent pools 
than acceptances. As a result, we only had a limited 
number of observations generated this way, which we used 
for categories I and II. Ideally, we would use data from the 
same procedure also for categories III and IV (although no 
claims charts would be needed for these, we would benefit 
from the high data quality), but given the scarcity of data 
points, we had to resort to another approach for categories 
III and IV, which we describe below. 
For category III, we relied on the patent list from the so-
called WCDMA patent pool (a pool which we discussed 
in the assessment procedures in Chapter 4)68 that was 
published by pool administrator SIPRO [38].69 The data from 
this source is also of a very high quality: we can be certain of 
pool acceptance. The most challenging category, however, is 
category IV. As pool rejection cannot be directly observed 
here, we had to reconstruct this category, by creating a set 
of patents very similar to the one in the actual pool. To do 
so, we selected patents using a set of defined criteria.70 
Where possible, we performed additional steps to check the 
selected patents were indeed not essential. 
While we believe that this is the best possible approach 
to find patents for this category, it cannot be ruled out 
that some of the patents we found were – for whatever 
reason – never offered to the pool for assessment. As 
a result, the uncertainty for data in this category is 
inherently higher than for the other three categories 
(and hence we characterised data quality as ‘medium’ in 
Table 6). Furthermore, we carefully checked the outcome 
of the experiment for any indications that an individual 
data point might be problematic, and for this reason 
discarded a limited number of cases from our final 
analysis.71 Before this step, we already removed some 
other cases when we learned that not all our assessors 
had followed our instructions in terms of which standard 
documents (or versions thereof) had to be considered, 
thereby rendering their assessment result incomparable 
to that of the pool assessment.72
Thinking about a future mechanism for essentiality 
assessment, the cases in quadrant I, II, and III are more 
representative of a mechanism where (selected) patents 
are submitted by patent owners for evaluation. Cases in 
IV, in contrast, are more representative of a mechanism 
where the starting point is all patents disclosed to an 
SDO.
 68 Over time, different names and organisations have been associated with this pooling activity. First, the activities moved from UMTS IPR Working 
Group to the UMTS IP Association (UIPA), and then to the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P). An organisation called PlatformWCDMA Ltd 
was exclusively established for the WCDMA pool. Initially, a newly established firm 3G Licensing Ltd was given the task of performing licensing 
operations; that task was later assigned to Sipro Labs Telecom, and currently Via Licensing acts as a licensing administrator for this pool.
 69 This list was downloaded from [www.sipro.com] but the website is no longer available (and the pool currently has a different licensing administrator).
 70 These criteria are as follows: (1) the patent owner is a member of the WCDMA pool, (2) the patent was declared to ETSI as potentially essential for 
the relevant standards, (3) the ETSI declaration included information on the specific standards documents for which the standard was potentially 
essential, (4) the ETSI declaration was within a time window in which the declaring firm declared most of its patents that eventually became 
WCDMA pool patents, (5) the patent itself is not part of WCDMA pool patents nor of an INPADOC family containing other patents that are among 
WCDMA pool patents, and (6) the patent was applied for at the EPO and granted.
 71 Eventually, we noted that 5 patents in our data set (of a total of 45 unique patents) were each assessed by at least two different assessors in our 
experiment, and for 75% or more of the observations, our assessors disagreed with the pool. These patents all belonged to Category IV. Looking 
at the qualitative feedback, we noted that for all five cases, our assessors reported specific issues after conducting their assessment. The 22 
observations associated with these 5 patents were discarded from our analysis.
 72 On the basis of this, we discarded already 32 cases. After these removals, there are 205-32-22=151 observations in the final data set. Of these, 
42 are in the internal experiment and 109 in the external experiment. Note that in Table 7 and Table 12, on the internal experiment, we do not 
include the 5 cases that have claim charts, so we show 42-5=37 cases there.
8.2 | Main	findings	from	our	pilot	experiment
In this section, we discuss our main findings, focusing on 
the following questions: 
1. How consistent are the assessment results with the 
pool outcomes?
2. How frequently are assessments inconsistent positives 
or inconsistent negatives?
3. How does the availability of claim charts affect the 
results?
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We tested our results for statistical significance. The 
appropriate statistical test here has the null hypothesis 
that the assessment does not discriminate. This can be 
tested with a chi-square test of proportions to check 
whether the table is homogeneous. The p-value for this 
test74 is 0.015 and using a 10% confidence level,75 we 
can thus reject the null hypothesis. In other words, from 
a statistical perspective, assessments (in the internal 
experiments) work better than a random labelling as 
“essential” or “non-essential”, with probability proportional 
to the number of cases included or not in the pool.
Table 8 shows external assessments (109 in total). 
In 74% of all the observations, the outcomes of the 
external experiment are consistent with the patent pool 
determination. Note, however, that because the cases 
in the external experiment include observations both 
with and without claim charts, we should not directly 
compare these results with those of the internal 
experiment in Table 7, which excludes observations 
with claim charts. 
8.2.1 How consistent are the assessment results with the pool outcomes?
Table 7 presents the internal assessments (37 in total).73 Overall, 70% of the outcomes are consistent with the patent 
pool determination.
Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
Patent included in pool (‘supposed essential’) 15 (75%) 
(Consistent with pool)
5 (25%) 
(Inconsistent negatives)
20 (100%)
Patent of pool member not included in pool  
(‘supposed non-essential’)
11 (64%) 
(Consistent with pool)
6 (36%) 
(Inconsistent positives)
17 (100%)
Total 26 (70%) 11 (30%) 37 (100%)
TABLE 7:	DISCRIMINATION	BETWEEN	ESSENTIAL	AND	NON-ESSENTIAL	PATENTS	(INTERNAL	EXPERIMENT).
Note: Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
 73 Note that we have not included the (few) internal assessments where claim charts were provided.
 74 For our analysis, we considered applying Yates correction for continuity in the 2x2 contingency tables, but finally decided not to use it as this tends 
to overcorrect. However, in all the cases where it could be applied, it did not actually make a difference to our results.
 75 Given the number of observations in our pilot experiment, we worked with a 90% confidence level throughout the study.
 76 Cases with claim charts were included.
Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
Patent included in pool (‘supposed essential’) 53 (83%) 
(Consistent with pool)
 11 (17%) 
(Inconsistent negatives)
64 (100%)
Patent of pool member not included in pool  
(‘supposed non-essential’)
28 (62%) 
(Consistent with pool)
17 (38%) 
(Inconsistent positives)
45 (100%)
Total 81 (74%) 28 (26%) 109 (100%)
TABLE 8:	DISCRIMINATION	BETWEEN	ESSENTIAL	AND	NON-ESSENTIAL	PATENTS	(EXTERNAL	EXPERIMENT)76
Note: Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
We tested our results for statistical significance. Again, 
the appropriate statistical text has the null hypothesis 
that the assessment does not discriminate, so we used 
a chi-square test of proportions to check whether the 
table is homogeneous. The resulting p-value for this test 
is 0.00000137 and using a 10% confidence level, we can 
thus reject the null hypothesis. In other words, assessments 
(for the external experiments) work better than a random 
classification. Yet, for the internal experiment, the share 
of assessments inconsistent with those of the respective 
pool is considerable.
4. Is there a difference between regular essentiality 
assessment and ‘novelty-based’ assessment?
5. Is there a learning curve in terms of consistency with 
pool assessments?
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For the internal experiment, we consider the results 
shown in Table 7 above. We see that inconsistent 
positives occur more often than inconsistent negatives 
(36% vs. 25%), suggesting a bias toward a positive 
assessment. We tested these results for statistical 
significance. Our null hypothesis here is that there 
are no differences in the occurrence of inconsistent 
positives and inconsistent negatives. Performing chi-
square test of proportions, we find a p-value of 0.49. 
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there 
are no differences between inconsistent positives and 
negatives. This non-significance is probably due to the 
small sample size.
For the external experiment, we consider the results shown 
in Table 8. Again, we see that inconsistent positives occur 
more often than inconsistent negatives, in fact now about 
twice as often (17% vs. 38%). We tested this difference 
for statistical significance. Our null hypothesis here is that 
there are no differences in the likelihood of inconsistent 
positives and inconsistent negatives. Performing chi-
square test of proportions, we find a p-value of 0.015. 
Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences between inconsistent positives and inconsistent 
negatives. Assessors appear to be biased toward a positive 
assessment; and having more observations and a larger 
difference allowed us to establish significance.
As indicated, 70% (internal experiment) and 74% (external experiment) of all the assessments in our experiment 
are consistent with those in the respective pool. We should, however, emphasise that: (1) we selected and stratified 
our cases in such a way that we were able to answer our defined research questions (such as the effect of the 
availability of claim charts), and (2) we believe pools are a good but not necessarily perfect reference point. 
Consequently, these percentages should not be taken as our expected accuracy outcome if a future assessment 
mechanism was introduced.
8.2.2 How frequently are assessments inconsistent positives  
or inconsistent negatives?
 77 See Section 8.1.3.
8.2.3	 How	does	the	availability	of	claim	charts	affect	the	results?
We answer this research question by looking at the 
external experiment, as that was specifically set up to 
determine the effect of claim charts. As shown in Table 
9, the share of consistent assessments for patents with 
claim charts is 83% (compared to 67% for patents without 
claim charts), suggesting that accuracy greatly improves if 
claim charts are available. We should emphasise that the 
cases with claim charts were more ‘difficult’ than those 
without.77 Thus, for cases of comparable difficulty, the 
difference might be even greater than the 67% to 83% 
increase suggests.
Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
No claim chart 38 (67%) 19 (33%) 57 (100%)
Claim chart 43 (83%) 9 (17%) 52 (100%)
Total 81 (74%) 28 (26%) 109 (100%)
TABLE 9:	DIFFERENCES	AS	A	RESULT	OF	THE	AVAILABILITY	OF	CLAIM	CHARTS	(EXTERNAL	EXPERIMENT)	
Note: Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
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We tested our results for statistical significance. Our null 
hypothesis is that there are no differences in consistency 
levels between experiments with and without claim 
charts available. (In other words, the 28 inconsistent 
assessments in Table 9 should be distributed over the 
rows “No claim chart” and “Claim chart” in proportion to 
the total number of cases in each row, yielding expected 
values of 14.6 and 13.4 respectively.) Performing chi-
square test of proportions, we find a p-value of 0.056. 
Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences between the availability or non-availability of 
claim charts. 
8.2.4	 Is	there	a	difference	between	regular	essentiality	assessments	 
and ‘novelty-based’ assessments? 
Since it was decided at a later stage that one patent office 
would do a ‘novelty-based’ assessment instead of the 
regular essentiality assessment, we now examine to what 
extent this assessment yields different results in terms 
of accuracy. We see that the outcomes of novelty-based 
assessments are slightly more often (79%) consistent 
with the pool outcome than the regular essentiality 
assessments (73%).
Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
Regular essentiality assessments 59 (73%) 22 (27%) 81 (100%)
Novelty-based assessments 22 (79%) 6 (21%) 28 (100%)
Total 81 (74%) 28 (26%) 109 (100%)
TABLE 10:	NOVELTY-BASED	VS.	REGULAR	ESSENTIALITY	ASSESSMENTS	(EXTERNAL	EXPERIMENT).
Note: Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
We tested our results for statistical significance. Our 
null hypothesis here is that there are no differences in 
consistency levels between experiments using the novelty-
based assessment and those using the regular definition 
of essentiality. Performing a chi-square test of proportions, 
we find a p-value of 0.55. Thus, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences between the 
regular essentiality assessments and the novelty-based 
assessments. 
Combining claim chart availability and novelty-based assessments
The results shown in Table 11 also indicate the average 
time spent per case (self-reported). Interestingly, the 
consistency of novelty-based assessments seems to 
increase if no claim charts are provided, but to decrease if 
claim charts are made available.
Above we looked at chart availability and novelty-based assessments separately, but since these effects may be 
interrelated, we now look at the combination of both.
Claim chart provided Type of assessment Consistent with pool
Inconsistent with 
pool Total Time spent
No Regular 27 (63%) 16 (37%) 43 (100%) 7.26 hrs.
No Novelty-based 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%) 12.63 hrs.
Yes Regular 32 (84%) 6 (16%) 38 (100%) 5.89 hrs.
Yes Novelty-based 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%) 10.44 hrs.
All 81 (74%) 28 (26%) 109 (100%) 7.93 hrs.
TABLE 11:	CLAIM	CHART	AVAILABILITY	AND	NOVELTY-BASED	ASSESSMENTS	(EXTERNAL	EXPERIMENT).
Note: Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
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Our null hypothesis here is that there are no differences 
in consistency with the pool result if the assessments 
are novelty-based or based on the regular definition 
of essentiality, taking into account the differences in 
consistency whether claim charts are provided or not. 
Performing chi-square test of proportions, we find a p-value 
of 0.247. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there are no differences between the regular essentiality 
assessments and the novelty-based assessments. 
8.2.5 Is there a learning curve in terms of consistency with pool assessments?
To assess the effect of a possible learning curve, we 
consider how the consistency of assessments develops 
as a function of the number of assessments already 
performed. For the internal experiment, Table 12 shows 
accuracy levels by assessment sequence number (if 
that number is 3, for instance, the assessor has already 
performed two previous assessments). Surprisingly, we 
see that the accuracy of the first assessment is relatively 
high, then the accuracy drops in assessments 2 to 6. 
(Because we randomised cases, we can rule out that this 
has anything to do with the nature of the first assessment 
as such.) Observations 7 and 8 are again more accurate. 
Note, however, that not all assessors did as many as 
8 assessments and consequently, the final observations 
are based on relatively few data points. We can only 
speculate about what caused this pattern, but one possible 
explanation is that the assessors took their first case very 
seriously, felt it was not that difficult, and were perhaps 
less focused for the next few cases. 
Assessment sequence no. Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
1 7 (88%) 1 (12%) 8 (100%)
2 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 7 (100%)
3 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 5 (100%)
4 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 7 (100%)
5 1 (33%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%)
6 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2 (100%)
7 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%)
8 2 (100%) 0 0(%) 2 (100%)
Total 26 (70%) 11 (30%) 37 (100%)
TABLE 12:	LEARNING	CURVE	(INTERNAL	EXPERIMENT)78
 78 Cases with a claim chart were excluded. Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total between brackets.
 79 In other words, the 11 inconsistent assessments in our table should be distributed over all the sequence numbers in proportion to all the assess-
ments with the corresponding number, and the same for all the consistent assessments. For example, 5 of 37 cases are “sequence number 3” 
assessments, and so under the null hypothesis, the expected value of inconsistent “sequence number 3” assessments equals 11 × 5 / 37 = 1.486. 
Under the null hypothesis, the deviations we observe would be purely random variations.
We tested these results for statistical significance. Our 
null hypothesis here is that there are no differences in 
accuracy as a function of the number of cases already 
assessed.79 Performing chi-square test of proportions, 
with null hypothesis that the table is homogeneous, we 
find a p-value of 0.490. Similarly, regressing the share of 
consistent assessments on the sequence number using 
the row totals as weights yields an insignificant slope of 
0.008, p=0.59. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that there are no differences between the stages in the 
ex-ante probability of a correct assessment.
In the external experiment, each assessor assessed 
8 patents, and so we have considerably more (109) valid 
observations than in the internal experiment. As can be 
seen in Table 13, results vary somewhat less than for the 
internal experiment, even though there is a bit of a drop 
for the sixth case. We can only speculate, but perhaps this 
is the result of reduced focus when carrying out repetitive 
tasks. 
Our null hypothesis is, again, that there are no differences 
in accuracy as a function of the number of cases already 
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assessed. Performing chi-square test of proportions, 
we find a p-value of 0.909. Thus, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that there are no differences. In contrast, 
regressing the share of consistent assessments on the 
sequence number using the row totals as weights, yields a 
significant negative slope of –0.016 (i.e., a decrease in the 
share by 1.6% per round), p<0.001. 
Assessment sequence no. Consistent with pool Inconsistent with pool Total
1 10 (83%)  2 (17%)  12 (100%)
2 10 (71%)  4 (29%)  14 (100%)
3 11 (85%)  2 (15%)  13 (100%)
4 11 (73%)  4 (27%)  15 (100%)
5 11 (79%)  3 (21%)  14 (100%)
6  8 (62%)  5 (38%)  13 (100%)
7  9 (69%)  4 (31%)  13 (100%)
8 11 (73%)  4 (27%)  15 (100%)
Total 81 (74%) 28 (26%) 109 (100%)
TABLE 13:	LEARNING	CURVE,	EXTERNAL	EXPERIMENT	(NUMBER	OF	OBSERVATIONS)80
8.3 | Opportunities for improvement
Based on the assessment scheme in our pilot experiment, 
there are several ways that the results of any future 
implementation of essentiality assessments could improve.81 
In their open feedback, the assessors recommended the 
following improvements: 
1. Allow assessors to communicate with the patent owner 
in order to ask for clarification, further information, etc. 
Such communication does take place (and is not unusu-
al) in patent pools, and also in patent examinations at 
patent offices, the patent prosecution phase allows for 
such communication (which often takes place).
2. Allow assessors to consult additional (public) informa-
tion sources, such as the patent file history (including 
information during the prosecution phase).
3. Allow assessors to discuss cases with colleague asses-
sors, including calls for assistance.
4. Allocate patents to assessors according to their key 
technological competences.
5. Have assessors look at multiple cases involving the 
same standard (so they build up knowledge and ex-
perience in that specific standard), and possibly even 
seek specialisation across assessors. 
6. Provide extensive, dedicated training for assessors, 
also on claim chart breakdown.
7. Allow parties (patent owners and/or third parties) to 
challenge the results of the assessment. However, 
challenging procedures need to be designed carefully 
in order to avoid the potential for the misuse.
Furthermore, in a future implementation, we would expect 
to see learning effects: (a) learning on an individual basis 
(progressing experience and knowledge), and (b) learning 
in a group setting (where individuals learn from each 
other). Assessors highlighted that 8 cases are not enough 
to enable learning effects.
Finally, we note that, in the pilot experiment, half of the 
assessed patents were selected to be actually essential 
and half were selected to be actually non-essential. In 
a real-world assessment system, these shares will likely 
differ, in particular if SDO disclosures are used as the 
starting point. Indications are that in portfolios of disclosed 
SEPs, often more than 50 percent are in fact non-essential. 
If this is the case, and if assessors are equally likely to 
produce false negatives (finding an essential patent non-
essential) and false positives (finding a non-essential 
patent essential), then the number of essential patents in 
a sample will be overestimated, the more so the smaller 
the share of actually essential patents is. For illustration, 
 80 Cells show number of observations and percentage of row total.
 81 During our pilot, we made several decisions to ensure the experiment was run properly, that unexplained variance would be reduced and that the 
results would be comparable with the pool assessment outcomes. In a future, real-life implementation, some of these restraints could be lifted.
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assume that 30 percent of a sample of declared SEPs 
are actually essential and the likelihood of an incorrect 
assessment is 10 percent. Then the assessment yields, on 
average, a 34 percent essentiality rate, hence a relative 
overestimation by 13 percent. Such bias can be addressed in 
a future implementation by suitable statistical corrections.
8.4 | Conclusions
While a perfect, absolute reference point of actual 
essentiality does not exist, we believe we can answer our 
key questions by taking patent pool results as reference 
point. In other words, we test the consistency score with 
patent pools. 
The best results (i.e. most consistent with patent pool 
outcomes) are achieved by individuals working at a patent 
office as patent examiners, who are provided with a claim 
chart, and perform a regular essentiality assessment (as 
opposed to a novelty-based assessment). They achieve 
a consistency rate of 84% with the pool outcomes, 
and report spending 5.9 hours on average per assessment. 
Note that this level of resources is considerably lower than 
what pools use to perform their assessments (see Chapter 
4). The number of observations on which we base the 
above result is sufficient to be considered informative (38 
cases with claim charts and regular assessments, out of 
a total of 109). (Note again that even in an experiment 
where assessments were (again) done by the pools 
themselves, it is not guaranteed that the outcomes this 
time would be 100% consistent to the earlier findings.)
In comparison, individuals working as senior engineers 
in academia (Associate Professor or Full Professor), who 
are not provided with a claim chart, achieve a 75% 
consistency rate with the pool outcomes. They report 
spending on average 4.75 hours per assessment. Junior 
engineers in academia (Postdoc level or similar) achieve 
a similar score. Yet, the number of observations on which 
we base our results for engineers is more limited and the 
results are therefore less certain.
As with any experimental set-up, ours also has its 
limitations. Some of the pool assessments that serve as our 
reference point, may not be correct.82 Furthermore, some of 
them may have been based on stricter or less strict criteria 
for essentiality than communicated to our assessors.83 This 
means that the actual accuracy of the assessments in our 
pilot may be lower or higher than 84% and 75%. 
Finally, we believe any future implementation of 
essentiality assessment could be improved in several 
ways, as suggested by assessors: (1) allow assessors to 
communicate with patent owners, (2) allow assessors 
to consult additional information sources, including the 
patent file history, (3) allow assessors to discuss cases 
with colleague assessors, (4) assign patents to examiners 
according to their key technological competences, 
(5) have assessors look at multiple cases involving the 
same standard and possibly seek specialisation across 
assessors, (6) provide extensive, dedicated training for 
assessors and (7) allow parties to challenge the results 
of the assessment. Furthermore, in future implementation, 
we would expect to see learning effects, both on an 
individual basis and in a group setting.
 82 Based on our observations, we do not see any indications that pools systematically over-include, but there might still be errors in the reference 
points.
 83 For instance, the pool may only have looked at essentiality for specific device categories covered by the pool license. (Footnote 62 explains why 
we could not use the same approach here as the pools.)
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A potential system for essentiality assessment should 
not only be technically feasible. It is part of a complex 
environment which requires that the system generates 
data that fits with the interests of parties for such data, 
has a suitable procedural design and organisational 
structure, and raises the funds needed to finance the 
required resources. Moreover, all previous design elements 
should be implemented in a mutually consistent manner 
and supported by stakeholders. Together, this determines 
what we call the institutional feasibility of the system. 
This chapter discusses the above aspects, using 19 distinct 
dimensions, which we introduce in Section 9.2 and discuss 
individually in the subsections below. 
In Section 9.3, we introduce a total of nine scenarios, each 
consisting of a set of consistent design choices for the 
dimensions we identified. 
Our investigation on the institutional feasibility of 
essentiality assessment presented in this chapter is based 
on a variety of sources, including:
• a stakeholder workshop we organised in October 2019 
in Brussels, with 23 participants selected from all 
different stakeholder categories, including SMEs;
• discussions and feedback at a number of events, 
including the Joint ITU-NGMN conference ‘Licensing 
practices in 5G industry segments’ (Geneva, January 
2019), ETSI IPR Special Committee meetings #31 
(Sofia Antipolis, March 2019) and #32 (Sofia Antipolis, 
February 2020), the TILEC conference ‘Patent Pools 
2.0’ (Brussels, April 2019), the EC Expert Group on 
Industrial Property Policy (GIPP) (Brussels, July 2019 
and October 2019), the EC Group of Experts on 
Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents 
(Brussels, December 2019);
• visits to the EPO in (Munich, April 2019) and the JPO 
(Tokyo, March 2019);
• sessions with the members of the Advisory Board 
(Sevilla, November 2019 and Brussels, February 2020) 
as well as during intensive online discussions;
• a number of visits to companies willing to discuss 
possible collaboration providing data for the experiment 
(see Chapter 8);
• numerous other exchanges with other parties;
• all the other work packages performed in the context 
of this study (literature survey, patent pools, Hantei-E, 
court cases, and landscape analysis). 
Institutional feasibility: stakeholder views  
on essentiality assessment
9
9.1 | Introduction and methodology
9.2 | Dimensions that determine institutional feasibility 
To facilitate a systemic discussion of the elements to bear 
in mind when designing a future system for essentiality 
assessment, we distinguish a total of 19 distinct 
dimensions. We group these into four categories: interest in 
transparent data on essentiality, procedures, organisation, 
and financing. The dimensions and their categories are 
shown in Table 14. The subsections in the remainder of 
this section discuss each of these dimensions.
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Category Dimension
A. Interest in transparent data on 
essentiality 
A1. Interest in transparent data on essentiality from different stakeholder categories
A2. Data types and desired confidence level
A3. Interest for data on specific standards and industry sectors
A4. Desired level of detail (product categories, optional normative features)
A5. Data interest and the standards’ life cycle
A6 Legal status of assessment outcomes
A7. Public availability of assessment outcomes
B. Procedures for essentiality assessment B1. Patent selection (within given standard)
B2. Use of sampling
B3. Required and available input
B4. Patent owner interaction 
B5. Availability of a procedure to challenge outcomes
B6. Required capacity
B7. Fast track for existing patents in a patent pool
C. Organisational structure for essentiality 
assessment
C1. Executing entity, capabilities and expertise
C2. Impartiality
C3. International dimension 
D. Financing of essentiality assessments D1. Principles for financing 
D2. Financial contribution collection
TABLE 14:	THE	19	DISCRETE	DIMENSIONS	RELATED	TO	INSTITUTIONAL	FEASIBILITY.
9.2.1 Interest in transparent data on essentiality
A1. Interest in transparent data 
on essentiality from different 
stakeholder categories
At the stakeholder workshop as well as during one-to-
one discussions with stakeholders, we observed that 
stakeholders expressed a clear interest in transparent 
data on actual essentiality: many (but certainly not all) 
of the stakeholders we talked to found it useful to know 
which patents are essential to specific standards, and why. 
Interest for transparent data on essentiality was 
expressed by standards’ implementers, by SEP owners and 
by courts, which all have different underlying reasons for 
their interest. Table 15 summarises the main benefits as 
perceived by these stakeholder groups. In addition, SDOs 
have expressed interest in transparent information on 
actual essentiality. 
The interests we observed are divergent. Even though 
these divergent needs were never really conflicting, they 
may call for different design parameters and can result in 
trade-offs. We will discuss that in more detail below.
Standards’ implementers could benefit from data 
on actual essentiality in the following ways. First, it 
can empower them in deciding with whom they should 
engage in licensing discussions. Even if a patent owner 
discloses potentially essential patents to an SDO, that 
does not mean they own patents which are actually 
essential, and are also actually essential for the specific 
products an implementer wishes to make (version of 
standard, product category, and inclusion of optional 
normative features). Furthermore, it can help them to 
be better informed during the licensing discussion about 
the actual SEP exposure of a given product (insofar the 
transparent data includes information on relevant product 
categories and optional normative features). Moreover, 
implementers may better determine what fraction a 
licensor’s essential patent portfolio forms out of the total 
stack of essential patents for a given standard, product 
category or product, which may help them in assessing 
the reasonableness of a demanded royalty for that SEP 
portfolio.84, 85 Finally, implementers may benefit from 
smoother and faster licensing negotiations, requiring 
fewer resources. Depending on the context, the data need 
of an implementer could range from knowledge of the SEP 
landscape at large (without necessarily identifying specific 
 84 Note that the number of owned SEPs as such may not only be the only parameter to be taken into account when it comes to the determination 
of a FRAND royalty rate, but those owned SEPs do form the starting point for such a determination.
 85 As we will further discuss below, such a comparison is only possible if numerator and denominator are assessed with the same level of accuracy 
and lack of bias.
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claims or patents) to the actual essentiality of a patent 
(claim) for an implementation of a specific product. (Below, 
we discuss one specific type of data, being ‘validated 
summary claim charts’, that allows such use.)
SEP owners could benefit from data on actual essentiality 
as it provides them with better knowledge of the extent of 
their own portfolio in relation to that of others,86 helping them 
to determine FRAND compliant licensing fees. We also refer 
to the fourth licensing principle put forward by the European 
Commission in COM(2017) 712 final [17], which states 
that, in defining a FRAND value, an individual SEP cannot 
be considered in isolation, and a reasonable aggregate rate 
has to be taken into account for the standard. 
SEP owners could yet benefit more from such assessments 
if they would generate “validated summary claim charts” 
(see below for more details), established by an independent, 
impartial assessor.87 If such documents are made public, 
they create several advantages for the patent owner:
• Firstly, SEP owners may benefit from smoother and 
timelier license negotiations, especially with parties in 
principle willing to license but who are held back by 
lack of credible information at the implementers’ side 
on what to license.88 This can save valuable resources 
and pull licensing revenues forward in time. 
• Secondly, SEP owners can derive value from such data 
in the context of infringement procedures (e.g. report-
ing by the infringer, damages, seeking injunctions, etc.), 
where it can create valuable, independent evidence. 
• Thirdly, this data is especially relevant in the context of 
the legal framework created in the Huawei/ZTE legal 
framework case. In the court case that initiated this 
framework, The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) ruled that the holder of a SEP who has com-
mitted to license that patent on FRAND terms, may 
be found in breach of the competition rules (Article 
102 TFEU) by seeking an injunction against a poten-
tial licensee in certain circumstances [12]. The CJEU’s 
judgment also explains that if the SEP owner meets 
a number of key requirements, then it would NOT be 
in breach of the competition rules and can indeed 
seek injunctive relief. One of these key requirements 
is “specifying the way in which [the SEP] has been in-
fringed”. “Validated summary claim charts”,89 generat-
ed by an independent, impartial assessor, may be well 
used to specify the ‘way of infringement’ as meant 
in the Huawei/ZTE court case, and helping the patent 
owner to seek injunctive relief if the implementer does 
not meet its own requirements under that framework.
We note that implementers, if they are given such 
‘validated summary claim charts’ in the course of a 
licensing negotiation, also benefit from that data as it 
makes them better able to take a position towards which 
patents are actually essential and why so.
We furthermore note that many SEP owners are also 
standards’ implementers, and thus may enjoy the benefits 
listed above for implementers. 
Courts may benefit from information on actual 
essentiality when they face the task of determining or 
assessing FRAND compliant fees. The judges we spoke 
to informed us that although they feel well equipped to 
deal with issues concerning validity or infringement of 
the attested patents in SEP cases (typically a handful), 
they often lack good input to determine or assess 
FRAND compliant fees.90 To do so, they require good and 
impartial data on actual essentiality for the SEP owner 
in question and – if possible – for other SEP owners 
using the same standard. This is especially relevant with 
cases that employ the so-called top-down approach (see 
Chapter 3).
Depending on its design, a system for transparency 
assessment can also provide information on the current 
ownership of SEPs – for instance, a system based on 
submissions by patent owners would reveal current 
ownership. Such information would be valuable for all 
stakeholder categories.
 86 See previous footnote.
 87 It does not provide insights on whether an implemented device infringes non-SEPs, but that it outside the scope of our study.
 88 Even if the patent owner itself attests that a given set of patents is essential, an implementer may find such information not to be determined 
in an impartial way, and may not be willing to rely on it.
 89 For this, it is crucial that these documents also provide information on product categories and optional normative elements, as this is necessary 
to make the ‘translation’ from ‘essential’ to ‘whether a specific product necessarily infringes the patent’.
 90 Currently, courts mostly rely on input provided by experts – either provided by the parties or appointed by the court. Their input, of course, does 
not have any binding value. The decision is taken by the judge(s) upon their own consideration of the (expert) input.
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Stakeholder category Main	benefits	derived	from	transparent	data	on	essentiality	
Implementer • Identification of which patent owners have legitimate claims concerning SEPs.
• Better information on actual SEP exposure for a given product.
• Enables better assessment of reasonableness of individual royalty rates (by comparing the extent of 
the actually essential portfolio of a specific patent owner with that of the actually essential portfolios 
of all relevant patent owners).91
• Smoother and faster licensing negotiations.
• Reduced need for resources in licensing negotiations.
• [Information on current ownership of SEP].
Patent owner • Enables better assessment of reasonableness of individual royalty rates (by comparing the extent of 
the actually essential portfolio of a specific patent owner with that of the actually essential portfolios 
of all relevant patent owners).92
• Smoother, faster licensing negotiations, especially with willing licensees.
• Reduced need for resources in licensing negotiations.
• Pulls licensing revenues forward in time.
• Helps in in terms of infringement procedures (e.g. reporting by the infringer, damages, seeking 
injunctions, etc.), and in specific to meet a key requirement as set out in Huawei/ZTE framework (‘way 
of infringement’).
• [Information on current ownership of SEP by other firms].
Courts • Supports courts being able to determine or assess FRAND compliant fees.
• [Information on current ownership of SEP].
TABLE 15:	MAIN	POTENTIAL	BENEFITS	FOR	THE	VARIOUS	STAKEHOLDERS.
The above types of interest in data have different 
implications for the transparent data needed to satisfy 
that interest, in terms of the type of data, and the 
confidence level of that data. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the next sections. The data interests may 
also be divergent. Trade-offs exist between these data 
types, as well as between the desired data and the design 
of a feasible mechanism to generate such data (see for 
instance Dimension A7 at Section 9.2.1, where we discuss 
the trade-off between having a high level of transparency, 
and conditions under which parties may be willing to 
participate in such a mechanism). 
Finally, note that there are also reasons why stakeholders 
may not wish to have more transparent data available. We 
will discuss these in Section 9.4.
A2. Data types and desired 
confidence level
Ideally, each individual essentiality assessment delivers a 
perfect result and every potential patent is assessed for 
essentiality. In practice, this is not possible. Not only are 
there inherent limitations to accuracy, there is also a trade-
off between invested resources and the accuracy of the 
outcome. 
We suggest looking at confidence from the usage 
perspective (e.g. the interest in data from implementers, 
patent owners, and courts), then consider whether a 
certain approach can satisfy such confidence levels. While 
we underline the importance of a rigorous process, both 
for usefulness and credibility, the required confidence level 
 91 Transparent data on essentiality can provide information on the extend of SEP portfolios. This is necessary information to assess the reasonable-
ness of licensing offers, but not sufficient information: other factors also will need to be taken into account to judge a FRAND offer. 
 92 See previous footnote. 
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should be assessed in the context of the way that data is 
used. 
Here, we focus on confidence in the actual dataset – used 
for a specific purpose – not the confidence (‘accuracy’) 
level of individual assessments. To determine the dataset 
confidence levels required from the usage perspective, 
we start with the purposes for which stakeholders may 
want to use essentiality information (as summarised in 
Table 15), and then consider the types of data that would 
support such use. These different types of data could be 
characterised as: 
• ‘numerator’: data on actual SEPs from a specific patent 
owner for a specific standard.
• ‘denominator’: data on actual SEPs from all relevant 
patent owners for a specific standard. Some refer to 
this data as the ‘size of the total pie’.
• ‘validated summary claim charts’: a one-page summary 
that maps patent claims in the actual SEPs to relevant 
parts in one or more standards, each identified by refer-
ence and version (and where possible with references 
to specific figures, table or other elements in the text 
of the standard). It also indicates whether the patent is 
relevant for some device categories only, or relevant for 
an optional normative element in the standard only.93, 94 
The validated summary claim chart is specific enough 
map the patent to specific products, but not so detailed 
that it raises concerns over being distributed publicly. 
• ‘detailed assessment outcomes’: data with full details 
on the outcome of the assessment procedure, for 
both actual SEPs and for assessed patents for which 
no essentiality was concluded (and for the latter, also 
the considerations by the evaluator to come to this 
conclusion). It contains a full (validated) full claim 
chart95 where each claim submitted to essentiality 
assessment is broken down into a set of claim elements, 
each of them individually indicated to read onto listed 
referenced and extracted relevant standard portion.
• ‘current ownership data’, indicating the current owner 
of the patent in question.96
Here, the terms numerator and denominator are borrowed 
from court cases that use the top-down approach (see 
Chapter 3) and the following division to determine a given 
patent owner’s numerical proportional share:
 93 Without specific information on device categories or optional normative element, the other information in this document can (in many cases) also 
help the reader to derive such conclusions (looking at the mapped claims and relevant part of standards, and where needed, consulting the text 
of the patent (claim) and that of the standard too. But this is a time-consuming exercise and requires knowledge and skills. If, instead, such data 
is readily provided in the document, it can be much easier be used in a large-scale exercise.
 94 This document can be regarded similar to such summary documents created by pools, such as the “Declaration of Essentiality” document issued 
by 3G Licensing and its successor, Sipro Lab Telecom, in their respective role of WCDMA patent pool administrator; see Section 4.2.4 for details. 
There is one element in which the ‘validated summary claim charts’ as meant in this study go a little step further: they also provide information 
on whether a patent is relevant for an optional normative element in the standard only.
 95 Note that this is not the submitted claim chart of the applicant.
 96 Such data may be directly obtained from the patent owners in some setting. While it may also be obtained from patent registers, this approach 
has limitations; see Dimension B3 in Section 9.2.2 for a more detailed discussion.
Numerical proportional SEP share of patent owner A =
Number of SEPs owner by A
Number of SEPs by all patent owners
The desired confidence level (i.e. the confidence level 
required to use the data for a certain purpose) has 
at least two dimensions: (1) the accuracy of the 
assessments (and, relatedly, if lower accuracy is subject 
to a systematic bias in some direction), and (2) the 
number of patents that needs to be assessed (e.g. full 
population or a sample). 
The required confidence level differs for the five data types 
we distinguished: 
i. The required dataset confidence level for numer-
ator data is usually high, regardless of whether it 
is used by an implementer, a patent owner, or by 
court. Ideally, each separate patent would be indi-
vidually assessed, at a high level of accuracy, and 
a sample would not suffice. 
ii. The required dataset confidence level for nominator 
data is usually lower, as it is the aggregated data 
of all the relevant patent owners. Here, a properly 
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taken sample of all patents could suffice, where it is 
important that all relevant statistical considerations 
are taken into account to ensure the sample results 
in a representative data set (one would, for instance, 
take into account distributional aspects such as 
possible large differences in rates between patent 
owners). Moreover, we suggest the assessment of 
the chosen sample is of precisely the same meth-
odology and carried out in the same rigor as that for 
numerator data to prevent systematic biases.
iii. The required dataset confidence level for ‘validated 
summary claim charts’ data is high. You really want 
accurate data for each individual patent. 
 The required dataset confidence level for ‘detailed 
assessment outcomes’ data is high. You really 
want accurate data for each individual patent.
iv. The ‘current ownership data’ indicates, as the 
name suggests, the current owner of the patent in 
question. The required confidence level is relatively 
high. This is typically relevant regarding the 
numerator, and not relevant for the denominator 
(which is about the ‘size of the pie’, regardless of 
who owns it).
Table 16 is an overview of the major elements in the 
above section.
Data type Description
Data 
(specifically)	
important for
Required level of detail of 
the data
Required	confidence	
level
I. Numerator Data on actual SEPs from a 
specific patent owner for a 
specific standard
Implementers, 
patent owners, 
courts
A positive decision for a given 
patent regarding a specified 
standards document
Relatively high (high 
accuracy for individual 
assessments; sampling 
not preferred)
II. Denominator Data on actual SEPs from all 
relevant patent owner for a 
specific standard
Implementers, 
patent owners, 
courts
A positive decision for a given 
patent with regarding a specified 
standards document
Moderate (high 
accuracy for individual 
assessments; sampling 
allowed (if well executed)
III. ‘validated 
summary 
claim charts’
A one-page summary that 
maps claims in the actual 
SEPs to relevant product 
categories and relevant parts 
in one or more standards, each 
identified by reference and 
version (and where possible 
with references to specific 
figures, table or other elements 
in the text of the standard
Implementers, 
patent owners, 
courts
Information on the standards’ 
specific claim(s) and the 
related specific requirement(s) 
as presented in the standard, 
for which the assessor has 
determined essentiality, and the 
relevant product categories. 
Preferable, this also provides 
information on whether patents 
are only essential for optional 
normative parts of the standard 
(see Dimension A4, below)
high (high accuracy for 
individual assessments; 
sampling not allowed)
IV. ‘detailed 
assessment 
outcomes’
Data with full details on the 
outcome of the assessment 
procedure, for both actual 
SEPs and for assessed patents 
for which no essentiality 
was concluded (including 
considerations by the evaluator 
to come to this conclusion). 
Patent owner97 Full (validated) full claim chart 
where each claim submitted to 
essentiality assessment is broken 
down into a set of claim elements, 
each of them individually 
indicated to read onto listed 
referenced and extracted relevant 
standard portion
high (high accuracy for 
individual assessments; 
sampling not allowed)
V. Current 
ownership 
data
Data revealing the current 
owner of the patent
Implementer, 
courts
Name of current owner, in 
relation to numerator data type 
Relatively high (high 
accuracy for individual 
assessments; sampling 
not allowed)
TABLE 16:	DATA	TYPES.
 97 Especially in an infringement context, or when it wants to challenge the outcomes of a (negative) assessment. 
89Pilot Study for Essentiality Assessment of Standard Essential Patents
Main	benefits	
derived from 
transparent data 
on essentiality 
Benefiting	Stakeholders Necessary data types
Implementer Patent 
owner
Courts I. Numerator II. Denominator III. ‘validated 
summary 
claim charts’
IV. ‘detailed 
assessment 
outcomes’
V. Current 
ownership 
data
Identification of which 
patent owners have 
legitimate claims 
concerning SEPs
Yes Yes Yes Needed Needed
Identification of which 
patent owners have 
legitimate claims 
concerning SEPs for a 
specific product
Yes Yes Yes Needed Needed Needed
Enables assessment 
of reasonableness of 
individual royalty rates 
for a specific product
Yes Yes Yes Needed Needed Needed Needed
Smoother, faster 
licensing negotiations
Yes Yes Needed Needed Needed Needed
Helps in in terms 
of infringement 
procedures
Yes Helpful Helpful
Helps to meet a key 
requirement as set 
out in Huawei/ZTE 
framework 
Yes Helpful
Supports courts being 
able to determine 
or assess FRAND 
compliant fees
Yes Needed Needed Needed Needed
TABLE 17:	MAIN	BENEFITS	(SELECTION),	BENEFITING	STAKEHOLDER,	AND	DATA	TYPES	NECESSARY	TO	REALISE	THESE	BENEFITS.
Based on above insights, we can now map (a selection) 
of the main benefits, the stakeholders for whom these 
benefits are important, and the data types necessary to 
realise these benefits.
Finally, we’d like to stress that a system for essentiality 
assessments should not strive for generating a single 
set of aggregated, static numbers (like essentiality rate 
percentages). Such numbers would not cater for specific 
situations, and don’t reflect that the data changes over 
time. Instead, a system for essentiality assessments 
should make accessible the underlying data points, where 
the user of the data, using relatively simple filters (which 
standards and documents, flags for device categories and 
for optional features, etc.), can create the information that 
is relevant for that used in the business context. 
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A3. Interest for data on specific 
standards and industry sectors
Most tension and conflict concerning SEPs have involved 
standards for mobile communications (i.e. the 3GPP 
Technical Specifications for 3G, 4G, 5G communications), 
for wireless networking (“Wi-Fi”98) and video encoding 
(MPEG-2/Video99, AVC100 and HEVC101). During this study, 
these were the standards most referred to by stakeholders 
in terms of benefitting from essentiality assessment. It is 
hard to say for which standards such needs will emerge 
in the future, but it is likely that standards relevant for IoT 
(in itself a very broad category, including radio standards 
as well as many more application-specific standards) will 
be part of that, as well as more sector-specific standards 
such as those for mobility − think of the Cooperative-
Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), where currently a 
battle is taking place between different standards.102
We also found that it is particularly important that any 
essentiality assessment is very clear about the specific 
version/release of the standard for which essentiality 
was assessed. After all, a patent that was found not to 
be essential for one specific version, might well become 
essential for future versions.103 For instance, when in the 
past, key technologies such as High Speed Packet Access 
(HSPA) and Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) were 
added to new releases of 3GPP Technical Specifications, 
patents became essential that were not essential to 
previous versions of these standards. 
A4. Desired level of detail (product 
categories, optional normative 
features, standards version)
Especially implementers stressed how important it is that 
transparent data on essentiality must include information 
that allows them to determine whether a SEP is essential 
for a specific product, instead of merely stating it is 
essential to the standard as a whole.104 Three types of 
distinctions are important here:
• The product categories to which the SEP applies. After 
all, the product category determines which parts of a 
standard are actually implemented in a device (and 
therefore exposed to certain SEPs). Taking a mobile 
communications standard as example: no single de-
vice is a mobile terminal, SIM card, base station and 
core network at the same time. Any one device only 
implements a subset of the standard, relevant for 
its product category. One challenge here is that rele-
vant product categories may change over time. Like 
in 2014, for its WCDMA patent pool, licencing admin-
istrator SIPRO distinguished the following categories: 
Terminal, Base Station, Radio Network Controller and 
Core Network.105 [38] Yet, for devices nowadays, it may 
be important to distinguish a terminal with voice vs. 
a data-only terminal. For future devices, it would be 
important to distinguish, for instance, between the var-
ious categories of narrowband communications devic-
es for the Internet of Things (IoT), such as those based 
 98 What is popularly known as “Wi-Fi” is formally known as the IEEE 802.11 suite of wireless LAN standards.
 99 MPEG-2/Video is formally known as ISO/IEC 13818-2 as well as ITU-T Rec. H.262.
100 MPEG-4 Advanced Video Coding (AVC) is formally known as ITU-T Rec. H.264.
101 High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) is formally known as ITU-T Rec. H. 265 as well as MPEG-H Part 2.
102 Main contenders are the WLAN-based ITS-G5 standard (based on IEEE 802.11p and in Europe formally standardised as ETSI EN 302 663), and 
the cellular-based C-V2X standard (part of the 3GPP suite of standards).
103 Technically, a patent may also lose essentiality for a newer version of a standard, although this is unlikely in practice.
104 Technically speaking, there are at least three issues that needs to be determined in such an analysis: (i) is the patent claim under analysis directed 
to a particular product (UE, base-station, voice encoding device...), (ii) are the requirements in the relevant portion of the standard specification 
directed to a particular product? (e.g. “the UE shall”; “the base-station shall”, or implicitly, the base-stations sends, therefore the UE must receive) 
and (iii) are there subcategories of products where only parts of the standard is used/required – such as a smartphone as opposed to an IoT 
device using eMTC, or base-station.
105 This list was downloaded from sipro.com, but the website is no longer available (and the pool currently has a different licensing administrator).
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on the NB-IoT or LTE-M technologies, which are now 
both part of 3GPP releases.106 This is important, be-
cause such devices only implement a (small) subset of 
the complete set of 3GPP Technical Specifications, and 
thus will only be exposed to a (small) subset of all es-
sential patents for the complete set of 3GPP Technical 
Specifications.107 
• Whether the SEP applies to a mandatory portion of 
the standard, or an optional normative portion (which 
the implementer may decide whether or not to offer 
in a product). Note that while many SDOs (including 
ETSI and IEEE) include optional normative portions in 
their definition of essentiality, some do not define this, 
and other SDOs exclude optional normative portions in 
their definition (such as ITU).108 In light of a transpar-
ency tool for SEP exposure and in the context of an es-
sentiality assessment mechanism, it seems advisable 
to include optional normative portions in the overall 
definition of essentiality, and to provide more detailed 
information on whether a patent is essential only when 
a specific optional normative feature is implemented. 
• The version (often called ‘release’) of the standard for 
which (document) the patent is essential. Almost in-
variably, a new revision of a standard is comprising all 
elements of the previous– one reason being the neces-
sity maintain backwards compatibility to products that 
implement an older version of the same standard. So, 
for practical purposes, we assume that if a patent is 
found essential for a certain version, then it is also es-
sential for future versions of that same standard Note, 
however, that while a ‘new standard’ or ‘new standard 
generation’ (e.g. 5G versus 4G) may inherit technology 
from the previous standard, but on that step, there will 
also be technology that is not ‘inherited’.)109
Note that the first two items (information on product 
categories and optional normative portion) are important 
because they are the key link in the ‘translation’ from 
‘a patent being essential to a standard’ to ‘whether a 
specific product using the standard necessarily infringes 
the patent’.
Obviously, a desire to have a higher degree of detail such as 
outlined above will result in need for more resources for the 
assessment. It is out of the scope of this study to assess the 
precise differences, but without the level of detail outlined 
above, the instrument might be of limited value. 
In the context of the precise text of the standard, we 
furthermore observe that the proper drafting of the text 
in a standard is critical in order to distinguish between 
requirements (normative), options (allowing for choices, 
which when selected become normative), recommendations 
(desired but not required), possibilities (examples 
of capabilities but not prescriptive), and informative 
statements which on their own do not permit establishing 
technical essentiality. Most SDOs have rules which define 
which wording is appropriate to be used in their specification 
under these circumstances: terms as ‘shall’, ‘may’, ‘should’, 
‘can’, and respectively ‘is/has’ all have specific meaning in 
this context. Likewise, at many SDOs, standards follow a 
given structure (template): some parts are normative (such 
as clauses and sub-clauses, tables, figures, normative 
references) and others are informative. Annexes may be 
labelled normative or informative as deemed appropriate. A 
good example of such a structure is defined in [25].
An alternative approach for mapping parts of standards 
(and hence SEPs) to product would be that certain bodies 
develop “profiles” that describe certain sets of normative 
elements of standards. On the basis of these profiles, 
implementers could issue a “protocol implementation 
conformance statement” and patent owners could consider 
whether their SEPs are essential when implementing a 
specific profile. 
106 eMTC: enhanced Machine-Type Communication, included in 3GPP Release 13; NB-IoT: narrowband Internet of Things, included in 3GPP Release 14.
107 Alternatively, public (certified) claim charts could help implementers to decide whether a certain patent is relevant for the products they make or 
not. This approach may be better able to deal with product category changes over time. But this requires a significant amount of knowledge at 
the implementer’s side and possibly a significant burden. Moreover, the decision to make certified) claim charts may have consequences for the 
degree to which patent owners are willing to make available (their own, non-certified) claim charts in the first place.
108 For more information, see [6, p. 58].
109 Note also that in mobile telecommunications, it is quite common that a device implements multiple generations (e.g. 2G, 2G, and 4G). In that 
case, the maker of the device must consider the actually essential patents for each of these generations
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A5. Data interest and the standards’ 
life cycle
An ultimate determination of essentiality is only possible 
once the standard is finalised, and after the patent has been 
granted and that decision has become final (e.g. because 
opposition is no longer possible, or no appeal had been filed. 
Only then, is it certain what is contained in the standard 
and what is covered by the patent’s claims. Although there 
was general agreement during the workshop on this, some 
participants noted that licensing negotiations are not 
necessarily just about granted patents. These could include 
existing patent applications that may still be granted during 
the term of the contract, or even patents that will be applied 
for in the future and become SEPs, often in a defined capture 
period.110, 111 While a patent owner is not allowed to require 
an implementer to license a patent that cannot (yet) be 
enforced, an implementer may nevertheless still decide to 
do so, and thus be certain of owning a license if the patent 
does become enforceable. 
Note, however, that for any patent that it is not found to 
be essential for a given standard document version at a 
certain point in time, it may be reassessed at a later point 
in time, for a newer document version or other standards 
documents, and perhaps be assessed to be essential. 
As a result, any strict determination of essentiality (by 
a court, ultimately) will not generate all the information 
implementers and SEP owners may wish to have access to 
when negotiating a license. This is a necessary limitation 
of essentiality assessment that everyone needs to accept. 
While we propose that an assessment of essentiality 
is only done (1) once the standard is finalised, and 
(2) after the patent has been granted and that decision 
has become final, there is still an important decision to 
be taken about when (e.g. the exact point in time) the 
essentiality assessment is or should be done after these 
two conditions are met. This decision will depend on 
the final model (for instance: on-demand vs systematic 
assessment of all patents), on the behaviour of parties 
(especially in an on-demand scheme) and on available 
resources, both in money and qualified assessors. 
A6. Legal status of assessment 
outcomes
It is obviously desirable that the outcomes of an essentiality 
assessment mechanism are valued, found useful and 
deemed respectable by all or the majority of stakeholders. 
This would be the case if during license negotiations, 
both parties agree these assessments form a solid basis 
for further negotiations about the value of the patents 
assessed to be essential (and essentiality would not need 
to be discussed further unless the parties engage in a court 
case). A high-quality mechanism, as well as procedures 
to challenge outcomes, can help to achieve this aim. At 
the same time, as expressed by many participants, courts 
have the sole authority to resolve IPR disputes, including 
infringement issues. While a European mechanism for 
essentiality assessment could provide the courts with 
valuable information, it should not challenge the courts’ 
authority.112 (This highlights again the need for a high level 
of rigour in any analysis that is made; ff any party feels that 
their treatment is incorrect in the analysis, they may go to 
court – which could result in an increase in litigation, rather 
than negotiating with this information as a basis.)
It is therefore advisable to not strive for such results that 
are legally binding. The outcome should rather earn the 
status of being of an industry standard level of quality 
that is generally accepted. We propose three terms may 
be chosen in this specific context: 
• ‘Opinion of essentiality’. This is the term used by 
the Japan Patent Office for the outcomes of its Han-
tei-E system.
• ‘Certificate	 of	 essentiality’.113 This is the term 
used by various patent pools to describe the outcome 
of their essentiality assessments.
• ‘Determination of essentiality’.
110 It is noted that when existing patent applications and future patent applications filed during the capture term are included, these may be only 
included to the extent these become essential to the standards within the scope of the license agreement or extensions/modifications of these 
standards generated during the term.
111 Of course, some parties may also decide to agree on a license that includes both SEPs and non-SEPs. But such agreements are out of the scope 
of this study, which focusses on the essentiality of patents.
112 This is also recognised by ETSI: “However, it should be noted that once an IPR (patent) has been granted, in the absence of an agreement between 
the parties involved, the national courts of law have the sole authority to resolve IPR disputes.” See Clause 4.3 in [14].
113 Not to be confused with ‘certification’ of parties that can carry out essentiality assessments. (See Dimension C1 in 9.2.3).
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Note that specific words may give rise to (planned 
or unplanned) associations and interpretations. This 
should be carefully considered before deciding on a final 
terminology. 
A7. Public availability of assessment 
outcomes
When we think of transparency, what springs to mind 
is providing full public availability of all relevant data. 
Concerning essentiality assessments, this would be the 
list of patents assessed, the outcome (positive as well 
as negative), as well as the all underlying evidence (input 
claim charts114 and other documents used to reach a 
conclusion). At the same time, a scheme making all these 
documents publicly available could seriously threaten the 
support and engagement of patent owners. They fear 
that information on negative decisions and the public 
availability of input claim charts might be (mis)used 
by others in legal procedures. In patent pools, similar 
considerations have led almost all pools to decide to 
publish positive outcomes, but no negative outcomes or 
underlying data. 
Looking at the five data types introduced in Dimension 
A2 in Section 9.2.1, we suggest the following (insofar the 
chosen system indeed generates such data):
• Numerator data should be made publicly available. 
• Denominator data should be made publicly available.
• ‘validated summary claim charts’ should preferably 
also be made publicly available. This way, in licens-
ing negotiations, such data can be exchanged and 
considered by all parties without first entering into 
lengthy and time-consuming negotiations on NDAs, 
and in this way this data could lead to significant 
advantages to all. While not all patent owners are 
currently willing to share such data, we believe it is 
advisable for them to consider doing so, as it does not 
contain real confidential data, and making it available 
can lead to considerable common benefits of patent 
owners and implements. The 3G3P pool (see Chapter 
4) is a good example where patent owners actually 
agree to make such data available to interested third 
parties. 
• ‘detailed assessment outcomes’ (as well as any input 
claim charts by parties) to be made available to 
patent owners only. For them, this data is especially 
valuable when they want to challenge the outcomes 
of an assessment, or when they need to prove 
possible infringement. At their own discretion, they 
may decide to share it with others. This category may 
include sensitive and confidential data. Disclosure 
of this type of data does not necessarily help the 
ecosystem as a whole. Also, if it would be made 
available, it is likely that patent owners are (much) 
less include to cooperate in any way in a system of 
essentiality assessments
• ‘current ownership data’ should be made publicly 
available.
We also note that for a system that would be an official 
public procedure, sponsored by the EU and/or its member 
states, there may be other considerations of what should 
be made publicly available or not. 
114 To distinguish claims charts that are submitted by parties from ‘validated summary claim charts’ (which are one of the outputs of an essentiality 
assessment), we use in this chapter the term ‘input claim chart’.
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B1. Patent selection (within given 
standard)
In the context of this study, patent selection refers to the 
mechanism applied to select patents for assessment. 
In principle, there are two different lines of approach: 
the ‘SDO disclosure-based approach’ and ‘On-demand 
approach’ which we discuss below. 
I: SDO disclosure-based approach
In the first line of approach, candidate patents are 
identified from SDO databases containing patents 
disclosed as potentially essential to a standard.115 Most 
SDOs have disclosure rules for concerning potentially 
essential patents, and thus in principle, this approach 
has the advantage that all potentially essential patents 
belonging to all relevant patent owners can be identified. 
In practice however, there are some limitations. Firstly, 
several important SDOs, including ITU, ISO, IEC and IEEE, 
allow parties to submit a ‘blanket claim’ indicating that 
they believe they own potentially essential patents, but do 
not provide the identities of these patents.116 This option is 
often used: for instance, as per 8 January 2020, the IEEE IPR 
database for the “IEEE 802.11 and amendments” (the suite 
of standards known as Wi-Fi) contained 439 declarations 
(called “Related-Patent Letters of Assurance, LOA), of 
which 302 (68.7%) did not provide any identification of 
patents at all. But also SDO IPR databases that do not 
allow blanket declarations may not necessarily contain all 
potentially essential IPR, for at least two reasons: (1) not 
every potential SEP owner is a member of every SDO and 
thus may not be subject to a declaration requirement, and 
(2) many SDO IPR policies have declaration requirements 
with a limited scope, using wording as ‘reasonable 
endeavors’ (ETSI), ‘personally aware’ (IEEE), or ‘known to 
the party participating’ (ITU/ISO/IEC), and almost no SDO 
obliges its members to perform a patent search.117 
It is important to realise that SDOs have declaration rules in 
order to know which patents are potentially essential, and 
in order to seek information on whether a FRAND license 
commitment is provided for those patents. Should such 
a commitment not be provided for a potentially essential 
patent, then the SDO can avoid adopting a standard that 
would require the use of that patent. For serving its purpose, 
it does not matter to the SDO at all whether there are (way) 
to many patents in the database; it is only important that 
as few as possible potential essential patents are missing. 
Indeed, SDO IPR databases are known to contain (many) 
more patents than those that are actually essential, for 
at least two reasons: (1) because such declarations are 
supposed to be submitted before the standard is finalised, 
and (2) they are often submitted before the patent is 
granted. Consequently, they suffer from a substantial 
‘overshoot’ in the context of serving as starting point for 
essentiality assessments. The ETSI IPR database alone 
currently includes over 8,300 patent families that have a 
European patent family member (see Chapter 6 for more 
details), of which a substantial share (possibly more than 
50%) would currently no longer be considered as potentially 
essential by their owner. 
Further challenges are that SDO IPR databases do not 
always provide information on the relevant technical 
standard in the way we might want for essentiality 
assessments. For instance, the ETSI IPR database does not 
easily allow you to determine whether a patent is believed 
to be essential for the 2G, 3G or 4G standards. Moreover, 
SDO databases usually do not offer details of the precise 
standards document (version and date) for which the 
patent is believed to be essential. (Note that many 
SDOs request or require members to disclose potentially 
essential patents at a ‘timely’ moment,118 and the precise 
standards document may not be known at that time.) 
II: On-demand approach with patent owner 
requests
In the second line of approach, patent owners are the 
ones that take the initiative to request a certain patent 
(or patents) to be assessed for essentiality. The initiative 
could come from the patent owner themselves, who can 
file a request for a single patent, a set of patents, or their 
115 SDO IPR policies use wording such as ‘May be or may become essential’ (ETSI), ‘Potentially essential’ (IEEE) and ‘Cover or may cover’ (‘IETF). For 
more details, see [6, p. 80].
116 For more details, see [6, p. 89].
117 For more details, see [6, p. 81].
118 See [6, pp. 85-88].
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full portfolio of potentially essential patents for a given 
standard. Having the patent owner make such a request 
has several advantages: (1) the owner will only file requests 
for patents they really believe to be essential, given the 
final standard and given the actual claims in the granted 
patent, (2) the owner may be asked specific information on 
the standard and on the precise standards document for 
which the patent is believed to be essential, (3) the owner 
may be asked to submit additional documents, such as a 
claim chart, and (4) information is also obtained about the 
current ownership of the patent (as part of the submission, 
patent owners may be asked to confirm that they believe 
they are the current owner of the patent in question). Also, 
by submitting a request, the owner is expressing support 
for the mechanism. 
Note that while a patent owner in some specific cases 
might also be interested in a confirmation that a certain 
patent is not actually essential, we don’t further discuss 
that situation further in this report.119 One of the main 
reasons for this decision is that proving non-essentiality 
is very difficult. Suppose essentiality for a specific 
patent is not found when looking against a specific 
standards document for a specific document version, 
actual essentiality may actually exist for other standards 
documents (and for a complex standard, there may (many) 
dozens or of such documents). Moreover, essentiality for a 
specific patent is not found when looking against a specific 
standards document for a specific document version, 
actual essentiality may actually exist for future versions of 
that same standards document. We believe these reasons 
are indeed among the main considerations why JPO, in 
their Hantei-E, cannot offer confirmation that a patent is 
non-essential, only confirmation that it is essential.
III: On-demand approach with third-party 
requests 
In a variant on the second approach, it could be other 
parties (such as implementers) are also able than the 
patent owner who be to file requests. As discussed in 
Section 3.3, there are situations in which another party 
than the patent owner may wish to see essentiality of a 
patent confirmed.120
In the case of a demand by another party, however, the 
four advantages listed above do not necessarily apply. 
More specifically: third parties may want to and/or asked 
to specific information on the standard and precise 
standards document for which the patent is believed 
to be essential, but perhaps are not in a good position 
to do so. The same goes for input claim charts. Third 
parties, lastly, are not likely to be able provide ultimate 
information on patent ownership. While one could, in 
case of a third-party request, ask the patent owner 
whether to provide additional information, but one 
cannot expect the patent owner to fulfil that request. 
All in all, information availability is more complicated in 
this variant.
An important element in this variant is whether third 
parties will file requests for individual patents or for 
entire portfolios. In the first case, third parties might pick 
patents they are particularly concerned about (e.g. patent 
assessed to be essential by their owner but not believed to 
be essential by the third party). Independent assessment 
of these patents can lead to interesting insights but will 
not generate a representative picture for the patent owner 
in question. In the second case, a representative picture 
would emerge, but if that owner has a large portfolio 
of potentially essential patents, the resulting work 
(and financial resources required) would be (very) large. 
Depending on who is carrying the burden if the cost, this 
could be substantial to the size of that party (especially if 
an SME). 
Table 18 summarises the three approaches discussed 
above. Of course, approach II and III could also be 
combined (we discuss a similar combination further on in 
this chapter). 
119 Note that ‘not found to be essential’ does not equal ‘found not to be essential’.
120 It may also be that another party than the patent owner may wish to see non-essentiality of a patent confirmed, but we will not discuss that 
further, for the same reasons as explain just above at the patent owner.
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Patent selection 
approach
Approach I: SDO disclosure-
based approach
Approach II: On-demand 
approach with patent owner 
requests
Approach III: On-demand 
approach with third-party 
requests
What potential SEPs are 
identified?
All patents, unless part of a 
blanket declaration, owned by non-
members, or fall outside the scope 
of the declaration obligation
Only those submitted by patent 
owner in question
Only those submitted by third 
party
Number of identified 
patents (cumulative for 
all potential SEP owners)
Very high Low to medium (only patents of 
submitting patent owners, and 
only those patents the owner still 
believes might be essential). May 
depend on fees charged. 
Low to medium (depends 
on third party’s submission 
behaviour. May also depend on 
fees charged. 
Can provide access to 
input claim charts?
No Yes No
Can provide detailed 
information on standard 
and standards document 
(version, date)?
No Yes No
Provides current 
ownership information?
No Yes No
TABLE 18:	THE	MAIN	CHARACTERISTICS	OF	VARIOUS	PATENT	SELECTION	APPROACHES.
121 Cost can also be brought down (resulting in more moderate degrees of confidence) by more superficial assessments, we are not in favor of this. 
First, more superficial assessments can lead to (unobserved) systematic biases. Second, efficiency gains are higher with sampling (100 times 4 
hours instead of 8 hours is still more than 10 times 8 hours.
122 Let us assume that 10% is representative of an entire pool of 8,000 patents. If one company in that pool owns 80 patents, probably around 8 
of these are selected in the sample. Consequently, the confidence level for that firm will already be lower, and perhaps 20% of that individual 
firm’s patents would satisfy the sought confidence level. If a firm owns 10 patents, probably only 1, 2 or perhaps even none of that firm’s patents 
will be selected in the large sample. Obviously, the confidence level will be very low. For a better confidence level, more patents for that specific 
company would need to be selected, and perhaps even the full set of patents for that company (in that case, it is no longer a sample: if each and 
every patent is selected, the result is totally representative).
B2. Use of sampling
In this report, sampling refers to a mechanism in which 
a subset of patents is selected for further essentiality 
assessment. Sampling could be done based of all the 
disclosed potentially essential patents, from a given 
disclosing party’s set of all disclosed potentially essential 
patents, or from a given owner’s set of all disclosed 
potentially essential patents. Sampling can bring down 
the overall costs for a given set of assessments, in 
cases where sampling still satisfies the desired level of 
confidence.121
Statistics dictate that the larger the sample, the more 
representative the outcome for the full population (and the 
higher the resulting confidence level), as long as samples 
are drawn from this exact population and in a completely 
random way. Section 9.2.1 already discussed that with 
some data, the requirements concerning confidence level 
are less strict than others.
As shown in the landscape study (see Chapter 6), the 
distribution of disclosing firms is very skewed. While actual 
current ownership does not necessarily lie with the original 
disclosing firm, the distribution of current ownership is 
probably also very skewed. As long as a dataset is sought 
that does not require information on the disclosing firm’s 
ownership or identity, like the data used for the denominator, 
then a single, random sample will suffice. However, if data 
is sought that distinguishes the disclosing firm’s ownership 
or identity (e.g. for the numerator), a stratified sample 
approach is needed, where sampling size is determined on 
a per-firm basis, to ensure that sample is representative of 
that firm within a required confidence level.122
For reasons of achieving credibility mat may be important 
to be transparent about the procedure of sampling, and 
perhaps even the sample itself.
In Dimension B6 in Section 9.2.2 below, some capacity 
calculations will include approaches with sampling. As it 
is beyond the scope of this report to calculate the required 
sample size for a specific context, we adopt a working 
assumption of a 10% sampling size for the purpose of 
indicative calculations. Whether that 10% is a proper 
number will require more investigation. 
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B3. Required and available input
The minimum input required for any essentiality analysis 
is: (1) the patent in question123, (2) the precise standards 
document(s) – including version/date, such as ‘ETSI TS 
125 215’) – for which essentiality is to be assessed. Also, 
the standards document must cover the focal parts of the 
standard that the essentiality exercise aims to address.124 
Depending on how the assessment process is designed, 
additional information may be required or helpful to 
make the process more reliable and/or cost-effective. In 
our study we identified the following forms of additional 
information:
• Information	 on	 the	 specific	 section(s)	 of	 the	
standardisation document(s) for which the 
patent is potentially essential (such as ‘ETSI TS 
125 215, Section 6.1.1.2’). If Approach II (‘On-demand 
approach with patent owner requests) was followed 
for the patent selection (see above), then patent own-
ers can be asked or even expected to provide input 
claim charts as part of their request.125 Since they are 
the ones taking the initiative to file a request, they are 
also likely to be willing to supply such information. If 
Approaches I or III are applied, it might be much harder 
to access such information, although you can always 
try asking the (current) patent owner. Alternative-
ly, with an ETSI standard, you might look at ETSI IPR 
declarations databases. These include a field called 
“Illustrative Specific part of the standard (e.g. Section)”. 
Yet, this is not a mandatory field when declarations are 
filed, and in recent years, this percentage has dropped. 
As per November 2019, only 23% of all declarations 
contained such information. Also, if this information is 
indeed present, it may be insufficient as input for es-
sentiality assessment: it may not be of the right granu-
larity level, and because it is ‘illustrative’, it may be not 
complete 
• Input claim charts, that detail precisely which pat-
ent’s claim(s) are believed to be essential to what pre-
cise element in the standards document(s) (section, 
paragraph, preferably also specific text phrases), as 
well as information on device categories that require 
the relevant element in the standards document(s), 
and information on whether the patent is believed to 
be only essential for optional normative portions of 
the standard. In the case Approach II (‘On-demand ap-
proach with patent owner requests) was followed for 
the patent selection (see above), then patent owners 
can be asked or even obliged to provide such input 
claim charts. Again, since they are the ones taking the 
initiative to file a request, they will probably be willing 
to supply such information. With approaches I or III, it 
might be much harder to access input claim charts, but 
you can always try asking the (current) patent owner.
• Information on current ownership. While not 
technically required to perform an essentiality assess-
ment, this is very valuable information for the potential 
user of assessment outcomes, and important if you 
want to ask the patent owner for additional informa-
tion, such as discussed above. Alternatively, ownership 
data could be derived from patent office data, where 
registered (re)assignment can be found. Disadvantag-
es here are that such data is not necessarily complete 
(patent offices often do not require transfers to be reg-
istered, or only under specific conditions), and this data 
is complex to interpret. Among other things, many reg-
istered transfers are in-company transfers (sometimes 
for tax box reasons or reorganisations) or transfers as 
a security in the context of loans or financing. Inter-
preting such data at a larger scale is challenging and 
requires extensive skills and resources.
Finally, data on earlier patent pool assessments can also 
be a form of input. We discuss this separately in Dimension 
B7 in Section 9.2.2. 
123 Since the actual scope of protection is in the claims of a patent, we could also write here “at least those claim(s) of the patent believed to be 
essential”
124 Whichever way you choose to define that focal standard: “GSM” “3G UMTS/WCDMA”, or perhaps “3GPP Release 16”.
125 As no single ‘standard’ on claim chart format, structure and quality exists, this will probably be developed. A slightly different (related) approach 
would be to leave the format open, but work under the principle that ‘a claim is not essential until the chart is convincingly proving essentiality.’ 
The one who submits the chart would have decide on the claim interpretation and why the claim is required by someone implementing the 
standard, and provide sufficient evidence.
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B4. Patent owner interaction 
Interaction withgo patent owners during the phase of the 
assessment can potentially increase the quality and cost-
effectiveness of assessment. Here we can take inspiration 
from the processes used at patent offices, as well as 
those of patent pools. Virtually all patent offices in the 
world allow for interaction between a patent applicant 
and the patent office. This is known as patent prosecution, 
and the rules and laws governing patent prosecution are 
usually set out in manuals released by the Patent Offices. 
For instance, an examiner may produce written objections 
describing why a patent would not meet the patentability 
criteria, and the applicant might respond by arguing in 
support of the application. Most patent pools allow for 
similar interaction between patent owner and the party 
conducting essentiality assessments for the pool. The 
patent owner could for example be asked to clarify their 
input claim chart. 
Additionally, patent owner interaction can take place 
with an essentiality assessment mechanism and. may 
improve the accuracy and efficiency of the assessment. 
At the same time, interaction carries the risk of biased 
outcomes favouring the patent owner (thus reducing 
accuracy). Involvement of implementors (e.g. as third 
party) could be considered to mitigate this risk. The 
general feeling at our stakeholder workshop was that the 
advantages of patent owner involvement outweigh its 
disadvantages. It is important, though, that the rules for 
such interaction are laid down clearly and followed up 
appropriately.
B5. Availably of a procedure to 
challenge outcomes 
Offering a possibility for parties to challenge126 the 
outcome of an assessment if they believe it is incorrect 
offers further potentially increases of the quality and cost-
effectiveness of assessment. Here we can again take 
inspiration from the processes used at patent offices, as 
well as those of patent pools. In addition, the availability 
of such procedures can significantly increase confidence 
and acceptance among stakeholders – who feel that if 
the assessment came to a wrong outcome, that there are 
opportunities to correct that
Patent offices have procedures by which a decision 
can be appealed, both decisions before the grant of a 
patent (pre-grant appeals) and after such a grant (post-
grant appeals).127 Some patent offices have opposition 
procedures, designed to allow third parties to present 
objections to the grant of a patent.128 Also patent pools 
offer appeal procedures (see Section 2.2). 
In the context of assessment of essentiality, we will here 
call this a ‘procedure to challenge outcomes’ (instead of 
calling it an ‘appeal’), to highlight that the outcome of an 
assessment is not binding. 
But also here is the risk of biasing outcomes in favour of 
the patent owner, especially if the procedure to challenge 
outcomes would be available only to the patent owner, 
or when procedure to challenge outcomes would be 
possible for third parties who would have less incentive, 
fewer resources or other reasons not to challenge. 
workshop participants generally feel that the advantages 
of procedure to challenge outcomes outweigh the 
disadvantages and that it is desirable that both the patent 
owner and third parties can challenge outcomes. It is 
important that a procedure to challenge outcomes need to 
be designed carefully to avoid the possibility of delaying 
tactics or using procedural options in bad faith.
B6. Required capacity
With capacity, we refer to the total workforce required 
to carry out assessment activities (internal and/or 
outsourced). That means that this does not include efforts 
by patent owners themselves (e.g. efforts for the original 
SDO declaration, for possible self-selection of patents for 
assessment, creating input claim charts, etc). We also do 
not consider organisational or overhead costs.
In Chapter 8 we explained how much time the assessors 
in our experiments spent assessing individual patents and 
discussed our findings on how time spent is related to 
outcomes. One may assume that, on general, the more time 
126 In the context of institution feasibility, this report uses the word ‘challenge’ instead of the word ‘appeal’, as the latter is in a strict sense often 
understood to be a ‘request made to a court of law or to someone in authority to change a previous decision’ (source: Cambridge Dictionary), and 
the essentiality assessment as referred to in this report are probably best not characterised as ‘decisions’.
127 For more details on such appeals, see [46, §4.77-4.11].
128 For more details on such appeals, see [46, §2.35-2.37].
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is spent, the higher the accuracy of the outcome will be.129 
Furthermore, the availability of input claim charts is found to 
have great positive impact on the quality of the outcomes 
and efficiency of essentiality assessments (Chapter 4). 
Considering the above, we will use the following working 
assumptions for our below estimates on required capacity: 
an assessment with input claim charts takes a fixed 8 hours, 
and an assessment without these takes a fixed 12 hours. 
With these assumptions, we aim at a comparable accuracy 
level for both cases (which is important for comparability 
between, for instance, numerator and denominator 
observations). Note, however, that the above 8 and 12 
hours are working assumptions for the calculations in this 
chapter, not conclusions as such: It is up the initiators of a 
final scheme to choose the time spend for the assessments.
The capacity required obviously depends on the number 
of assessments to be carried out, and that number, in turn, 
depends on the patent selection (see Dimension B1 in Section 
9.2.2, above). Our capacity calculations are for illustrative 
purposes; we have to rely on many assumptions (which may 
turn out differently in practice), and we do not include all type 
of costs (like management and organisational overhead). For 
our calculations, we use the ETSI/3GPP cellular standards 
2G (GSM), 3G (UMTS/WCDMA), 4G (LTE) and 5G as focal 
standards. There are currently approximately 25,000 patent 
families potentially essential for these standards in the ETSI 
IPR database. If we are looking at ‘European SEP exposure’, 
the analysis should focus on the 16,000 or so families that 
have a European member. Of these, around 8,000 families 
have a granted European member. If we focus on ‘Global SEP 
exposure’, another 3000 families need to be investigated 
that have a granted patent outside the EPO. 
If Approach I (‘SDO disclosure-based approach’) is used 
for patent selection, 8,000 European patents would need 
to be assessed for European SEP exposure. At 12 hours 
per patent (as there is no input claim chart), the total 
number of working hours involved would be 96,000, 
equalling 52.6 person-years.130 For global SEP exposure, 
11,000 patents would have to investigated, equalling 
72 person-years (assuming the same effort is required for 
non-European patents). Note that with this illustration we 
are not suggesting that a transparency system should be 
focusing at these standards only or specifically.
If Approach II (‘On-demand approach with patent owner’) 
is used, the number of patents to be assessed depends on 
the degree to which patent owners decide to file requests. 
Importantly, you would expect firms to only file requests for 
patents which they currently believe to be essential (and 
which are granted in Europe), a number which is probably 
significantly lower than the number of patents disclosed 
to an SDO as potentially essential. For our calculations 
below, we make an educated guess that firms would file 
requests for 40% of the European granted patents they 
own. The total workload depends on the extent to which 
firms actually submit patent requests:
• Suppose all the firms that actually submit patent 
requests represent 25% of all SDO disclosed SEPs, the 
capacity required for European SEP exposure would 
be 8,000 * 40% * 25% = 800 patents. At 8 hours 
per patent (as there is an input claim chart), a total 
of 6,400 working hours would be involved, equalling 
3.5 person-years. For global SEP exposure, this 
is 11,000 * 40% * 25% = 1,100 patents, a total of 
8,800 working hours, equalling 4.8 person-years.
• If all the firms that actually submit patent requests rep-
resent 50% of all SDO disclosed SEPs, the total working 
time would be 7.0 person-years for European SEP expo-
sure and 9.6 person-years for global SEP exposure.
• If all the firms that actually submit patent requests 
represent 75% of all SDO disclosed SEPs, the total 
working time would be 10.5 person-years for Europe-
an SEP exposure and 14.4 person-years for global SEP 
exposure.
Note that the above applies to the ETSI/3GPP cellular 
standards. Other standards such as IEEE 802.11 (‘Wi-Fi’) 
would require additional efforts. (Since IEEE allows for 
blanket declarations, it is hard to estimate how large such 
additional efforts should be). Also note that every year, 
additional previously disclosed patents are granted, and 
new patents are disclosed as potentially essential, so the 
above is a moving target. 
In Section 9.3 below, we return to the matter of workforce 
required in the various scenarios. 
129 Note that this does not necessarily have to be true for a set of observations such as the ones we have in our pilot experiment: in ‘difficult’ cases, 
assessors may have spent more time, but still come to a less reliable outcome. If one were able to correct for difficulty, one would expect to 
find a positive relation between time spent and accuracy. (Unfortunately, independent data on difficulty did not exist for the patent in our pilot 
experiment, so we could not correct for that.)
130 This calculation uses the following data and assumptions: 52 weeks a year, a 5-day work week, an 8-hour workday and 32 days annual leave.
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B7. Fast track for existing patents in 
the patent pool
Depending on the standard(s) for which an essentiality 
assessment mechanism is set up, companies may have 
patents that have already undergone an essentiality 
assessment in a patent pool. In order to reduce workload 
and costs, the outcomes of such pool assessments 
could be used instead of conducting a new assessment. 
In doing so, however, it is crucial that the previous 
assessment meets all the quality criteria defined in the 
new assessment system. A pragmatic approach is to set 
up a certification system whereby each individual pool 
can apply for a certificate,131 and the assessments in that 
pool are examined to see if they meet the defined quality 
criteria (or whether additional steps are needed in order 
to comply). This in fact creates a fast track procedure for 
existing patents in a patent pool. 
The potential savings with such a fast track procedure 
depend on the share of overall patents brought into a 
pool. For 3GPP cellular technologies, this share is relatively 
modest. Yet from the perspective of the individual 
companies that bring 3GPP patents into the pool, the fast 
track savings would be substantial. 
The key aspect here is that, however, the resulting 
procedure should meet the requirements of general public 
acceptance.
In some cases, patent owners may have let outside 
law firms done essentiality assessments for their own 
individual licensing programs (while not choosing to 
license them in a pool). In that case a fast track procedure, 
where the individual patent owner or performing law 
firm can apply for a certificate and get its SEPs accepted 
without another essentiality assessment, could also bring 
substantial savings to individual companies. It is crucial, 
however, that in such a case, impartiality can be assured. 
Also here, the key aspects here is that, however realised, 
the resulting procedure should meet the requirements of 
general public acceptance.
131 Alternatively, a patent owner in a pool could file a request for a certain pool to be certified.
132 Here, the ultimate responsibility for the essentiality assessments would remain with this organisation, while the organisation could call the ex-
ternal party (that is tasked to conduct the actual assessment) to account if its performance does not comply with the contract.
9.2.3 Organisational structure for essentiality assessment
C1. Executing entity, capabilities  
and expertise 
While the task of running an essentiality assessment 
system could in principle be given to a single, newly-to-be 
established organisation, the challenges are considerable − 
setting it up, deciding what capacity is required, employing 
qualified staff to carry out the assessments, etc. For these 
reasons, many stakeholders expressed a preference for 
using existing organisations. Such an approach makes 
good use of exiting expertise, allows a quick set-up time, 
and would enable multiple organisations to perform the 
actual assessment, which would encourage specialisation 
(e.g. patents in a certain language or jurisdiction) and 
prevent conflict of interest (see below). 
A small, administrative/management organisation could 
be established to design and define procedures, oversee 
the system, and have overall responsibility for quality.132 
This organisation could then outsource the actual 
assessment tasks for individual patents to (multiple) 
external parties. In fact, this organisational design very 
much reflects that of the patent pools. To ensure quality 
and impartiality, it is vital that external parties meet a 
defined set of criteria (which could be in the form of a 
certificate, see Dimension C2 below). An important design 
choice here is under which auspices or legal regime this 
organisation would be set up.
Various types of existing external parties could qualify for 
carrying out the actual assessments:
1. Public institutions, including:
• The European Patent Office (EPO). While very well 
qualified, the EPO itself highlighted the importance 
of any activities being compatible with its man-
date, and not affecting the granting process. 
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• National patent offices. Several national patent 
offices in EU countries in fact already offer com-
mercial services to the market, like infringement 
analyses and freedom-to-operate studies. This 
might make it easier for them to decide to offer 
essentiality assessment services as well. 
• The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), which has gained specific expertise on 
standards essential patents in arbitration centres, 
has expressed interest in involvement in an essen-
tiality assessment scheme. 
2. Commercial service providers, including: 
• Law firms and patent attorney firms. Several have 
already conducted essentiality assessments for pat-
ent pools, some of them for decades and gained 
extensive experience in this task. Interesting in this 
context is IPEC, the consortium of patent law firms 
and patent attorneys that currently provides assess-
ment services for a range of patent pools. Compared 
to these firms’ current activities, the assessments in 
the new system could offer opportunities for econo-
mies of scale and scope, and such firms may be able 
to offer lower rates than the current patent pool. 
• Commercial firms offering assessment services, 
other than law firms and patent attorney firms. A 
number already performs essentiality assessment 
(for some of their publications, see Annex 1). We 
note that the workshop participants expressed con-
cern about whether impartiality could be sufficiently 
ensured for such firms – see Dimension C2 below. 
C2. Impartiality
During the workshop, the stakeholders overwhelmingly 
agreed that a European essentiality assessment system 
should ensure total impartiality. For the institutional 
parties mentioned above, impartiality is usually already 
warranted via their laws, rules and procedures. 
Law firms and patent attorney firms are usually also 
subject to sectoral regulation and norms (e.g. a bar) that 
ensure impartiality. During the workshop, this was clearly 
acknowledged by representatives of the courts. It is also 
in their commercial interest not to cross the line: breaches 
of impartiality could have grave consequences for them in 
terms of winning new client contacts. Large organisations 
in this field also have experience dealing with complex 
issues, including the use of Chinese walls. Again we see an 
interesting example of how to avoid conflict of interest in 
essentiality assessment in patent pools – an assessor may 
only accept a task if the owner of the patent to be assessed 
is not a client of their firm, nor has an adverse interest in 
that firm in a legal dispute. By having a choice of multiple 
assessment firms (per country/jurisdiction), pools can simply 
turn to another firm should a conflict of interest arise. 
The workshop participants did, however, express significant 
concerns about whether commercial firms other than law 
and patent attorney firms could meet the impartiality 
requirements. 
C3. International dimension
As this study follows on from the European Commission in 
COM(2017) 712 final [17], it makes sense to first focus on 
whether a European system could be set up for essentiality 
assessment. If the scope was to be SEP exposure in 
Europe, technically speaking, EPO and national patents in 
the EU (possibly extended to the European Economic Area, 
EEA or the European Free Trade Association, EFTA) would 
be sufficient. In practice, however, firms often engage in 
global negotiations when it comes to essential patents, 
and just having information on SEP exposure in Europe 
might be insufficient to satisfy the transparency needs of 
the parties in question.
The most pragmatic approach might be to start with 
patent families, then focus on one patent in that family, 
selected in the following order:133
1. European patents
2. National patents in EU/EEA/EFTA countries
3. A patent from an IP5 office134 other than EPO (order 
still to be decided) 
133 The applicability of this scheme depends on when the essentiality assessment is done and whether at that point in time patents have been 
already granted.
134 The IP5 Offices are the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), the China 
National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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In this way, one single patent per family would be assessed. 
Although it is in principle possible that within a family, a 
member in one country is essential, while a member in 
another is not, assessing each individual member would 
be extremely costly.135 And in a system aimed at providing 
information on SEP exposure, and where licenses are 
typically global, it may not be that important to know 
about differences between family members after all. 
The above also implies that the mechanism should be 
able to rely on assessors who can assess USPTO or 
JPO patents. The approach outlined in 9.2.3.C1 caters 
for that, as ‘local’ parties, located around the world, 
could be added to the set of certified outsourcing 
organisations.
In a later phase, after a successful introduction, discussions 
could be initiated on whether regulators in other world 
regions would be willing to set up their own essentiality 
assessment mechanisms. If so, good coordination is 
desirable, and could lead to fairer sharing of the overall 
burden, prevent duplication of work, and avoid unnecessary 
costs for stakeholders. 
9.2.4 Financing of essentiality assessments
D1. Principles for financing 
Many workshop participants underlined the principle that 
all parties benefitting from the system should play a part 
in financing it. Some put forward the view ‘the polluter 
pays’, but agreeing on who these polluters are, proved 
challenging. 
Greater availability of transparent data on essentiality 
could also arguably serve a public need, and might 
convince people that it would be appropriate to use public 
funds for setting up such a system. Yet, as stakeholders 
are clearly the ones gaining many of the benefits, the 
abovementioned principle (that all benefitting parties 
should play a part in financing the system) seems 
appropriate.
That said, ‘all benefitting parties’ is a complex concept 
for translating into actual financial contributions, and 
raises questions like ‘who benefits how much’, ‘benefits in 
the future vs. benefits now’, and so on. The next section 
presents pragmatic approaches that might avoid such 
discussions. 
D2. Financial contribution collection
An ex-ante model that determines how much stakeholder 
categories should contribute, and how much individual 
stakeholders should contribute, is not only hard to 
determine, but also the way to collect these contributions 
would be challenging. 
The ‘on-demand’ approach, as discussed at B1 above, offers 
an interesting approach. Patent owners who voluntarily 
request that their patents are assessed, could be asked 
to cover the costs of such assessments (just like in patent 
pools) and thus pay up front. When licensing the patents that 
have been found essential, the patent owner can then pass 
on part of these costs to the licensing fee, just like already 
happens for other costs associated with patenting, such as 
fees to the patent office. Since actual SEPs have significant 
licensing opportunities, SEP owners face relatively low risks 
of these patents remaining unlicensed and not being able to 
pass on (part of) the costs of essentiality assessment.136, 137 
Moreover, the costs of essentiality assessments are likely 
to be relatively small compared with the potential licensing 
revenue of the related SEPs.
135 Patent pools make a different choice: they check essentiality for each family member. This choice is prompted by legal requirements and the 
pools’ royalty allocation mechanisms.
136 Of course, in markets with uncertainty, such as in the IoT space, it may be hard to predict in advance how many implementers will take a license. 
Also, there are questions in how to allocate the costs precisely over different types of implementers (small or large, different industries). Having 
this said, such challenges are also equally present for ‘regular’ licensing fees (that do not incorporate some of the costs of essentiality assess-
ment).
137 Such risks do exist if a significant portion of implementers is unwilling to license. Elsewhere in this report we explain how a transparency scheme, 
depending on the way it is designed, offers opportunities to react stronger against non-willing licensees (via de ‘way to infringe’ data).
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In this way, the other beneficiaries, implementers, also bear 
part of the burden. The advantages of this mechanism 
are that it is market-based (the regulator does not need 
to design an ex-ante finance allocation scheme), and it 
only allocates costs to those actually benefitting from the 
specifically associated patents and standards (opposed to 
tax-like systems where those not benefitting also bear the 
burden). 
Obviously, an essentiality assessment system, processing 
a significant portion of all potentially essential patents, 
does require significant funding. As discussed in Dimension 
B6 in Section 9.2.2 and in the scenarios, the resources 
required vary from approximately 5 to 72 person-years for 
the current ETSI/3GPP cellular standards. At the same time, 
workshop participants pointed out that such investments 
are minor in light of the enormous value these essential 
patents represent, the vast costs associated with acquiring 
and exploiting legal rights, and the benefits that would 
be gained if SEP transaction costs were lower and legal 
conflicts declined. 
In the case of an approach in which a third party requests 
an essentiality assessment (Approach III above), one can 
consider having this party to have to bear the cost of this 
assessment. We note, however, that in this case, an SME 
requesting the patents to be assessed of a very large SEP 
holders, might be facing costs it could not bear. There is 
no simple solution to this, but if third party requests are 
combined with other schemes (that are cost-covering and 
allow for some overhead) then this might be less of an 
issue.
138 Other scenarios can be created, but for the sake of space and clarity, we do not discuss each possible combination of approaches. For many 
combinations, the characteristics can be determined based on the information provided below.
139 See [9, pp. 14-15], which states: “The patent or other IPR holder believes that it holds granted and/or pending applications for intellectual property 
rights such as Patents, utility models or semiconductor topographies, the use of which would be essential to implement the above document and 
hereby declares […] The Patent or other IPR holder undertakes to inform CEN and/or CENELEC for any update or change of the above information. [...]”
9.3 | Scenarios for essentiality assessment
Based on all the dimensions discussed, we created nine 
different scenarios – plus a baseline, status quo scenario – 
that are internally consistent (in terms of patent selection, 
data generated, data interests satisfied, financing). These 
scenarios, which might differ in feasibility, are:138 
• Scenario 0: Status quo. Here, no action is taken, 
and no transparent data on essentiality is generated. 
The interest in such data is not satisfied at all.
• Scenario A Self-assessment. Here, patent owners 
themselves perform a self-assessment of the essenti-
ality of their patents, after the final standard is issued 
and the patents in question are granted. This could be a 
voluntary or a compulsory scheme (e.g. if SDOs manage 
to make that obligatory in their IPR policies). Examples 
of the latter are CEN and CENELEC, two European SDOs 
who recently included such an update requirement in 
their IPR commitment forms. Note however, that the 
number of SDO commitments at these SDOs is much 
lower than that at, say, ETSI.139 And given differences in 
governance structure across SDOs, these organisations 
will also differ in the degree they would be able to actu-
ally adopt such a change to their IPR policies. 
• Scenario B: Systematic assessment of all 
disclosed SDO patents. Here, all patents that are 
disclosed to SDOs (for a given standard) are sys-
tematically assessed for essentiality. An additional 
mechanism would be needed for SDOs where dis-
closed patents may not be identified (‘blanket decla-
rations’). 
• Scenario C: Assessment of sampled disclosed 
SDO patents. Like Scenario B, but a random sample 
is drawn from those patents (either from the total set 
of patents, or one sample per patent owner). 
• Scenario D: Assessment of patents voluntarily 
requested by patent owner. In this scenario, pat-
ent owners can choose to put their patents forward for 
evaluation. 
• Scenario E: As scenario D, complemented by 
third party requests. Patent owners can put their 
patents forward for evaluation, but also third parties 
are allowed to file requests (depending on the imple-
mentation of individual patents and/or a patent own-
er’s entire portfolio).
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140 Especially in an infringement context, or when it wants to challenge the outcomes of a (negative) assessment. 
Stakeholder 
with data 
interests 
(see A1 and 
A2)
SCENARIOS
0: 
Status 
quo
A: Self-
assessment
B: All SDO 
disclosed 
patents
C: Sampled 
SDO 
disclosed 
patents
D: 
Voluntarily 
requested 
by patent 
owner
E: As 
D plus 
third-
party 
requests
F: As 
D plus 
sampled 
disclosed 
SDO 
patent
G: AI-
based 
system 
H: As 
D plus 
assistive 
AI system 
I. Numerator 
(information 
on	specific	
SEP owner)
Implementer, 
patent owner, 
courts
No No (a) Yes Partly Yes, for 
submitting 
patent owners
Yes, for 
submitting 
patent 
owners plus 
for SEPs 
selected in 
TPR (b)
Yes, for 
submitting 
patent 
owners, 
partly for 
others
Depends 
on public 
acceptance 
(c)
Yes
II. 
Denominator 
(information 
on all SEP 
owners) 
Implementer, 
patent owner, 
courts
No No (d) Yes Yes No No Yes Depends 
on public 
acceptance 
(c)
Yes
III. ‘validated 
summary 
claim charts’ 
data’
Implementer, 
patent owner, 
courts
No Maybe (d) Depends No Yes (f) Yes (g) Yes (g) No Yes (f)
IV ‘detailed 
assessment 
outcomes’
Patent 
owner140
No Maybe (d) Depends No Yes (f) Yes (g) Yes (g) No Yes (f)
V. Current 
ownership 
data
Implementer, 
courts
No No No No Yes, for 
submitting 
patent owners
Yes, for 
submitting 
patent 
owners
Yes, for 
submitting 
patent 
owners
No Yes, for 
submitting 
patent 
owners
TABLE 19:	SCENARIOS	AND	HOW	THEY	MEET	STAKEHOLDERS’	INTERESTS	FOR	DATA	(A1	AND	A2).
Note: (a) Unless the patent owner in question has performed such self-assessments, and the reliability of the assessments it carried out is believed to be satisfactory; (b) TPR = Third 
Party Requests; (c) assuming the AI system is reliable and its outcomes are accepted by stakeholders; (d) Unless all patent owners have performed such self-assessments, and the 
reliability of the assessments they carried out is believed to be satisfactory; (d) depends on whether the quality of the self-assessment is deemed sufficient by a court to satisfy the 
relevant Huawei/ZTE requirement; (f) Yes, and this information is available (only) to the patent owners themselves, who are the stakeholder that has interest in such data (see text).)
Dark orange indicates that data interests are not met, yellow that they are partly or conditionally met, and green that they are met. Blue means that it depends on public 
acceptance.
• Scenario F: As scenario D, complemented by 
assessment of sampled disclosed SDO pat-
ents. Patent owners can put their patents forward for 
evaluation, and the patents of firms that choose not to 
do so, are subject to a sample approach similar to that 
in Scenario C. 
• Scenario G: An automated system. Here, essenti-
ality assessments would be performed fully based on 
an automated system, e.g. using AI.
• Scenario H: As D, complemented with assistive 
semantic/AI	system.	Patent owners can choose to 
put their patents forward for evaluation, and the pat-
ents of those firms that choose not to do so, are sub-
ject to a system whereby an AI system assists asses-
sors by selecting patents most likely to be essential, 
followed by a human assessment. 
We now consider the type of data interests (see Dimension 
A1 in Section 9.2.1), then which stakeholder(s) have that 
data interest (see Dimension A1 in Section 9.2.1), and the 
confidence level associated with that data (see Dimension 
A2 in Section 9.2.1) which we summarise in the first two 
columns of Table 19. Then, having considered the various 
scenarios, we determine to what degree they meet those 
data interest as shown in Table 19. For Scenarios D, E 
and F, in which parties can voluntarily request essentiality 
assessments, we will assume that some but not all parties 
will do so. 
Concerning numerator data, we argued earlier that 
the required dataset confidence level is relatively high. 
Sampling is not preferred but can be used to generate 
insights. Hence, only Scenarios B and G can fully satisfy 
this demand (but, as we will later see, at great cost and 
low feasibility). They are followed by Scenario F (combining 
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requested patents with samples for the rest), then by 
Scenario E and Scenario D. 
Concerning denominator data, we argue that the 
required dataset confidence level is moderate and can be 
satisfied with a sampling approach (as noted before, also 
when sampling is used, the actual resulting assessments 
must be using same methodology and same rigor for both 
numerator and denominator data, otherwise they are 
incomparable). Of course, the required dataset confidence 
level can also be achieved by systematically assessing 
all patents. Hence, Scenarios B, E, F and G all satisfy this 
demand. The other scenarios do not.
Concerning ‘validated summary claim charts’ data 
(which helps in in terms of mapping a product to actually 
essential standards, helps implementers to know who owns 
SEPs for a specific products, helps to determine what is the 
SCENARIOS
0:	
Status 
quo
A: Self-
assessment
B:	All	SDO	
disclosed 
patents
C: Sampled 
SDO 
disclosed 
patents
D: Voluntarily 
requested by 
patent owner
E: As D plus 
third-party 
requests
F: As D plus sampled 
disclosed SDO patent
G:	AI-based	
system 
H: As D plus 
assistive AI system 
A3. Interest for data on 
specific	standards	and	
industry sectors
n/a
Can (will?) be 
chosen freely
Can be chosen freely, but challenges if SDO for associated standard allows blanket 
declarations
Can be chosen 
freely (a)
As B-F
A4. Desired level of detail Preferably specific indication of relevant product categories and optional normative features
A5.	Data	interest	and	the	
standards’	life	cycle
After the standard is finalised, and the patent has been granted, and opposition from the patent office is no longer possible
A6 Legal status of 
assessment outcomes
Not legally binding, best characterised as an ‘opinion’, ‘certificate’, or ‘determination’ 
A7.	Public	availability	of	
assessment outcomes
Public: fact that positive opinion is reached on specific patent and specific standard document(s)
Not public: Negative opinions and underlying data
B1.	Patent	selection	(within	
given standard)
B2.	Sampling
n/a
Depends on 
SDO choices
All SDO 
disclosed
Sample 
of SDO 
disclosures
By voluntary 
requests
By voluntary 
requests
By voluntary requests 
complemented with 
SDO sample
All SDO 
disclosed
By voluntary 
requests 
complemented with 
all SDO disclosures
B3.	Required	and	available	
input	(b)
[some 
SSECT from 
SDOs] (c)
[some 
SSECT from 
SDOs] (c)
SSECT, ICC, 
OWN
SSECT, ICC, 
OWN
SSECT, ICC, OWN SSECT, ICC, OWN
B4.	Patent	owner	interaction	
n/a No (i) No (d) No (d)
Yes, for submitting patent owners; helps to increase 
accuracy and acceptance
No (d) As D
B5.	Availability	of	procedure	
to challenge outcomes
n/a n/a No (e) TBD (e)
Yes, for submitting patent owners; helps to increase 
accuracy and acceptance
No (e) As D
B6.	Required	capacity,	in	
person-years,	for	2G	thru	5G	
for	European	SEP	exposure	(f)
0 Not estimated 52.6 5.3
3.5 / 7.0 / 
10.5 (g)
4.8 / 9.6 / 
14.5 (g)
7.5 / 9.6 / 11.8 (g) Unknown Unknown
Same,	but	for	Global	SEP	
exposure	(f)
0 Not estimated 72.0 7.2
4.8 / 9.6 / 
14.4 (g)
6.6 / 13.2 / 
19.8 (g)
12.2 / 13.2 / 16.2 (g) Unknown Unknown
B7.	Fast	track	for	existing	
patent pool patents
n/a n/a No No
Yes, for submitting patent owners; reduces costs and 
increases benefits
No As D
C1. Executing entity, 
capabilities and expertise
n/a n/a
Small central body and outsourcing of assessments to certified parties  
(e.g. patent offices, patent organisations, law firms, patent attorney firms)
C2. Impartiality n/a n/a Is ensured in patent offices and also via existing mechanisms in law firms, patent attorney firms
C3. International dimension
n/a n/a
System can also assess families without EPO family members, yet at additional costs. Future alignment with other regional 
initiatives
D1.	Principles	for	financing	 n/a Internal Principle of ‘all benefiters should pay’
D2. Financial contribution 
collection
n/a Internal Not clear Not clear
Linked to submission process, partial pass through via 
licenses
Not clear 
As D plus extra 
financing
Feasibility [main challenge]
High
Low 
[willingness]
Low [fee 
collecting, 
finance]
Medium 
[fee 
collecting, 
finance]
High High Medium/ high [finance]
Not yet 
feasible, 
possible in the 
(far) future?
Not yet feasible, 
possible in the 
(nearer) future?
TABLE 20:	SCENARIOS	AND	HOW	THEY	RELATE	TO	DESIGN	DIMENSIONS	(A3-D2).
Note: (a) may depend on standard of context for which AI system has been trained; (b) SECT: Information on the specific section(s) of the standardisation document(s) for which 
the patent is potentially essential; ICC: Input Claim charts, OWN: Information on current ownership; (c) Only sparsely from the SDOs, e.g. some ETSI declarations have “Illustrative 
Specific part of the standard (e.g. Section)”; (d) in non-participative scenarios, interaction with the patent owner is not logical; (e) to be decided, but less logical in such non-
collaborative scenarios. In combination with Scenario B, workload would become unmanageable. (f) assumptions include firm self-selection of 40% for patent submission, 8 hours 
assessment time per patent; and 10% sample size; and third-party requests 10% on top of patent owner requests; see further at Dimension B2 (Section 9.2.2) and Dimension B6 
(Section 9.2.2) for further details; (g) values for 25%/50%/75% participation levels. Colours indicate how well the dimension in question is satisfied by the scenario: dark orange 
indicates is low, yellow medium, and green high.
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reasonableness of a proposed royalty rate, and helps imple-
menters in infringement procedures and in meeting a key re-
quirement as laid out in Huawei/ZTE framework), we argued 
above that the required dataset confidence level is very high. 
Furthermore, for at least that patent owner, full coverage is 
required, and sampling is not allowed. In terms of this criteri-
um, Scenario B may satisfy, depending on its design.141 Sce-
narios D, E and F satisfy insofar that patent owner decided 
to voluntary submit its patents. Scenario G would not satisfy 
this data type in the first place, as an AI-based assessment 
does not generate the relevant information. Thus, only Sce-
narios D, E and F meet all the criteria for this data category.
141 Scenario B systematically assesses all patents, but the question is in how far this process without having input claim charts will allow for the 
creation of reliable ‘validated summary claim charts’. In specific, not starting from claim charts, the assessor may overlook a specific mapping 
(and therefor the relevance to a specific device category).
142 For the assumptions on which this number was derived, see Dimension B6 in Section 9.2.2 as well as Table 20 and its notes.
For the next step, we consider all the design dimensions 
discussed in the previous sections and how they are related 
to the various scenarios. The result is shown in Table 20.
As a final step, we combine the degree to which stakeholder 
interest in transparent data on essentiality is satisfied 
(derived from Table 19, and considering all five data types) 
and our overall estimate of feasibility of that scenario 
(derived from Table 20). Table 21 shows the overall 
scores of these scenarios on the degree they generate 
transparent data on essentiality for which interest was 
expressed, and their implementation feasibility.
SCENARIOS
0: Status 
quo
A: Self-
assessment
B: All SDO 
disclosed 
patents
C: Sampled 
SDO disclosed 
patents
D: Voluntarily 
requested by 
patent owner
E: As D plus 
third-party 
requests
F: As D plus 
sampled 
disclosed SDO 
patent
G: AI-based 
system 
H: As D plus 
assistive AI 
system 
Degree to which 
transparent data 
on essentiality is 
generated 
[Main limitation]
Low
[No data 
at all]
Low
[No impartial 
data, diversity 
of definitions 
and tests]
Medium
[No type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Limited 
numerator 
data, type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Medium
[No denominator data. For 
non-participating firms, no 
numerator data and no 
ownership data]
Medium to 
high
[For non-
participating 
firms, less 
detailed 
numerator 
data and no 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Depends 
on public 
acceptance; 
no type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
High
[For non-
participating 
firms, no 
ownership data]
Feasibility of 
implementation
[Main challenge]
High Low 
[willingness]
Low 
[financing, 
capacity]
Medium 
[financing]
Medium to high 
 [partici pation]
Medium to 
high
 [participation, 
financing]
Not yet; 
possible in 
the (distant) 
future?
Not yet; 
possible in the 
(nearer) future?
[participation]
TABLE 21:	SCENARIOS	AND	THEIR	OVERALL	ASSESSMENT	CONCERNING	(A)	THE	GENERATION	OF	TRANSPARENT	DATA	ON	ESSENTIALITY	AND	(B)	IMPLEMENTA-
TION	FEASIBILITY.
Type III data is ‘validated summary claim charts’ data; type IV data is ‘detailed assessment outcomes’ data. Dark orange indicates a low degree or a low feasibility, yellow medium, 
and green high.
As the content follows from the above sections, we will 
highlight selected scenarios for specific features or merits. 
Scenario B (‘Systematic assessment of all disclosed SDO 
patents’) scores medium in terms of the degree to which 
it generates transparent data on essentiality. It provides 
both information on specific firms (numerator) and all firms 
(denominator), but does not result in ownership information, 
or ‘validated summary claim charts’ data. We determined 
its feasibility to be low, because it would be hard to have 
this scheme financed by the stakeholders, and the required 
capacity of the essentiality assessment mechanism would 
have to be very large. Implementing elements like prosecution 
or procedures to challenge outcomes are not possible in this 
setting. That said, this scheme is entirely independent of 
stakeholder involvement, and if the European Commission 
wants to go ahead without having to rely on the choices of 
others, and is willing to bear the costs (for illustration: this 
is estimated at 72 person-years142 for global SEP exposure 
information on the current state on 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS/
WCDMA, 4G/LTE and 5G, and more if other standards are 
added such as “Wi-Fi”, etc.), this scenario that would allow that. 
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Scenario D (‘Assessment of patents voluntarily requested by 
patent owner’), also scores medium in terms of the degree 
to which it generates transparent data on essentiality. 
For participating firms, it generates specific information 
on that firm (numerator), ownership information, as well 
as ‘validated summary claim charts’ data. But it does not 
generate information all firms (denominator). It scores 
‘medium to high’ on overall feasibility, where the actual 
degree to which companies would indeed voluntarily 
engage is the critical issue. The voluntary involvement 
design has several interesting features: 
• Voluntarily submitting patents is beneficial to compa-
nies, as they obtain ‘validated summary claim charts’ 
data. This type of data benefits both patent owners 
and implementers in a number of ways (see Table 17). 
The data benefits the patent owner specifically in an 
infringement context, helping it to meet one of the 
key requirements of the Huawei/ZTE legal framework. 
When negotiating with willing licensees, this data 
helps to make negotiations smoother and faster. With 
non-willing licensees, this data helps these companies 
to seek injunctive relief, when appropriate.143
• The voluntary request also opens up the possibility to 
request input claim charts and ownership information. 
• Such a voluntary involvement also increases support 
and acceptance of the mechanism. Companies will 
have more confidence in the output if they can provide 
the right input (input claim charts), can clarify where 
necessary (prosecution) and can challenge the out-
comes when they feel this is necessary. 
• This voluntary involvement also creates a possibility 
for designing a financing mechanism, in which patent 
owners pay the up-front costs, and can (partly) pass 
them on into their patent license fees. 
Scenario F combines the strengths of the voluntarily 
requested scenario (D) with that of an SDO declaration, 
sample-based approach (Scenario C). As a result, it 
creates both detailed data on participating firms as well 
as nominator data for the entire industry, and therefore 
scores ‘medium to high’ for the degree to which it 
generates transparent data on essentiality. Having all 
the features of Scenario D, it scores ‘medium to high’ on 
overall feasibility.
Scenario H brings an AI component to participative scenario 
D. In terms of generating transparent data on essentiality, 
it scores the best of all scenarios (‘high’). But we believe 
this scenario is currently not feasible. Yet, if the system 
starts with one of the other participative scenarios (D, E 
or F), generates a sufficiently large reference data set that 
can be used to develop and validate the desired AI system, 
and such a system is found satisfactory, a relatively easy 
migration to Scenario I is possible (from Scenario F to I, 
you would just replace the sample-based component with 
the AI system). 
143 To do so, the company will also need to satisfy the other necessary conditions for the availability of injunctive relief in this framework.
9.4 | Key success factors, challenges, and potential risks 
In this section, we summarise key success factors for 
the adoption as well as potential risks associated with 
any undertaking to assess essentiality at a large scale, 
specifically to inform the Commission on what to watch 
for and avoid, if such scheme would be implemented.
Key success factors
• Broad acceptance by stakeholders. To achieve 
that, it is important to engage with all stakehold-
ers in the above process. Acceptance by stake-
holders also requires that the system is designed and 
operated in such a way that it earns trust. To achieve 
this, it is important to ensure high levels of reliability, 
thoroughness, and impartiality. 
• Consider essentiality assessment as a con-
tinuous process, not a one-time snapshot. This 
requires that data is kept up to date (e.g. when new 
standard releases are issues or new patents are grant-
ed, new assessments may need to take place to keep 
both numerator and denominator up to date). Further-
more, one should continue to evaluate for which stand-
ards assessments are desired and whether new types 
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of device categories (e.g. for specific usages) emerge 
that would require transparent essentiality data to be 
available. 
• Some of the most promising scenarios (partly) 
build on patent owners willing to submit 
requests for assessment, including input claim 
charts. It is important to maintain benefits for these 
firms to do so. Furthermore, it is key that firms that 
supply information in this process can be confident their 
information is kept confidential where appropriate.
Key challenges 
• The first challenge is to decide on the appropriate level 
of accuracy (degree of thoroughness) of assessments 
and the associated design parameters (including those 
for sampling). The confidence level required for the dif-
ferent types of usages of that data (see Dimension A2 
in Section 9.2.1) and the resources (money) required 
to reach these levels are the primary important fac-
tors for these choices. Additionally, one should consider 
the views of stakeholders on what level of accuracy 
is found to be appropriate (and matching these likely 
increases overall acceptance of the system). Several 
stakeholders expressed to us that any system would 
need to ensure high levels of reliability, thoroughness, 
and impartiality. They stressed that if a solution is not 
rigorous, it may actually upset the current working 
principles of SEP licensing rather than enhancing SEP 
licensing in the future.
• A second challenge is that essentiality assessments 
are not checking validity or value. This could potential-
ly result in a future situation where essentiality sta-
tistics are gamed. One example would be the filing of 
relatively narrow IPR, or filing many families on similar 
subject matter, and then claiming related solutions, all 
of which might be essential, but where each family 
with essential claim(s) add limited independent value 
over the other to the standardised feature. 
• The third challenge is related to timing. If not updated 
regularly, the aggregated information drawn from such 
assessments becomes outdated, particularly during 
the early phases of a new standard’s development. 
Essentiality analyses are best performed long after 
the stabilisation and adoption of the standard, and 
when the majority of all related IPR has been grant-
ed. Only at this time it is also known what portions of 
the standard have achieved a strong market adoption 
(and which portions remain as dead letters). Howev-
er, it seems the stakeholders would benefit most from 
having the information much earlier in the process - 
which is not easily achievable.
9.5 | Conclusions
This chapter investigates the institutional feasibility of 
a system for large-scale essentiality assessment. We 
consider a system institutionally feasible if it meets an 
interest for transparent essentiality data, has a suitable 
procedural design, has an appropriate organisational 
structure, and can raise the necessary funds to finance the 
resources required.
As the above aspects are interwoven, we developed a 
total of nine scenarios, each consisting of a set of mutually 
consistent design choices over the 19 distinct dimensions 
we identified that cover all the above aspects. 
We briefly discuss the scenarios that score at least 
‘medium’ in terms of the degree to which they meet the 
stakeholders’ expressed interest for transparent data on 
essentiality. 
Scenario B (‘Systematic assessment of all disclosed SDO 
patents’) requires many resources and is the costliest 
scenario. That said, this scheme is entirely independent of 
stakeholder involvement, and if the European Commission 
wants to go ahead without having to rely on the choices of 
others, and is willing to bear the costs (for illustration: this 
is estimated at 72 person-years144 for global SEP exposure 
information on the current state on 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS/
WCDMA, 4G/LTE and 5G, and more if other standards are 
added such as “Wi-Fi”, etc.), this is a scenario that would 
allow that.
144 For the assumptions on which this number was derived, see Dimension B6 in Section 9.2.2 as well as Table 20 and its notes.
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Scenario D (‘Assessment of patents voluntarily requested 
by patent owner’) seeks to actively involve stakeholders 
and maintain the underlying benefits of the assessments, 
for them to participate. Because patent owners perform 
a self-selection of potentially essential patents and the 
procedure is more cost-efficient, overall needed resource is 
considerably lower (estimated at 9.6 person-years instead 
of the 72 person-years in the above scenario145) This 
involvement also opens up the possibility for additional 
data, that can help licensing negotiations between patent 
owners and willing licensees to be smoother and faster. 
It also helps patent owners to be able to seek injunctive 
relief and deal with non-willing licensees. The voluntary 
involvement is likely to increase overall support for the 
mechanism, create possibilities for a self-supporting 
financing structure, and achieve better overall accuracy 
and cost-efficiency. Yet, this scenario does not collect data 
on non-participating firms. 
Scenario F combines the strengths of above scenario (D) 
with a system to collect data on non-participating firms, 
and therefore scores again higher in terms of creating 
transparent data on essentiality. The additional data for 
non-participating firms is based on assessments of a 
random sample of patents that they disclosed as ‘may be 
or may become essential’ at SDOs. Required resources are 
at 13.2 person-years when using the same assumptions 
as for the above calculations. In terms of overall feasibility 
(including financing), it scores as high as Scenario D, 
making it perhaps the most attractive of our scenarios. 
(Where we do note that costs for the sampling part would 
need to be covered by overhead on on-demand part, and 
that at start-up, pre-financing may be required.) Compared 
Scenario B, an overhead would need to be added to the 
on-demand assessment, and/or (pre)financing for the 
sampling part would be required, for instance from a 
public institution.
Two other scenarios use some form of automated 
assessment, like Artificial Intelligence (AI). While promising, 
we think these two scenarios are not yet feasible in the 
short term but may become feasible in the future.
145 Ibid.
10 KEY FINDINGS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
111Pilot Study for Essentiality Assessment of Standard Essential Patents
We combine the insights and findings from all the previous 
chapters to present the overall conclusions on the 
feasibility of introducing a European large-scale system for 
essentiality assessments, followed by recommendations 
for the European Commission and various stakeholders.
Key	findings	and	recommendations10
10.1 | Key	findings	on	the	concept	and	meaning	of	essentiality
1. Essentiality is a binary concept, but assess-
ments	are	not	a	simple	0/1	exercise.	Concep-
tually speaking, a patent is either essential, or 
it is not; there is no such thing as a ‘degree’ of 
essentiality. Yet, the actual assessment is a 
complex process, which may include some grey 
areas. The outcome depends on the precise definition 
of essentiality, which differs across SDOs,146 and fur-
ther depends on which precise version of a standard 
(standards document) essentiality is investigated. It 
also depends on the concept of patent infringement, 
and there are differences across jurisdiction on the 
precise meaning of that concept.147 The outcome may 
depend on the interpretation and meaning of techni-
cal vocabulary,148 and also the assessor’s knowledge 
of other technical solutions than the one in the pat-
ent that would also satisfy the standard. There have 
been court cases where senior experts, having spent a 
very considerable amount of time on the same, single 
patent and sometimes even serving as experts for the 
same party, came to different essentiality conclusions. 
In one such case, the judge commented: “Based on my 
assessment of both experts, I am sure the disagree-
ment represents cases in which reasonable people 
can differ.” [44, p. 74] In another case, the judge com-
mented “… ‘disagreements’ is probably a more accu-
rate label than ‘error’.” [40, p. 28, Footnote 16]. 
 Furthermore, even though there are many different 
definitions of essentiality, there is a broad under-
standing on how ‘essentiality’ should be understood 
in the context of a large-scale assessment mecha-
nism. The verbatim definition of essentiality differs 
considerably between (the policy documents of) SDOs, 
although in effect their meaning is often quite close. 
Policies also differ in whether (and how) they mention 
specific situations (examples are whether the defini-
tion encompasses of commercially essential patents, 
optional normative portions, normative references to 
other standards, enabling technologies, or patents for 
which alternatives exist which are all patented them-
selves).149 Yet, in our exchanges with stakeholders dur-
ing the preparation of our pilot experiment, it became 
clear that everyone was happy to work with the same 
working definition (see Section 8.1.1 for details).
 In this context, we also note that an assessment out-
come ‘not found to be essential’ does not equal ‘found 
not to be essential’. The reason for this is as follows: 
once an assessor has found essentiality, he or she can 
stop. But when essentiality is not (yet) found in a given 
amount of time, the question is how long an asses-
sor is supposed to go on (a patent can have dozens 
of claims, and the number pages in all the potentially 
relevant standards documents can be immense). As a 
146 These differences relate to the types of IPR covered, the inclusion of commercially essential patents, optional normative portions, normative 
references, enabling technologies and the situation when all existing alternatives are patented.
147 These differences relate to, inter alia, the concept of indirect infringement and the Doctrine of Equivalents.
148 For illustration, we here shortly discuss a case which was referred to us by experts as ‘Invalid-as-Applied’. Suppose a patent owner asserts a 
patent is essential and backs that claim by offering a relatively broad (but not unreasonable) interpretation of the scope of a claim in its granted 
patent. Also assume that when reading the description of the patent and the patent prosecution file, it becomes clear that the patent examiner 
used a narrower definition of that claim during its examination; and with the broader interpretation as offered by the owner, the patent would not 
have met the novelty criterium and would therefore not have been granted. What should the assessor conclude? That the patent is essential, but 
perhaps invalid (even though the assessor is not asked or positioned to determine validity)? Or that the patent is not essential? This is only one 
example that illustrates that such things can become complex.
149 These differences relate to the types of IPR covered, the inclusion of commercially essential patents, optional normative portions, normative 
references, enabling technologies and the situation when all existing alternatives are patented.
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result, a search cannot be always exhaustive, and the 
assessment is unbounded. 
 Although for a large-scale system of essentiality assess-
ment several choices can be made relating to interpreta-
tion and implementation,150 we conclude this would not 
significantly impact the outcomes on a large scale nor 
determine a widely supported and objective definition. 
2. The concept of essentiality also has conse-
quences for the moment that essentiality can 
be determined. By mere definition, actual essential-
ity can only be determined once the standards’ docu-
ment in question is final (often referred to as ‘adopted’ 
or ‘frozen’) and once the patent in question is granted. 
Only at that point in time, are the precise normative 
elements in the standard known, and the exact scope 
of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent.151, 152 
Some experts suggest that essentiality should not 
be assessed before the window for patent opposition 
(such as available at EPO) is closed. In commercial li-
cense negotiations, parties might also be interested in 
future outlooks: patents that still need to be granted, 
standards that are not finalised, and perhaps also new 
patents still to be applied for (called ‘capture period’ 
in licensing negotiations). But any exercise looking at 
such categories is about expectations or potential, not 
about actual essentiality. We advise keeping such ex-
ercises separate from actual essentiality analyses. 
3. Patent	essentiality	differs	from	patent	validi-
ty,153 patent enforceability,154 or patent value. 
These concepts are all important in the context of a 
licensing negotiation concerning essential patents. 
They are also related to each other and sometimes 
cannot be seen in isolation. Yet, we believe that it is 
best to keep these concepts separate for assessment 
(and that you can also strive for more transparency on 
these and other concepts). 
4. Patent	 essentiality	 also	 differs	 from	 patent	
infringement155. Whether a specific device in fact 
infringes specific actually essential patents, often 
depends on the device category: not every device 
category needs all the normative elements of a stand-
ard. For instance, a communication module that im-
plements the 3GPP 5G NB-IoT standard will only need 
to implement a very small subset of all the normative 
parts of the 3GPP 5G standard and would therefore 
only infringe a small subset of all the patents that are 
actually essential to the 3GPP 5G standard. In addition, 
whether a specific device infringes actually essential 
patents also depends on whether the patent in ques-
tion is only essential to an optional normative fea-
ture (which may or may not have been implemented 
in the device), and whether the patent in question is 
essential for the specific version of the standard im-
plemented by the device. (At Dimension A2 in Section 
9.2.1, we discuss transparent data on devices catego-
ries and optional normative features that allows for 
the ‘translation’ from essentiality to infringement.)
5. This study also explored an alternative ap-
proach	 to	 the	 regular	 essentiality	 definition. 
Essentiality assessment has significant similarities 
to novelty assessment as performed in the examina-
tion process by patent offices. Instead of asking the 
question “does a product that conforms to the stand-
ard necessarily infringe the patent?”156 you could ask: 
“assuming that the text of the standard would already 
have been disclosed before the patent was filed, would 
the patent then still meet the novelty requirement?”. 
Both the pilot experiment outcome and exten-
sive discussions with stakeholders indicate 
that the second question can form an alter-
native basis for essentiality assessment, even 
though there might be rare border-line cases in which 
the answers to these two questions differ.157 We tested 
both definitions during the pilot experiment and con-
150 These include “commercial essentiality”, “indirect infringement”, and the Doctrine of Equivalents.
151 One of these edge cases would be where the standard merely discloses a particular solution to a problem but does not require it (in the sense 
that it is normative element of the standard.
152 Patent pools are consistent with this: they only assess granted patents against adopted standards documents.
153 Patent validity, in short, refers to whether a patent meets the patentability criteria (including novelty and non-obviousness) in the jurisdiction in 
question. In principle, a granted patent is assumed to be valid unless invalidated by an authoritative court.
154 Patent enforceability, in short, means that a patent is granted, that all formal requirements are met (including the payment of renewal fees for 
the patent), and that it has not expired.
155 Wherever we use the word infringement, note that if a patent is actually licensed, it is not infringing.
156 To clarify the difference, we deliberately use a looser definition of essentiality. See Section 8.1.1, Footnote 50 on the definition of essentiality as 
used in ETSI.
157 The second question does not include the concept of “infringement”, and because of specific aspects relating to infringement (such as the Doc-
trine of Equivalents, which exists in some but not all European countries) the answers to the two questions may differ.
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firm that the results are very similar. This alternative 
is interesting for organisations that may be willing to 
perform essentiality assessments but are not in a po-
sition to use a definition that relies on the concept of 
infringement (which may be the case for some patent 
offices).
6. In order to be properly able to assess essenti-
ality,	it	is	important	that	standards	are	draft-
ed in such a way that it can be well determined 
which part of the text are (mandatory or op-
tional) normative elements, and which parts 
are not (e.g. recommendations, possibilities, 
and informative statements). Most SDOs have 
rules which define how specific words and/or how the 
document structure signals what is normative or not 
(see Dimension A3 in Section 9.2.1), but it is important 
that such rules are well respected by those that draft 
standards. 
7. On the side of the patent, it is the claims that 
determine the scope of exclusive rights con-
ferred by the patent, and therefore determine 
the essentiality. The description and drawings are to 
be taken into account when interpreting the claim.
158 Often, essentiality dates cannot be compared because they used different selection criteria or assessment procedures.
159 The ‘essentiality rate’ is the total number of patents found to be essential, divided by the total number of patents investigated for essentiality. 
Such a rate could be calculated for all companies that own patents relevant for a given standard, or for one specific patent owner. Often, the 
denominator in this division (i.e. ‘total number of patents investigated’) is the total number of patents disclosed at an SDO as potentially essential 
for a given standard, but the denominator can also be another set of patents, such as a set preselected by a patent owner.
10.2 | Key	findings	for	existing	essentiality	assessment	
mechanisms
There is a very wide range of essentiality assessments 
available. They differ considerably in design, efforts, and 
quality. The below findings on these existing mechanisms 
are on the basis of desk research. 
8. Claim charts play a key role in high-quality 
essentiality assessments. In patent pools, actual 
assessments are outsourced to independent, special-
ist third parties, who receive such claim charts as in-
put. Individual companies prepare claim charts also 
for their own, standard-based licensing programs. 
The availability of claim charts is found to have great 
positive impact on the quality of the outcomes and 
efficiency of essentiality assessment. Here, efficiency 
refers to the resources required to reach that quality. 
(See also key finding 1 above, about unbounded as-
sessments.)
9. To date, patent pools have the most sophisti-
cated systems in place for essentiality assess-
ment. These systems have the following characteris-
tics: (1) it is a voluntary process for patent owners to 
participate, (2) claim charts play a key role, (3) actual 
assessments are outsourced to independent, specialist 
third parties, (4) there are well-developed appeal pro-
cesses in place, (5) there is a specific choice in terms 
of transparency and (6) the outcomes are generally 
considered to be highly accurate. A new, large-scale 
system for essentiality assessment can learn a great 
deal from the rich experiences of patent pools. 
10. During discussions we had with patent pools, 
it was acknowledged that, theoretically speak-
ing, the outcome of the assessment could de-
pend on whether particular jurisdiction recog-
nises the Doctrine of Equivalents, or induced 
infringement,	 or	 other	 specific	 national	 as-
pects. Yet, it was explained that in practice, 
such	differences	hardly	ever	matter	for	essen-
tiality assessments.
11. Large scale essentiality assessments per-
formed for court cases show there are substan-
tial	differences	in	(comparable158) essentiality 
rates159	 across	 firms	 and	 across	 technology	
generations. In one court case analysis we reviewed, 
the overall essentiality rate found for disclosed GSM 
patents is 28% higher than that of disclosed UMTS pat-
ents. In another case we reviewed, the essentiality rate 
of one selected, large patent owner was 69% higher 
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than the rate of the other selected, large patent owner 
for this analysis. Such	differences	confirm	there	
is merit in (transparent) information on es-
sentiality: one cannot simply assume that all 
companies, over all technologies, have similar 
essentiality rates.
12. The courts recognised that the large-scale es-
sentiality assessments performed by experts 
were not perfect and sometimes subject to 
flaws.	Still,	the	courts	held	the	view	that	such	
assessments have merit. In fact, in all the three 
landmark court cases we reviewed, the results of these 
assessments were ultimately used to reach a verdict 
(sometimes after the court made adjustments). 
13. For several reasons, market parties have not made 
use of the Japanese advisory opinion for essenti-
ality, known as Hantei-E (as of 10 March 2020). 
Our conversation with staff of the JPO indicated that 
the likely reasons are the several stringent admission 
criteria,160 the test itself is narrowly defined,161 and 
only one single patent is investigated, which means 
no insights are generated on essentiality at the port-
folio level. The procedure was revised in June 2019, 
and the significant changes (including but not limit-
ed to: support for check on optional features, allow-
ing confidentiality for some documents, allowing for 
requesting an opinion that a virtual object - based 
on the standard - does not fall within the technical 
scope of the patented invention, allowing multiple 
standards documents; see Section 5.3) might make 
the system more appealing to potential users.
14. In recent years, various commercial assess-
ment studies and services related to essen-
tiality have been published and introduced. 
These usually start as lists of patents disclosed as 
potentially essential. The definition of essentiality var-
ies, and several studies actually measure something 
entirely different (such as ‘seminal patents’). Although 
detailed information on their methodology and actual 
execution is often incomplete or not publicly availa-
ble, we observe a great diversity in design, operational 
choices and resource investment. It is hard to assess 
the quality of the outcomes of these efforts, as there 
is no accountability, no appeal procedure, and no eval-
uation of the outcomes, etc. Some services allow for 
additional input to be submitted by patent owners, but 
this may result in bias with regard to the firms that did 
not do so.
15. While the cases we looked at confirm that essentiality 
assessments that are accurate, impartial and trustwor-
thy (e.g. in patent pools) can have value, none of the 
existing assessment mechanisms we looked at 
establish a formal legal status of essentiali-
ty (unless agreed between parties in a private 
contract, e.g. in patent pools). Parties disagreeing 
on the outcome of the essentiality assessment can 
challenge the assessment in court.
16. Concerning	the	efforts	for	assessments	in	ex-
isting schemes, we observed for commercial 
studies and court cases an approximate range 
from 0.3 to 6 person-hours per individual pat-
ent, and approximately 2 to 3 person-days for 
patent pools. Obviously, there is a link between the 
accuracy and the time spent. 
	 Concerning	 the	 qualifications	 of	 assessors	
in existing schemes, we found technical en-
gineers (both senior and supervised junior), 
patent attorneys, and patent lawyers. We find 
that commercial studies mostly rely on technical en-
gineers, court cases mostly on senior technical en-
gineers and patent attorneys (in-house or external; 
these people may be but do not always appear as 
experts in the case itself) and sometimes outsource 
to larger teams of less senior staff supervised by a 
senior expert. Patent pools mostly rely on patent at-
torneys or law firms that specialise in essentiality as-
sessments. 
 Concerning the costs of assessments in ex-
isting schemes, we observed a range from 
160 The requesting party must be willing to attest the patent is essential (so the procedure cannot be initiated by a party that believes a patent is 
non-essential), both parties must declare that there is a dispute (if one party denies the dispute, the case is not admissible), and both parties 
must agree to their roles in the procedure.
161 The requesting party must define a virtual object based on the standard, this object may not include optional (normative) features, and must 
indicate a specific part of the standard (hence, the procedure will not consider that the patent may be essential for another part of the standard, 
and therefore can never result in a conclusion that a patent is non-essential – it can only result in a statement that it is essential for that specific 
part of the standard.
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Time spent Qualification	of	assessors Costs of assessment (estimates)
Commercial studies Very diverse Technical engineers (mostly) € 300 to € 9,000
Court cases 20 minutes to 6 hours 
per patent, longer for 
selected patents
Senior technical engineers and patent attorneys. 
Sometimes larger teams of less senior staff 
supervised by a senior expert.
Lowest € 300, highest 
unknown 
Patent pools 2-3 days Specialised patent attorneys or law firms € 5,000 to € 10,000 for a 
European patent
TABLE 22:	TYPICAL	TIME,	COSTS	AND	ASSESSOR	QUALIFICATIONS	IN	EXISTING	ASSESSMENT	SCHEMES.
European patent. Obviously, there is a link between the 
quality (read: accuracy) and the costs. 
Table 22 provides an overview of the three above points. 
Note that the procedures and depth of the work differ 
greatly between the different type of efforts.
approximately € 300 to € 10,000 per patent. 
For commercial studies we see a range from € 300 
(for very ‘light’ assessments and/or assessment out-
sourced to low-wage countries) to € 9,000 (for ‘full 
assessment’) per patent, and in pools a range from 
€ 5,000 to € 10,000 average costs for assessing a 
10.3 | Key	findings	for	Artificial	Intelligence	(AI)-based	
approaches
In our study, we also looked at possibilities to use 
AI-based and other automated approaches for 
essentiality	 assessments.	 Our	 findings	 here	 are	
based on extensive discussions with stakeholders. 
(This is not a case study of an existing mechanism, as we 
did for patent pools and court cases.)
17. AI-based and other automated approaches for 
essentiality assessment (e.g. based on seman-
tic similarity) are promising. We acknowledge 
that such approaches may be valuable as assisting 
tools and potentially improve the efficiency of human 
essentiality assessment (in terms of higher quality or 
less required resources). 
18. For several reasons we believe automated ap-
proaches will not be able to replace human ef-
forts in the short or medium term. These reasons 
include: (1) The meaning, interpretation, and precise 
scope of words and terminology (both in patents and 
standards) is of utmost importance by cannot easily 
be properly ‘understood’ by an automated system; 
(2) semantic approaches can face difficulties dealing 
with changes in terminology over time; (3) patents are 
written in a different (natural) language standards; 
(4) a technology or solution required to implement the 
standard may not be explicitly mentioned in the stand-
ard’s text (i.e. implied by the standard); (5) an essentiality 
assessment should consider possible alternatives to 
the patent under investigation that may also satisfy 
the standard; (6) An AI system would require a (not yet 
existing) reference training set, with a sufficiently large 
number of assessments, both positive and negative, of 
a very high confidence level. 
19. Even if above challenges are solved, we still 
need to be aware of other challenges like antic-
ipation (by those that file patents or submit technical 
proposals for standards), and acceptance of such AI 
systems by stakeholders (see Section 6.3).
20. The introduction of an (regular) assessment 
creates the opportunity to build a large ref-
erence data set, which could be used to devel-
op and validate a future AI-based mechanism. 
Once such a set is there and a system is successfully 
developed and validated, then it could play an impor-
tant role in assisting human assessors (e.g. by reducing 
the set of patents they need to manually asses) or, in 
the further future, perhaps even replace human efforts. 
But even when technical challenges are solved, one 
still needs to be aware of other challenges, like antic-
ipation (by those that file patents or submit technical 
proposals for standards), acceptance of such AI sys-
tems by stakeholders, and inherent limitations of such 
systems in this context. 
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Our	findings	on	technical	feasibility	are	based	on	a	
pilot experiment conducted in Spring and Summer 
of 2019, with 28 different persons performing a total of 
205 assessments, spending a total of 176 working days 
on performing the assessments. 
21. Our	 experiment	 confirmed	 that	 essentiality	
assessments on a larger scale, where approxi-
mately 7 hours are spent per assessment, are 
technically feasible. We compare outcomes of 
assessors with various backgrounds with the 
outcomes of assessment of the same patents 
done by patent pools, seen here as the gold 
standard. The most consistent results are achieved 
by individuals who work at a patent office as patent 
examiners and are provided with a claim chart. They 
achieve a consistency rate of 84% (while spending 
considerably less time than the pool assessors). In our 
experiments, assessors that work as senior engineer 
in academia score below that (75% consistency rate, 
without input claim charts). (Note again that even in 
an experiment where assessments were (again) done 
by the pools themselves, it is not guaranteed that the 
outcomes this time would be 100% consistent to the 
earlier findings.)
22. We expect this performance will increase in a 
future essentiality assessment system. Firstly, 
we made a number of choices to meet the scientific 
requirements for experiment design (see Section 8.3 
for details). Among other things, we did not allow as-
sessors to communicate with the patent owner in or-
der to ask for clarification, to consult additional (public) 
information sources, such as the patent prosecution 
history, or to discuss cases with colleague assessors. 
In practice, such restrictions can be lifted, and perfor-
mance will increase. Secondly, in an actual implemen-
tation, there are (more) opportunities to seek speciali-
sation, for instance by allocating patents to assessors 
according to their key technological competences, and 
by individual specialisation on specific standards and 
even parts of standards (e.g. a radio interface, or core 
network). Thirdly, there are strong reasons to expect 
significant learning effects both on the individual and 
group level, also as a result of specialised training. 
Fourthly, the system could implement features that 
improve accuracy, such as allowing parties (patent 
owners and/or third parties) to challenge the results of 
the assessment. Altogether, we anticipate substantial-
ly higher consistency scores, even though these could 
not be quantified in our study.
10.4 | Key	findings	for	technical	feasibility	
10.5 | Key	findings	for	institutional	feasibility	
Our investigation on the institutional feasibility of 
essentiality assessment is based on a variety of 
sources, including a stakeholder workshop we organised 
in October 2019 in Brussels, with 23 participants selected 
from all different stakeholder categories, including SMEs, 
as well as a large number of meetings and discussions 
(see Section 9.1 for details), as well as all the other work 
packages performed in the context of this study (literature 
survey, patent pools, Hantei-E, court cases, and landscape 
analysis). 
23. We conclude that setting up a system essen-
tiality assessment is institutionally feasible. 
Setting up such a system does require choosing be-
tween a consistent set of design choices across many 
interrelated dimensions, which do involve several chal-
lenges and trade-offs. There are several scenarios that 
offer such a consistent set of design choices.
24. Many stakeholders expressed a clear interest 
in increased availability of transparent data 
on the essentiality of patents for standards. 
This	 interest	 is	 coming	 from	different	 stake-
holder categories: implementers, patent own-
ers and courts. In addition, SDOs have expressed 
interest in information on actual essentiality. While 
actors in these categories sometimes have different 
reasons for their interest, there are also commonali-
ties, like the potential for smoother and faster licensing 
negotiations, reducing transaction costs in general, for 
parties that are in principle willing to enter into a li-
cense.
25. The above-mentioned interest is mostly ex-
pressed in relation to mobile telecommunica-
tions	(e.g.	the	3GPP	technical	specifications	for	
3G, 4G and 5G communications) and for wire-
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less networking standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11 
series,	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 “Wi-Fi”).	 But	 the	
future may bring demand for other standards. 
The emergence of IoT, Industry 4.0 and changes in 
vertical industries, as well as the anticipated role of 
standards in solutions helping to address Grand So-
cietal Challenges (standards for smart grids, Intelli-
gent Transport Systems, etc.) may lead to a need for 
transparent data on essentiality for other, more do-
main-specific standards. Because it is hard to predict 
for which precise standards there will be a future inter-
est in transparent data on essentiality, it is advisable 
to set up any mechanism for essentiality assessments. 
26. This	 study	 distinguishes	 five	 types	 of	 trans-
parent data on essentiality. 
I. The first type, ‘numerator data’, is information on 
the actual SEPs portfolio by of a specific patent 
owner for a specific standard. This data type is rele-
vant for all stakeholders and requires a high degree 
of confidence.
II. The second type, ‘denominator data’, is information 
on actual SEPs owned by all relevant patent own-
ers for a specific standard. In combination with nu-
merator data, it can indicate the size (extent) of the 
SEPs portfolio owned by a specific patent owner in 
relation to all SEPs for the standard in question. Be-
ing able to do so is crucial for one of the licensing 
principles expressed by the European Commission, 
which states that, in defining a FRAND value, an in-
dividual SEP cannot be considered in isolation, and 
one needs to take into account a reasonable ag-
gregate rate for the standard [17]. This data type 
is relevant for all stakeholders, and only requires a 
moderate level of confidence, which could also be 
satisfied by sampled data.
III. The third type, ‘validated summary claim charts’, 
is a one-page summary that maps claims in the 
actual essential patents to relevant parts specific 
standards documents, also considering device cat-
egories and optional normative features. Such data 
helps to understand why and how a patent is es-
sential, and also allows one to determine whether 
a patent is indeed used by a specific product (as a 
specific product usually does not implement all the 
normative elements of a standard). This data types 
both benefits patent owners and implementers in 
a number of ways (see Table 17) but also benefits 
the patent owner specifically in an infringement 
context and helping it to meet one of the key re-
quirements of the Huawei/ZTE legal framework. 
IV. The fourth type, ‘detailed assessment outcomes’, 
provides extensive information on both patents as-
sessed to be essential and those for which essenti-
ality was not found. This type of data is especially 
valuable for patent owners, for instance when they 
want to challenge the outcomes of an assessment, 
or when they need to prove possible infringement. 
V. The fifth type, ‘current ownership data’ provides, 
as the name suggest, information on the current 
owner of the patent in question. Without this data, 
knowledge about essentiality of a given patent has 
considerably less relevance, and without it, it’s hard 
to create the numerator data mentioned above.
27. A system for essentiality assessments should 
not strive for generating a single set of ag-
gregated, static numbers (like essentiality 
rate percentages). Such numbers would not cater 
for specific situations and for the specific needs of 
those that would like to use that data, and don’t reflect 
that the data changes over time. Instead, a system for 
essentiality assessments should make accessible the 
underlying data points, where the user of the data, us-
ing relatively simple filters (which standards and docu-
ments, flags for device categories and for optional fea-
tures, etc.), can create the information that is relevant 
for that used in the business context.
28. On the basis of our pilot experiment, the ex-
periences of patent pools and the views of ex-
perts, we conclude that the availability of claim 
charts (made available by the patent owner) as 
input for an assessment procedure is an impor-
tant aspect of designing a system that com-
bines	 high	 performance	 with	 high	 efficiency. 
Equally, it is important to acknowledge these charts are 
usually made and provided by the patent owner with 
an interest in a positive outcome, and sometimes may 
go at greater length to, for instance, extend the scope 
of some patent claim beyond the limitations introduced 
during the prosecution or take one advantageous inter-
pretation of the standard while introducing unwritten 
additional requirements. Therefore, in any mechanism, 
assessors should be well instructed and gain experience 
118 Pilot Study for Essentiality Assessment of Standard Essential Patents
in critically reading such input claim charts, and assess-
ments using such charts as input should remain rigorous 
and thorough. Essentiality assessments are however 
also possible without access to claim charts. In that 
case. The claims for consideration must be selected by 
the assessor (and patents often have many claims). This 
makes the assessment more demanding. As a result, 
the level of accuracy will likely be lower and the amount 
of required resources higher.
29. This	study	identifies	nine	scenarios	for	a	large-
scale essentiality assessment mechanism. 
Basically, a scenario is a set of consistent design 
choices over the 19 dimensions identified in this 
study. Table 23 shows the degree by which these 
scenarios generate transparent data on essentiality, 
and the degree by which their implementation is 
feasible.
SCENARIOS
0: Status 
quo
A: Self-
assessment
B: All SDO 
disclosed 
patents
C: Sampled 
SDO disclosed 
patents
D: Voluntarily 
requested by 
patent owner
E: As D plus 
third-party 
requests
F: As D plus 
sampled 
disclosed SDO 
patent
G: AI-based 
system 
H: As D plus 
assistive AI 
system 
Degree to which 
transparent data 
on essentiality is 
generated 
[Main limitation]
Low
[No data 
at all]
Low
[No impartial 
data, diversity 
of definitions 
and tests]
Medium
[No type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Limited 
numerator 
data, type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
Medium
[No denominator data. For 
non-participating firms, no 
numerator data and no 
ownership data]
Medium to 
high
[For non-
participating 
firms, less 
detailed 
numerator 
data and no 
ownership 
data]
Low to 
medium
[Depends 
on public 
acceptance; 
no type III 
or type IV or 
ownership 
data]
High
[For non-
participating 
firms, no 
ownership data]
Feasibility of 
implementation
[Main challenge]
High Low 
[willingness]
Low 
[financing, 
capacity]
Medium 
[financing]
Medium to high 
 [partici pation]
Medium to 
high
 [participation, 
financing]
Not yet; 
possible in 
the (distant) 
future?
Not yet; 
possible in the 
(nearer) future?
[participation]
TABLE 23:	OVERALL	SCORES	OF	THE	SCENARIOS	ON	(A)	THE	GENERATION	OF	TRANSPARENT	DATA	ON	ESSENTIALITY	AND	(B)	IMPLEMENTATION	FEASIBILITY.
Type III data is ‘validated summary claim charts’ data; type IV data is ‘detailed assessment outcomes’ data. Dark orange indicates a low degree or a low feasibility, yellow medium, 
and green high.
30. Below, we briefly discuss the most promising sce-
narios, which are the ones that score at least ‘medium’ 
in terms of the degree to which they meet the stake-
holders’ interest for transparent data on essentiality. 
 Scenario B (‘Systematic assessment of all disclosed SDO 
patents’) requires a lot of resources and is the costliest 
scenario. That said, this scheme is entirely independent 
of stakeholder involvement, and if the European Com-
mission wishes to go ahead without having to rely on 
the choices of others, and is willing to bear the costs 
(for illustration: this is estimated at 72 person-years162 
for global SEP exposure information on the current state 
of 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS/WCDMA, 4G/LTE and 5G; note that 
with this illustration we are not suggesting that a trans-
parency system should only focus on these standards), 
this is a scenario that would allow that. 
 Scenario D (‘Assessment of patents voluntarily re-
quested by patent owner’) seeks to actively involve 
stakeholders and maintains benefits for them to par-
ticipate. This involvement also opens up the possibility 
for additional data, that can help licensing negotia-
tions between patent owners and willing licensees to 
be smoother and faster. It also helps patent owners to 
be able to seek injunctive relief if they have to deal 
with non-willing licensees. The voluntary involvement 
is also likely to increase overall support for the mech-
anism, create possibilities for a self-supporting financ-
ing structure, and achieve better overall accuracy and 
cost-efficiency. 
 Scenario F combines the strengths of scenario (D) with 
a system to collect data on non-participating firms, 
and therefore scores again higher in terms of creating 
162 For the assumptions on which this number was derived, see Dimension B6 in Section 9.2.2 as well as Table 20 and its notes.
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transparency. The additional data for non-participating 
firms is based on assessments of a random sample 
of granted patents disclosed as ‘may or may not be-
come essential’ at SDOs. In terms of overall feasibility 
(including financing), this scores as high as Scenario D, 
making it perhaps the most attractive of our scenarios. 
 Two other scenarios use some form of automated as-
sessment like Artificial Intelligence (AI). While promising, 
we think these two scenarios are not yet feasible in the 
short term but may become feasible in the future.
31. Stakeholders	from	different	perspectives	 indi-
cate they would support a system for essenti-
ality assessment. However, only once final decisions 
on system designs have been made (and published) and 
the system is in operation, will we see the actual support 
for a specific design. The scenarios we present that are 
based on voluntary participation need to maintain their 
beneficial character to get patent owners involved. To 
increase support, it is advisable to involve stakeholders 
through the different stages of requirements, specifica-
tion and design of any essentiality assessment system. 
As standardisation is global and involves patents at na-
tional and international levels, it is also important that 
the system must be open to skilled assessors special-
ised in these different legislations, for gaining credibility 
and trust from all stakeholders. 
32. Many stakeholders embrace the principle of 
‘all	benefiters	should	pay’. While determining the 
allocation of costs and finding a way to collect finan-
cial contributions may be difficult, the voluntary par-
ticipation scenarios we discussed (D, E, F and H) offer 
good opportunities to collect contributions that are 
then shared among the benefiters, in a market-based 
mechanism. While it is obvious that the type of sys-
tem we are talking about requires significant resourc-
es (estimated between 5 and 72 person-years for the 
current ETSI/3GPP cellular standards, depending on its 
design), workshop participants pointed out that such 
investments are minor if seen from the perspective of 
the high potential value these essential patents rep-
resent, the considerable costs associated with acquir-
ing and exploiting these legal rights, and the potential 
benefits if SEP transaction costs, tension and legal bat-
tles were reduced. 
33. While a transparency system does also serve 
a	public	 benefit,	 it	would	be	beneficial	 if	 the	
system	 was	 self-financing (from all benefiting 
stakeholders in the total ecosystem). This would re-
flect the utility and value that the stakeholders see in 
the system. At the same time, some scenarios would 
benefit from partial (pre)financing, for instance from a 
public institution.
10.6 | Recommendations
Considering:
(i) that we have observed an interest in transparent data 
on essentiality of patents for standards, from imple-
menters, patent owners and courts alike;
(ii) such data can provide important benefits to stake-
holders; among other things, it can help to (a) facilitate 
smoother and faster SEP licensing negotiations, re-
quiring fewer resources and resulting in lower trans-
action costs in general; (b) reduce legal tension and 
‘unnecessary’ court cases;163 (c) enable determina-
tion of SEP exposure for a given product, and the 
determination of the current owners of these SEPs; 
(d) enable more accurate assessment of reasonable-
ness of individual royalty rates, and more. Standards 
that require the use of patented technology are be-
coming more widespread, following developments 
such as IoT, Industry 4.0, connected cars and many 
more, which are reshaping their respective land-
scapes and ecosystems. Many companies, especially 
SMEs, will be part of future license negotiations, and 
the benefits described earlier are particularly relevant 
in such a scenario;
(iii) our study finds that establishing a system for generat-
ing such data seems both technically and institutional-
ly feasible;
163 We acknowledge that litigation is not necessarily a bad thing; the option to go to court is a crucial element in FRAND-based IPR policies at SDOs. 
Nevertheless, if court cases could be prevented by improving the availability of transparent data on essentiality, this would be a gain.
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we make the below recommendations, both towards 
policy makers in general as well as to the European 
Commission in particular (being the commissioning body 
of this study), patent owners, implementers of standards, 
patent offices and patent organisations, patent pools, 
Standards Developing Organisations (SDOs), and, finally, 
to all stakeholders: 
a) We recommend policy makers to pursue the 
development and implementation of a system 
for essentiality assessments. We recommend 
them to further formulate the precise require-
ments for such a system, identify the demand 
for	 a	 specific	 design,	 and	 assess	 its	 impact	
when creating a new legal framework, while 
taking into account the issues and risks relat-
ing to any particular approach. Because both the 
product markets and patent licenses in standards-re-
lated markets have a predominantly global character, 
we also recommend policy makers to collaborate with 
similar institutions from other regions/countries to 
work towards an open and harmonised approach. 
b) We recommend that policy makers engage 
with all stakeholders in the above process, as 
acceptance by stakeholders is a key success 
factor. Among other things, this requires the system 
to be designed and operated in such a way that it 
earns trust. To achieve this, it is important to ensure 
high levels for reliability, thoroughness, and impartial-
ity. It is also beneficial to keep information up to date 
as appropriate.
c) When designing a system for essentiality as-
sessments,	we	recommend	to	specifically	con-
sider the three most promising scenarios we 
identify. These are: 
• A scenario where all patents disclosed to SDOs as 
potentially essential are systematically assessed 
(Scenario B in this report). The advantage of this 
scenario is that it satisfies many (but not all) ex-
pressed interests for transparent data on essenti-
ality, and its implementation is independent of the 
willingness of parties to participate or provide in-
put: data is created for the full landscape. A major 
downside is that it requires very significant resourc-
es, which might be hard to raise in a self-financing 
manner. It also does not generate information on 
patent ownership, which is important for many us-
ers of such data. Moreover, it requires that the SDO 
in question publishes all the disclosed patents’ 
identities, and this is not the case for SDOs that 
allow blanket disclosures. 
• A scenario in which assessments are initiated at 
the request of the patent owner, who then also 
provides valuable input claim charts as input to 
the process (Scenario D). The advantage of this 
scenario is that it generates rich data on essen-
tiality, including ownership data and detailed data 
that can help to make patent licensing negotia-
tions smoother and faster, which already provides 
a benefit for patent owners to participate. The 
involvement of the current patent owners also 
allows for higher quality and more cost-efficient 
assessments and is likely to increase acceptance 
in the market. Furthermore, it requires considerably 
fewer resources than Scenario B, and allows for a 
self-financing model in which all those who benefit 
are contributing their share. A major downside is 
that it relies on voluntary participation by patent 
owners, and for those parties that choose not par-
ticipate, no data is generated (and, in case partic-
ipation is low, no comprehensive overview of the 
total essentiality landscape is created).
• A scenario that combines elements of Scenarios B 
and D, and assessments initiated at the request of 
the patent owner are complemented with an as-
sessment of patents disclosed to SDOs. For the lat-
ter part, however, a representative sample is taken 
of disclosed granted patents instead of a system-
atic review of each and all patents. This scenario 
combines the key advantages of the two above 
scenarios. 
d) We recommend that, in designing a system, to 
take into account the various business and li-
censing models of SEP owners.
e) We	recommend	to	recognise	the	specific	situ-
ation of SMEs. For SMEs that implement standards, 
it is important that transparent information on essenti-
ality is available at the product category and optional 
feature level, enabling them to determine the relevant 
SEPs for their specific products (for instance an IoT 
device that uses a the 3GPP NB-IoT protocol, which 
only implements a very specific part of the total 5G 
standard). It has to be taken into account that some 
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SMEs might not be able to mobilise as much knowl-
edge or skills to interpret/process that information in a 
business context. For SMEs that are potential owners 
of SEPs, the assessment system should be designed 
in such a way that it does not create unnecessary ob-
stacles to participate, and that the anticipated benefits 
clearly outweigh the costs. 
f) We	 recommend	 to	 strive	 for	 a	 self-financing	
system for essentiality assessments, in which 
all benefitting stakeholders in the ecosystem contrib-
ute. This would reflect the utility and value that the 
stakeholders see in the system.
g) We recommend the European Commission to 
arrange for a small, supervising body to de-
sign	and	define	the	procedures,	to	oversee	the	
system, to harmonise internationally with the 
different	 regions/countries	 concerned,	 and	 to	
have overall responsibility for quality and per-
formance. Actual assessment tasks can then be out-
sourced to existing organisations, especially those that 
already have experience with similar tasks, such as 
patent offices and patent organisations, as well as law 
firms and patent attorney firms that already perform 
essentiality assessments. A certification scheme is a 
good way to ensure that these organisations perform 
the assessment in a harmonised manner and meet 
the requirements for reliability, impartiality, quality and 
performance.
h) We recommend to consider the detailed as-
sessment procedure developed in our pilot ex-
periment as input when specifying and design-
ing a system. This procedure is described in Chapter 
8. Our procedure was developed in close collaboration 
with patent offices and with input from experts. We 
furthermore recommend embracing the specific, future 
improvements we identified in our pilot experiment 
(see Section 8.3). Among other things, such improve-
ments include technical specialisation, collaboration 
between assessors and between assessors and patent 
owners, and training and learning in individual as well 
as group settings. 
i) We	recommend	to	explore	Artificial	Intelligence	
(AI) based approaches to support essentiali-
ty assessments in the future. We recommend 
starting by arranging essentiality assessment 
records to be collected so they can be used for 
developing (including training and validating) 
AI	systems	for	this	specific	task.	One option is to 
have a future competition, where external parties get 
access to a dataset for training and testing purposes in 
order to develop AI-based systems. The performance 
of these contenders is then validated (using a different 
part of the data set), and the best design can be se-
lected to play a complementary role (e.g. pre-screen-
ing) in the essentiality assessment system.
j) We recommend that patent owners consider 
how a system for essentiality assessment can 
benefit	 them.	 In specific, we recommend them to 
consider how ‘validated summary claim charts’ (this is 
a one-page summary mentioning claim numbers and 
sections in standards documents; see Section 9.2.1) 
can help them to conclude smoother and faster licens-
ing negotiations with willing prospective licensees and 
enable them to act better when facing unwilling pro-
spective licensees.
k) We recommend that implementers consider 
how a system for essentiality assessments can 
benefit	 them	 and	 how	 they	 can	 contribute	 to	
support or facilitate such a system. A potential 
benefit for implementers is that such a system can help 
them check if license offers by patent owners are fair 
and reasonable. A possible form of support could be an 
indication of their willingness to cooperate proactively 
and constructively when transparent, impartial informa-
tion is available on actual essentiality resulting from the 
application of a defined and published methodology.
l) We recommend that the European Patent Of-
fice	(EPO),	national	patent	offices	and/or	pat-
ent organisations consider playing an active 
role in carrying out assessments in a system 
for essentiality assessments to be introduced. 
This study identified that these organisations are very 
well positioned in terms of knowledge and skills to per-
form this task, and widely trusted to be impartial and 
objective. 
m) We recommend that patent pools and their 
members investigate whether the assess-
ments they perform (and have performed) can 
serve as an input to a new system for essen-
tiality assessment and engage in discussion with 
the European Commission with the aim of evaluating 
whether a fast track procedure can be implemented. 
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n) We recommend that patent pools and their 
members investigate how essentiality 
assessments under the new assessment 
system can play a role in their own patent 
inclusions procedures. Patent pools could 
benefit from the efficiencies and effectiveness of 
assessments done under the new assessment 
system, if these meet their requirements for those 
assessments, possibly in the form of input to 
additional own assessments.
o) We recommend that Standards Developing 
Organisations (SDOs) implement improvements 
in	 their	 disclosure	 rules/procedures	 and	
(access to) disclosure data, while ensuring that 
such steps do not compromise the current roles these 
processes and databases have in their own processes 
and policies. Such steps would not only facilitate 
(external) essentiality assessments but also provide 
added value for their members and stakeholders 
otherwise. We recommend that SDOs specifically 
consider improvements in:
a. data specificness (e.g. data on the individual pat-
ent identity and on the specific standard, docu-
ment, document version or specific sections or 
parts within such documents), 
b. data quality (e.g. updating unharmonised records 
and orphans, and complement incomplete disclo-
sures), and 
c. keeping data up to date (e.g. by updates of disclo-
sures).
p) We recommend that all stakeholders men-
tioned above adopt a constructive and col-
laborative stance towards the potential crea-
tion of a system for essentiality assessments. 
While there are certainly differences between parties, 
the availability of transparent data on actual essenti-
ality in the long term will benefit all benevolent par-
ties in the market, will reduce transaction costs and 
friction. In the current practice, information is usually 
shared under NDAs, and it often takes months if not 
years to agree on them. It takes courage to move to 
a new practice, in which documents such as validated 
summary claim charts (see above) are shared with-
out NDAs, or perhaps even made public. Yet, such a 
change is likely to eventually offer great benefits to 
both patent owners and (willing) licensees. Maintain-
ing an opaque environment in an increasingly complex 
and diversified area of technological uptake appears 
to bear high risks. Forward-looking steps will require 
parties to think in terms of possibilities, not objections. 
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In this Annex, we present an overview of the sources used for our literature review.
Annexes
Annex 1 | Literature review
Academic contributions
Academic contributions on the topic of essentiality 
assessments are rather rare. Methodologies in the 
contributions presented differ substantially from those 
mentioned in the reports. Two of the following contributions 
compare patents to other patents rather than patents 
to standards. However, their methodologies are closely 
related to our field of interest and are thus relevant for 
designing an essentiality assessment mechanism.
All three contributions rely on semantic similarity between 
patents or patents and standards. In addition, they use 
manual assessments of essentiality as validity checks.
Author Basic idea Standards 
included
Information on the assessment 
process
Younge & Kuhn 
[47]
Computation of semantic similarity between 
patents + conduction of manual validity 
checks
(not applicable) (not applicable)
Arts et al. [4] Computation of semantic similarity between 
patents + conduction of manual validity 
checks
(not applicable) (not applicable)
TABLE 24:	OVERVIEW	OF	RELEVANT	ACADEMIC	CONTRIBUTIONS.
Institutionalised essentiality assessments: 3G3P
The work by Goldstein & Kearsey [23] guides practitioners 
and stakeholders through the entire process of planning 
and implementing a patent licensing program, from start 
to finish. Based on the authors’ experience of setting up 
such a platform for licensing patents related to the 3G 
mobile communication standard, this book focuses on the 
3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P).
Author Basic idea Standards included Information on the assessment process
Goldstein & 
Kearsey [23]
Describe the experience 
of a system implemented 
by the 3G Patent Platform 
Partnership (3G3P)
3G standard • Assessors: From the International Patent Evaluation 
Consortium (IPEC, a consortium of several patent law 
firms); a panel of patent lawyers and agents from the 
firms in the consortium (3 evaluators, including one lead 
evaluator)
• Assessment: Patent owner provides an input claim chart, 
on which the assessment is based
• Cost: Lead evaluator devotes on average two working 
days to assessing each application
TABLE 25:	OVERVIEW	OF	RELEVANT	LITERATURE	ON	INSTITUTIONAL	ESSENTIALITY	ASSESSMENTS.
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Commercial contributions
The majority of the reports covering essentiality 
assessment methods can be classified as commercial 
contributions and have mostly been prepared by 
specialised consultancies.
For the most part, the reports listed below rely on manual 
assessments of essentiality. This implies that individual 
assessors or a group of assessors compare declared SEPs, 
or claims thereof, to the relevant standards. iRunway [28] 
do not use declared SEPs but rely on their own portfolio 
analysis technology to identify what they call “seminal 
4G-LTE patents”. However, we were unable to capture 
further details on their exact methodology. The report 
prepared by Charles River Associates [13] for the European 
Commission does not focus on actual essentiality 
assessments, but elaborates on potential ones.
Author Basic idea Standards included Information on the assessment process
Fairfield [20], [21], [22] 
based on an academic 
paper by Goodman & 
Myers [24]
Manual assessments 
of essentiality
WCDMA, CDMA2000 (2005) 
GSM standard (Release 6.0) 
(2007) WCDMA (Release 7.0) 
(2009) LTE and SAE, 3GPP 
Release 8.0 (2010)
• Assessors: Panel of technical experts (telecom 
engineers)
• Assessment: Whether technology described in 
at least one independent claim is necessary to 
implement the standard
Article One Partners [3] Analysis of 
undisclosed 
third-party data 
conducting manual 
essentiality and 
novelty evaluation
ETSI LTE specifications as of 
November 18, 2011
• Assessment: Extent to which each patent’s 
claims conform with standards
Cyber Creative Institute 
Co. Ltd. [13]
Manual assessments 
of essentiality
ETSI declarations as of 
July 2011/ March 2012 / 
November 2012 LTE/SAE 
standard: TS24.301, TS23.401, 
TS23.272, TS24.301, 
TS33.401, TS 36
• Assessors: “Technical people”
Jefferies [33]164 Manual assessments 
of essentiality
LTE (more detailed information 
missing)
• Assessors: physics PhDs, wireless engineers, 
patent legal specialists, and former patent of-
fice employees
iRunway [28] Semi-automatic 
identification of 
important 4G-LTE 
patents
4G-LTE standard –
PA Consulting  
Group [36]165
Manual assessments 
of essentiality
ETSI declarations as of July 
2013 3GPP-LTE specifications 
of Release 11
Confidential report
Information from the ETSI document:
• Assessors: Team of engineers involved in de-
veloping related technologies
• Assessment: Comparison of independent 
claims to relevant sections of specifications
• Cost: € 300 to € 500 per patent
Charles River 
Associates [10] 
Suggestion for 
essentiality 
assessment scheme
(not applicable) • Cost: For one patent, “medium” assessment 
would cost around € 4,500 and full assess-
ment € 9,000.
TABLE 26:	COMMERCIAL	PUBLICATIONS	ON	ESSENTIALITY	ASSESSMENT	SCHEMES.
164 In their Company Note on RIM, Jefferies reference their Industry Note “Smartphone Patent Wars Far From Over: Deep Dive Into Essential LTE 
Patents” – however, we were not able to source this report.
165 This report is not public, it can be purchased together with the associated database.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 About the study 
The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) in cooperation with DG GROW 
has requested our research consortium to perform a feasibility study on essentiality 
checking mechanisms for standard-essential patents (SEPs). The objective of the project 
is to assess the feasibility of essentiality testing mechanisms both a technical as well as 
institutional point of view. The study may prepares proposals for how to develop such 
mechanisms. To this end, the study will consist of an analysis of various existing 
essentiality testing mechanisms, among which those employed by patent pools, the 
Japanese patent office (Hantei advisory opinion) and in legal cases. From these insights, 
various possible mechanisms are defined, whose technical merits are tested in an 
experiment.  
In this experiment, a large number of evaluators (among which are engineers, 
attorneys, and patent examiners) are asked to perform essentiality tests on various 
example cases (based on real-world patents and essentiality information). This 
experiment allows the researchers to find out which mechanisms are suitable, and which 
are not, and how they are influenced by various parameters. 
1.2 About this document 
This document is intended for patent offices who are participating in the experiment 
described above and have agreed to have a number of their patent examiners carry out 
essentiality tests.  
The document is written as a guide for the evaluators as well as the coordinators at 
each patent office. 
1.3 Rules of the game 
Confidentiality 
For methodological reasons, it is crucial to adhere to the following 
confidentiality rules (some of which will be formalized through NDAs): 
 For methodological reasons, it is crucial that the contents of this document shall 
remain confidential between the European Commission/JRC, the research team, 
and the involved persons from the patent office. 
 Evaluators shall not share any materials provided to them, nor the outcomes of 
their evaluations, with others. Evaluators shall remove all data provided to them 
directly after finishing an evaluation. 
 Evaluators shall not discuss the exercise with others (within or outside the PO) 
before the final deadline of the evaluation period (31/7). Any questions should 
be directed to the research team directly. 
Identifiability 
This exercise is not a race. We will not be comparing evaluators or POs, nor 
sharing results identifiable to any evaluator or office. The exercise is about 
learning about the mechanisms, not about who is the best evaluator or PO, nor 
about the quality of certain SEPs portfolios. 
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Therefore:  
 The research team will not share outcomes in a way that is deducible to particular 
organisations, evaluators or patents with anyone outside the research team. Any 
outcomes that are shared will be anonymous with respect to individual 
organisations, evaluators and patents. 
 SEP owners in particular will not get any feedback on the evaluation results for 
cases referencing their patents. 
 Evaluators shall not attempt to find out more information about the cases 
provided (e.g. by looking up the patent or similar patents, looking up patent pool 
information, et cetera) for evaluation during the evaluation period. 
Methodological considerations 
 Instructions should be closely followed. 
 Evaluators cannot re-assign work to other evaluators or POs. An evaluator should 
stick to the patent set specifically assigned to him/her by the researchers. Should 
there be any reason to re-assign work, please contact the researchers. 
 Evaluators should perform the tasks alone and not accept any interference by 
others. 
1.4 Planning and logistics 
The experiment is planned to take place between June 6 and July 31, 2019. Evaluators  
This means that the researchers will provide the necessary (final) instructions as well 
as any data required from June 6 onwards. Evaluators can perform the essentiality 
testing tasks at any time before the deadline of July 31, before which we expect the 
evaluators to have finished all cases assigned to them. 
Around June 6, we will send each evaluator a link by e-mail, pointing to the first case 
to be evaluated. After completion of an evaluation, the evaluator will receive a new link 
for the next case. This link can be saved/bookmarked. 
In case an evaluator experiences difficulties, forgets a link, et cetera: please contact the 
researchers. 
Technical requirements 
The cases for evaluation will be provided through an online form. Any documents are 
linked from the form as PDF documents, possibly in a ZIP file. Evaluators fill in their 
evaluation through the online form. 
Evaluators need to have a PDF reader (Google Chrome will do), an unzip tool such as 
WinZip or 7-Zip, internet access, and a recent web browser.  
1.5 Point of contact 
 In case of any question or issue related to the experiment, please contact Tommy 
van der Vorst (vandervorst@dialogic.nl, +31302150593) or Rudi Bekkers 
(r.n.a.bekkers@tue.nl).  
 
 Please do not contact anyone else, not even fellow evaluators, in case of an 
issues or question. 
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2 Instructions for evaluators 
2.1 Objectives 
The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) in cooperation with DG GROW 
has requested our research consortium to perform a feasibility study on essentiality 
checking mechanisms for standard-essential patents (SEPs). The objective of the project 
is to assess the feasibility of essentiality testing mechanisms both from a technical as 
well as from an institutional point of view. To this end, the study will consist of an 
analysis of various existing essentiality testing mechanisms, among which those 
employed by patent pools, the Japanese patent office (Hantei advisory opinion) and in 
legal cases. From these insights, various possible mechanisms are defined, whose 
technical merits are tested in an experiment.  
In this experiment, a large number of evaluators (among which are engineers, 
attorneys, and patent examiners) are asked to perform essentiality tests on various 
example cases (based on real-world patents and essentiality information). This 
experiment allows the researchers to find out which mechanisms are suitable, and which 
are not, and how they are influenced by various parameters. 
This exercise is not a race. We will not be comparing evaluators or POs, nor 
sharing results identifiable to any evaluator or office. The exercise is about 
learning about the mechanisms, not about who is the best evaluator or PO, nor 
about the quality of certain SEPs portfolios. Please provide honest answers 
over the course of the experiment. 
2.2 Definitions 
For the purposes of this exercise, the following definitions are used. 
A patent is essential with respect to a particular standard if it is not possible 
to comply with the standard without infringing that patent.1 
More specifically: 
 Essentiality should take into account normal technical practice and the state of 
the art generally available at the time of standardization. 
 A patent is essential even if it would only be infringed when implementing 
optional features of the standard. 
 The costs of alternative (non-infringing) implementations should not be taken 
into account when deciding on essentiality (i.e. ‘commercial essentiality’ is not 
considered here). 
There may be a very specific situation where the following applies: 
 If an unpatented alternative is available that complies with the standard, then 
the patent cannot be essential. If there exist alternatives, but all are patented, 
then they are all considered essential. 
                                           
1 This definition is inspired by the definition adopted by ETSI. 
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Note that this exercise does not take into account the validity of a patent, nor the 
enforceability of a patent (e.g. whether the patent has expired, has been declared invalid 
by a court, et cetera).2 
A ‘linkage’ is defined as a specific combination of (1) a single patent claim, and (2) one 
or more paragraphs, figures and/or other elements in the standard document, related 
to that claim, positively determining essentiality of the patent with respect to the 
standard. A claim chart lists one or more linkage candidate(s). 
2.3 Evaluation procedure 
Who will perform the evaluation? 
 Evaluators are assigned cases by the researchers in a specific order. 
 Evaluators cannot share or redistribute the cases assigned to them. In case 
reassignment is necessary, evaluators shall contact the researchers.  
 Evaluators shall not discuss the evaluations with anyone. 
How should an evaluator perform the evaluation procedure? 
For each case to be evaluated, you as an evaluator: 
1. Obtain the input documents (patent, standard, possibly a claim chart) 
2. Consider the essentiality definition provided (below).  
3. Take a look at the score sheet (below). 
4. Given the definition, provide an assessment whether the evaluator believes the 
patent to be essential to the standard. 
5. Fill in the answers and an evaluation in the form. 
You will be provided with a link to an online form for the first case by e-mail. After 
completion of the first case the system will provide you with a link to subsequent cases. 
Note: due to the experimental methodology, it is possible that all of the cases provided 
to you are essential patents, none of the patents are essential, or anything in between. 
Which documents should the evaluator use? 
 Evaluators shall base their evaluation of essentiality on the documents provided 
(per case this is one or more standards documents, one anonymized patent grant 
publication, and possibly a claim chart document). 
 
 Evaluators shall not use other versions of the documents provided. 
 
 Evaluators may look up technical information from other sources (technical 
handbooks, academic papers, web sites, et cetera) in order to aid their 
understanding of the technology described in the patent and/or the standard.  
 
 Evaluators may look up other 3GPP standards documents, but only if they are 
part of the same 3GPP release. 
 
                                           
2 Nor are we considering whether a specific standards-based product infringes the patent. After 
all, such a specific product may only implement a part of the standard (e.g. only the part for 
mobile terminals) or might not implement all optional features.  
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 Evaluators shall NOT look up (or do internet searches that may result in) 
information related to the patent or the patent owner (evaluators should not 
perform a web search on the patent title or text, for instance, but can look up 
technical terminology). 
Which parts of the patent provided should be considered? 
If the provided patent includes text in multiple languages, then the evaluator shall only 
consider the English texts. 
 
If no claim chart was provided:  
 The evaluator may consider any element of the standard document provided. 
If a claim chart was provided: 
 The evaluator verifies essentiality by verifying only the candidate linkages 
between patent and standard text described in the claim chart (i.e. only looking 
at the parts of the standard and the patent that are referenced). The evaluator 
shall not consider any candidate linkages other than the ones in the claim chart. 
 
 Where necessary, the evaluator may consult other (not referenced) parts of the 
provided standard document (e.g. to check whether the composition of features 
is actually as intended in the standard). 
Which parts of the patent provided should be considered? 
If no claim chart was provided:  
 The determination of essentiality shall exclusively be based on the claims. 
 Other parts of the patent may be used for understanding the claims. 
If a claim chart was provided: 
 The evaluator verifies essentiality by verifying only the linkages between patent 
and standard text described in the claim chart (i.e. only looking at the parts of 
the patent that are referenced). The evaluator shall not consider any linkages 
other than the ones in the claim chart. 
 Other parts of the patent may be used for understanding the claims. 
An example claim chart template is provided at the end of this document. 
When should an evaluator consider the patent essential? 
The patent shall be considered essential by the evaluator when the evaluator is confident 
in (at least) one of the linkages. After confirming one linkage, the evaluator does not 
need to consider other candidate linkages. 
If no claim chart was provided: 
 The evaluator will attempt to construct a linkage. For the convenience of the 
evaluator, a template is provided in Annex 1: Empty claim chart template). 
If a claim chart was provided: 
 The linkage shall be one of the candidate linkages from the claim chart. 
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How much time should an evaluator spend? 
 The evaluator shall decide on the amount of time spent per patent (i.e. will 
continue until the evaluator is sufficiently confident).  
2.4 Example evaluations 
To illustrate more clearly what kind of evaluation we are looking for in the experiment, 
we provide example evaluations based on a fictitious standard. First, the example 
standard is defined as follows: 
Standard TS99.888: “A UE shall include function A, function B and 
function C. Optionally, a mobile terminal may include function D. A 
base station shall include function A, function B and function E.  
Standard case of essentiality 
Below is an annotated claim chart for an example patent A. The colors indicate how the 
patent relates to the standard (note that ‘real’ cases in the experiment may or may not 
have claim charts, and the level of detail of the claim charts provided may differ between 
cases). 
 
Patent A Standard TS99.888 
Claim 1: A mobile telecommunications device 
comprising functions A, B and C  
A UE shall include function A, function B and function 
C. 
 
Essentiality assessment: the standard requires that a UE includes A, B and C, and thus 
it is not possible to make a UE conforming to the standard without necessarily infringing 
patent A. Hence, patent A is essential to the standard.  
Patent-side scoping 
Patent B Standard TS99.888 
Claim 1: A base station device comprising functions 
A, B and C  
A UE shall include function A, function B and function 
C. 
 
Essentiality assessment: the standard requires that a UE includes A, B and C. Yet, the 
scope of the patent only covers base stations that comprising functions A, B and C. 
Hence, the patent is not necessarily infringed by implementing (this part of) the 
standard. Hence, patent B is not essential to the standard. 
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3 Feedback form 
Note: do not fill in the form below. Evaluators will receive a link through which they can access their cases 
and will be provided with an online version of this form, that should be filled in. 
Score page 
The following documents are provided (these are examples): instruction 
leaflet, patent, standard document, empty claim chart template. 
1 Is this patent essential with respect to the standard provided?  
 Yes 
 No 
2 How confident are you in your evaluation of essentiality?  
 
very 
uncertain 
quite 
uncertain 
Undecided 
quite 
certain 
very 
certain 
I am: 
     
 
Please proceed to the explanation page. 
* mandatory question 
Explanation of the essentiality 
The questions in this block should only be answered if the question "Is this patent 
essential with respect to the standard provided? " has been answered with "Yes" . 
3 Specify the number of the claim that is essential. 
 
4 Specify at least one associated relevant section in the standard document. 
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5 Specify the device categories (if any) for which the patent would be 
essential for implementation of the mobile communication standard. 
 Terminals (e.g. UE) 
 Base station (e.g. BS / NodeB / eNB) 
 Core network element (e.g. RNC, CN, SGSN, GGSN, SAE-GW, EPC) 
 Other (e.g. SIM, eSIM) 
6 Would you consider this patent ONLY to cover an optional feature(s)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
7 How much time did you spend evaluating (including filling in this page)? 
Choose...
 
Choose... 
8 Have you seen this patent before and/or did you recognize a specific 
applicant? 
 Yes 
 No 
9 Did you encounter any issues evaluating this patent (i.e. did you have to 
assume anything, was information missing)? 
 
10 Please proceed to the feedback page. 
* mandatory question 
Feedback page 
Please report the feedback honestly, we are not comparing nor sharing individual 
performance data. 
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11 Is anything missing (in terms of data, knowledge, tools, training, et cetera) 
to perform a proper evaluation of essentiality? What additional resources 
would improve the ability to perform a proper evaluation?  
 
12 Do you have any recommendations to the researchers and/or the European 
Commission with respect to systematic essentiality testing? 
 
13 Did you spend more or less time than expected? 
 
Much 
less 
A little 
less 
Not more, not 
less 
A little 
more 
Much 
more 
I spent: 
     
14 Please elaborate on the time you spent. 
 
15 Do you feel you became more skilled in evaluating essentiality over the 
course of the different cases? 
 
Not at 
all 
Slightly Moderately Considerably 
A great 
deal 
My skills 
improved:      
16 How helpful did you find the provided claim chart? 
[This question is only visible if a claim chart was provided]  
 
Not at all 
helpful 
Slightly 
helpful 
Moderately 
helpful 
Very 
helpful 
Extremely 
helpful 
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The claim 
chart was:      
 
17 Do you feel qualified to perform essentiality testing in the way done it is 
requested in this experiment? Does the task align well with your regular 
activities, experience in the technical domain, experience in standard-
setting processes, et cetera? Which qualifications do you think are 
required? 
 
18 Do you have any further comments or suggestions with respect to this 
experiment, the project, your experience in it and/or essentiality testing 
in general? 
 
 
The answers provided will be shown in future cases, so they can be updated at 
any time. 
* mandatory question 
Delete documents page 
Please delete all documents now. 
You have finalized the evaluation procedure for this case. You are now obliged to delete 
all case related documents and notes. 
√ Yes, I deleted all documents and notes. 
Thank you. Please proceed to submit this case. 
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Annex 1: Empty claim chart template 
Claim number Standard 
document and 
version 
Relevant section(s) in the standard document 
Example: 
Claim 1 
 
TS99.888 V9.3.1 
 
§4.3.1, §4.3.2, Figure 2-1 
   
   
   
   
   
 
Colorized text mapping 
Claim text Standard document text 
Example: 
Claim 1 
Claim 1: A mobile telecommunications device 
comprising functions A, B and C 
 
TS99.888 V9.3.1 
A UE shall include function A, function B and function 
C. 
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2 Instructions for evaluators 
2.1 Objectives 
The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) in cooperation with DG GROW 
has requested our research consortium to perform a feasibility study on essentiality 
checking mechanisms for standard-essential patents (SEPs). The objective of the project 
is to assess the feasibility of essentiality testing mechanisms both from a technical as 
well as from an institutional point of view. To this end, the study will consist of an 
analysis of various existing essentiality testing mechanisms, among which those 
employed by patent pools, the Japanese patent office (Hantei advisory opinion) and in 
legal cases. From these insights, various possible mechanisms are defined, whose 
technical merits are tested in an experiment.  
In this experiment, a large number of evaluators (among which are engineers, 
attorneys, and patent examiners) are asked to perform essentiality tests on various 
example cases (based on real-world patents and essentiality information). This 
experiment allows th  resear hers to find out which mechanisms are suitable, and which 
are ot, and how they are influ nced by variou  parameters. 
This exercise is not a race. We will not be comparing evaluators or POs, nor 
sharing results identifiable to any evaluator or office. The exercise is about 
learning about the mechanisms, not about who is the best evaluator or PO, nor 
about the quality of certain SEPs portfolios. Please provide honest answers 
over the course of the experiment. 
2.2 Definitions 
For the purposes of this experiment, we define ‘novelty-based essentiality test’ as 
follows: 
Evaluation of whether the patent meets the novelty requirement in the 
(imaginary) hypothetical situation where the relevant standard 
document already would have been in the public domain before the 
filing date of the patent. 
Note that this exercise does not take into account the validity of a patent, nor the 
enforceability of a patent (e.g. whether the patent has expired, has been declared invalid 
by a court, et cetera).1 
A ‘linkage’ is defined as a specific combination of (1) a single patent claim, and (2) one 
or more paragraphs, figures and/or other elements in the standard document, related 
to that claim, positively determining essentiality of the patent with respect to the 
standard. A claim chart lists one or more linkage candidate(s). 
2.3 Evaluation procedure 
Who will perform the evaluation? 
 Evaluators are assigned cases by the researchers in a specific order. 
                                           
1 Nor are we considering whether a specific standards-based product infringes the patent. After 
all, such a specific product may only implement a part of the standard (e.g. only the part for 
mobile terminals) or might not implement all optional features.  
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Feedback form for participants 
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Essentiality testing experiment
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Feedback Finishing up
Proceed
Please download the documents for this case and begin evaluation
Download documents to consider for this case
After downloading, you may start your essentiality assessment.
Now is also a good time to copy the link to this form in case you want to return to this form later:
https://XXX
Once you have finished your evaluation, click 'proceed' to continue to the score page.
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Feedback Finishing up
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Proceed
Is this patent essential with respect to the standard provided? *
Yes
No
How confident are you in your evaluation of essentiality? *
very uncertain quite uncertain Undecided quite certain very certain
I am:
Please proceed to the explanation page.
* mandatory question
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Feedback Finishing up
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Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
Specify the number of the claim that is essential.*
Specify at least one associated relevant section in the standard document.*
Specify the device categories (if any) for which the patent would be essential for implementation of the mobile communication
standard.*
Terminals (e.g. UE)
Base station (e.g. BS / NodeB / eNB)
Core network element (e.g. RNC, CN, SGSN, GGSN, SAE-GW, EPC)
Other (e.g. SIM, eSIM)
Would you consider this patent ONLY to cover an optional feature(s)?*
Yes
No
Not sure
How much time did you spend evaluating (including filling in this page)?*
[please use rounded hours]
Have you seen this patent before and/or did you recognize a specific applicant?*
Yes
No
Did you encounter any issues evaluating this patent (i.e. did you have to assume anything, was information missing)?
Proceed
Please proceed to the feedback page.
* mandatory question
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
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Specify the number of the claim that is essential.*
Specify at least one associated relevant section in the standard document.*
Specify the device categories (if any) for which the patent would be essential for implementation of the mobile communication
standard.*
Terminals (e.g. UE)
Base station (e.g. BS / NodeB / eNB)
Core network element (e.g. RNC, CN, SGSN, GGSN, SAE-GW, EPC)
Other (e.g. SIM, eSIM)
Would you consider this patent ONLY to cover an optional feature(s)?*
Yes
No
Not sure
How much time did you spend evaluating (including filling in this page)?*
[please use rounded hours]
Have you seen this patent before and/or did you recognize a specific applicant?*
Yes
No
Did you encounter any issues evaluating this patent (i.e. did you have to assume anything, was information missing)?
Proceed
Please proceed to the feedback page.
* mandatory question
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Specify the number of the claim that is essential.*
Specify at least one associated relevant section in the standard document.*
Specify the device categories (if any) for which the patent would be essential for implementation of the mobile communication
standard.*
Terminals (e.g. UE)
Base station (e.g. BS / NodeB / eNB)
Core network element (e.g. RNC, CN, SGSN, GGSN, SAE-GW, EPC)
Other (e.g. SIM, eSIM)
Would you consider this patent ONLY to cover an optional feature(s)?*
Yes
No
ot sure
How much time did you spend evaluating (including filling in this page)?*
[please use rounded hours]
Have you seen this patent before and/or did you recognize a specific applicant?*
Y s
No
Did you encounter any issues evaluating this patent (i.e. did you have to assume anything, was information missing)?
Proceed
Please proceed to the feedback page.
* mandatory question
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
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Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
Please report the feedback honestly, we are not comparing nor sharing individual performance data. The answers provided will
be saved and shown after the next evaluation, to be updated if needed
Is anything missing (in terms of data, knowledge, tools, training, et cetera) to perform a proper evaluation of essentiality? What
additional resources would improve the ability to perform a proper evaluation?
Do you have any recommendations to the researchers and/or the European Commission with respect to systematic essentiality
testing?
Did you spend more or less time than expected?*
Much less A little less Not more, not less A little more Much more
I spent:
You can elaborate on the time you spent.
Do you feel qualified to perform essentiality testing in the way done it is requested in this experiment? Does the task align well
with your regular activities, experience in the technical domain, experience in standard-setting processes, et cetera? *
Do you have any further comments or suggestions with respect to this experiment, the project, your experience in it and/or
essentiality testing in general?
* mandatory question
Proceed
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
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Please report the feedback honestly, we are not comparing nor sharing individual performance data. The answers provided will
be s v d and shown after the next evaluation, to be updated if needed
Is anything missing (in terms of data, knowledge, tools, training, et cetera) to perform a proper evaluation of essentiality? What
additional resources would improve the ability to perform a proper evaluation?
Do you have any recommendations to the researchers and/or the European Commission with respect to systematic essentiality
testing?
Did you spend more or less time than expected?*
Much less A little less Not more, not less A little more Much more
I spent:
You can elaborate on the time you spent.
Do you feel qualified to perform essentiality testing in the way done it is requested in this experiment? Does the task align well
with your regular activities, experience in the technical domain, experience in standard-setting processes, et cetera? *
Do you have any further comments or suggestions with respect to this experiment, the project, your experience in it and/or
essentiality testing in general?
* mandatory question
Proceed
Introduction Essentiality evaluation Scoring Explanation Feedback Finishing up
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